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An innovative negotiation framework for resolving complex construction conflicts 
and disputes has been developed in this research. The unique feature of the 
proposed negotiation framework is that it takes into account the attitudes of the 
decision makers, which is an important human factor in construction negotiation 
at both the strategic and tactical levels of decision making. At the strategic level, 
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) technique has been 
systematically employed as a method of determining the most beneficial strategic 
agreement that is possible, given the competing interests and attitudes of the 
decision makers. At the tactical level, a previously agreed-upon strategic decision 
has been analyzed in depth using utility functions in order to determine the trade-
offs or concessions needed for the decision makers to reach a mutually 
acceptable resolution of the negotiation issues. A real-life case study of a 
brownfield construction negotiation has been used to illustrate how the proposed 
methodology can be applied and to demonstrate the importance and benefits of 
incorporating the attitudes of the decision makers into the negotiation process to 
better identify the most feasible resolutions.  
 
 
The proposed attitude-based negotiation framework constitutes a new systems 
engineering methodology that will assist managers in tackling real-world 
controversies, particularly in the construction industry. The negotiation framework 
 iv
has been implemented into a convenient negotiation decision support system 
that automates the proposed negotiation methodology. The research is expected 
to improve negotiation methodologies for construction disputes, thereby saving 
significant amounts of time and resources. The proposed methodology may also 
assist decision makers in overcoming the challenges of conventional negotiation 
processes because the incorporation of the attitudes of the decision makers 
results in a more accurate identification of tradeoffs, greater recognition of the 
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The construction industry is one of the largest industries in the world, with 
members who are expert in planning, design, construction, operation, and 
administration. Construction projects have become increasingly complex, with 
the parties involved often having conflicting objectives. For example, the owner 
would like a project to be inexpensive and quickly completed, while the contractor 
wants large and income-generating projects with few time restrictions. According 
to Litigation Trends Survey Findings (LTSF, 2006), construction firms worldwide 
spend close to 31 million US dollars annually on litigation: the second highest 































































Figure 1.1: Worldwide Litigation Fees for Various Industries (LTSF, 2006) 
 2
In the highly competitive multi-party environment of construction, disputes can 
arise for many reasons, such as the complexity and magnitude of the work, the 
lack of coordination among the contracting parties, poorly prepared and/or 
executed contract documents, inadequate planning, financial issues, and 
disagreements about methods of solving on-the-spot site-related problems. Any 
one of these factors can derail a project and lead to complicated litigation or 
arbitration, increased costs, and a breakdown in the communication and 
relationships between parties (Harmon, 2003). 
 
According to the Department of Justice Canada (1995), construction is the 
industry that has the highest number of disputes. Moreover, Kumaraswamy 
(1997) has found that about 75% of construction contracts have been the subject 
of some types of dispute which represents an enormous expenditure of time, 
effort, and human resources. In other words, the construction industry has 
become an adversarial culture prone to conflict and disputes (Brooker and 
Lavers, 1997; Fenn et al., 1997; Garrett, 2002; Kellogg, 2001; Kumaraswamy, 
1997; Mathews, 1997). The adversarial attitude prevalent in many disputes 
undermines the cooperative environment necessary for the success of a project 
and is at odds with the collaborative nature required in construction activities. A 
great deal of research has been devoted to finding ways to reduce the number 
and magnitude of these conflicts and more effective approaches are needed if 
sustainable solutions are to be found for the current types of conflicts (Barnett, 
1997). 
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The three major parties traditionally involved in a construction project are the 
owner, the consultant, and the contractor. Clearly, the successful delivery of a 
project requires their full cooperation and collaboration: time, costs, resources, 
and objectives must be coordinated. However, differences in the perceptions of 
the parties involved in a project make conflicts and disputes inevitable. 
Therefore, resolving disputes has become an essential component of 
construction administration and many studies have been conducted with respect 
to finding effective dispute resolution methods (Barnett, 1997; Cheung et al., 
2002; Diekmann and Girard, 1995; Doug, 2006; Rameezdeen and Gunarathna, 
2003; and Shen et al., 2007).  
 
The traditional method of resolving construction disputes is litigation, which is 
usually complicated because of unresolved conflicts or disputes connected with 
large, complex projects (Pinnell, 1999). The enormous amounts of time and 
money expended by all parties involved in litigation (Figure 1.1) have led to the 
emergence of other dispute resolution methods, called Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) tactics (Harmon, 2003). The main purpose of ADR tactics is to 
resolve disputes with the ‘‘least possible intervention by an outside third party’’ 
(Gillie et al., 1991). As illustrated in Figure 1.2, two groups of ADR tactics are 
used in construction: formal-binding and informal-nonbinding tactics (Di-Donato, 
1993). Formal-binding ADR is predominantly arbitration, while informal-
nonbinding ADR tactics include mini-trials, mediation, third-party neutrals, dispute 
resolution boards, and negotiation (Trantina, 2001).  
 4
As shown in Figure 1.2, negotiation is the least hostile approach and is also the 
fastest and least costly. The objective of sensible dispute management should be 
to negotiate a settlement as soon as possible. Negotiation can be, and usually is, 
the most efficient form of dispute resolution with respect to both managing time 
and costs and to preserving relationships. It should be envisioned as the 
preferred route in most disputes (Office of Government Commerce, 2002). Its 
advantages include speed, cost savings, confidentiality, preservation of 




Due to these potential benefits, negotiation has gained the attention of 
construction project managers. Cheung et al. (2002) mention that those who 




























Dispute resolution board 
Figure 1.2: ADR Methods in Construction (based on Trantina (2001))  
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preserving or enhancing existing job relationships. Their research also points out 
that negotiation is effective in reducing costs and opening channels of 
communication. In addition, according to an official document published by the 
Office of Government Commerce (OGC) (2002), negotiation is by far the most 
common form of dispute resolution, with a variety of related systems having been 
developed for employing it. Despite the importance of negotiation and the 
availability of formal negotiation techniques, they have not thus far been widely 
used in the construction industry.  
 
1.2. Research Motivation  
The goal of this research is to develop a systematic negotiation methodology, 
especially suited for complex construction disputes, which incorporates the 
negotiators’ attitudes not only at the strategic level of decision making but also at 
the tactical (detailed) level of decision making. The research has been motivated 
by the following considerations.   
 
A) Negotiation is important to the construction industry: Most construction 
projects involve cost overruns, time extensions, and conflicts among parties. The 
widespread extent of these problems is generally attributed to two main factors 
(Hegazy, 2002): the unique and highly uncertain nature of construction projects 
and the fragmented and highly competitive nature of the construction industry. In 
this challenging environment, any of the variables that affect a project, such as 
the weather, the interpretation of the contract, soil conditions, labor, or 
 6
equipment, can become a problem at any moment. Because each party then 
strives not to take the blame for the consequences of any difficulties that arise, 
disputes and conflicts are inevitable. Efficient conflict and dispute management 
techniques, such as negotiation, thus become key to the success of projects and 
of the parties involved in the project. It should be mentioned that construction 
negotiations take place among the parties who are often bounded by a contract. 
However, there are negotiations among construction parties who are not 
necessarily bounded by a contract.   
 
B) The construction industry lacks negotiation support: Negotiation is 
potentially one of the most effective methods of ADR in the construction industry. 
It provides a process whereby construction disputants can communicate to one 
another their conflicting interests and resolve differences so that further disputes 
arising from misperceptions of the current conflict can be prevented. The ability 
of construction managers to effectively negotiate significantly influences the 
performance of the project.  
 
In spite of the importance of negotiation, with respect to construction, it has been 
the subject of little research or education (Dudziak and Hendrickson, 1988). 
Engineering managers, for example, learn negotiating skills mainly through 
experience and observation (Smith, 1992). Moreover, negotiation in construction 
can be difficult since the individuals charged with negotiating the settlement are 
reluctant to make concessions because of the risk of having to explain them to 
 7
uninformed senior management. In other words, construction disputants lack 
organized negotiation support to help them handle complex construction conflicts 
and disputes. Developing negotiation support tools that can provide assistance 
for construction managers and administrators is therefore important. 
 
In response to the need for negotiation support tools, several studies have been 
conducted in the area of negotiation support systems (NSS) (Cheung et al., 
2004; Li, 1996; Molenaar et al., 2000; Omoto et al., 2002; Ren et al., 2003; and 
Yaoyueyong et al., 2005). Such systems, however, seem to suffer from the 
following restrictions: 
• They do not consider the psychological aspects of the decision makers in 
the negotiation and thus fail to address attitude, which is one of most 
influential psychological factors in negotiation (Kahneman and Tversky, 
2000).   
• They are restricted to informing decision makers about the progress of 
only the current negotiation and cannot provide details about past rounds 
of negotiation, or about the parties involved, or their preferences. 
• They do not consider the characteristics of disputes and disputants in the 
negotiation methodology. 
• They fail to implement suitable negotiation strategies that incorporate 
changes, since they do not take into account the effect of moves and 
countermoves by decision makers during interactive strategic decision 
making.  
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• They provide decision makers with only cardinal payoff values for 
conflicting issues and do not suggest to the involved parties any strategic 
equilibrium state. 
• They lack a systematic approach for complementing varying levels of 
negotiation, such as complementing strategic and tactical levels of 
decision making to develop a comprehensive negotiation methodology. 
 
Therefore, if current negotiation methodologies are to overcome the above 
limitations and constraints, they need improvement.  
 
C) The psychological aspects of negotiation need to be considered: 
Negotiation is considered a decision-making process in which decision makers 
take into account the social factors (e.g., economic, psychological, financial, and 
political) that affect their offers and counteroffers during negotiation. Depending 
on the circumstances surrounding the decision, some of these aspects are more 
important than others. Psychological factors, such as attitude, often have 
significant influence on the outcome of the negotiation. For example, when two 
parties who have negative attitudes toward each other negotiate, the outcome of 
the negotiation is unlikely to be productive. The attitudes of decision makers 
toward one another may also change during each round of negotiation. For 
example, two decision makers may initially have negative attitudes toward each 
other, but as negotiation continues and they share their concerns and limitations, 
they may develop more positive attitudes and eventually reach a productive 
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outcome. Therefore, using a negotiation methodology that considers the attitudes 
of the negotiators is more likely to provide a reliable outcome that can be a stable 
solution to the conflict.    
 
When parameters are set for conflict situations, the few negotiation models 
prepared for the construction industry (Cheung et al., 2004; Molenaar et al., 
2000; and Omoto et al., 2002) lack consideration of the psychological states of 
the decision makers. A key goal of this research is therefore to incorporate the 
attitudes of the decision makers into the modeling of the negotiation process so 
that more realistic and reliable equilibrium outcomes can be suggested. In other 
words, a comprehensive negotiation methodology should be capable of including 
the psychological aspects of negotiation, such as the negotiators’ behavior and 
attitudes, at both the strategic and the tactical levels of the decision making 
process. Such unified methodology can then suggest the most stable solution. 
  
D) Decision analysis tools should be integrated within the negotiation 
methodology: Recent research in negotiation has shown the advantage of 
employing decision-making tools to help produce better negotiation outcomes 
(Bellucci and Zeleznikow, 1998; Kersten, 2002; Matwin et al., 1989; and 
Thiessen and McMahon, 2000). Such integration provides the following 
advantages: 
• Effective communication among decision makers, 
• The capability of learning from experience, 
 10
• Explanations helpful to decision makers,  
• The modelling of the dynamic properties of the negotiation, and 
• The ability to draw reasonable conclusions and clear strategic guidance. 
 
Negotiation Decision Support Systems (NDSSs) have been used successfully in 
other domains, such as family counseling (Bellucci and Zeleznikow, 1998); E-
commerce and E-negotiations (Kersten, 2002); and manufacturing disputes 
(Sycara, 1993). In spite of the potential benefits and inherent capabilities of 
NDSSs, the construction industry has not been sufficiently introduced to these 
recent developments in negotiation methodologies and support systems. For 
example, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) methodology was 
developed by Fang et al. (1993); the concept of utility theory was explained by 
Fishrburn (1970); the concept of Efficiency Frontier was introduced by Raiffa et 
al. (2002); and the concepts of Even Swaps and Value-Focused Thinking were 
introduced by Hammond et al. (1999) and Keeney (1992), respectively. These 
concepts have not been widely employed for addressing construction disputes. 
Moreover, such theories and methodologies have potentially beneficial 
applications in resolving construction conflicts because they can model the risk 
attitudes and behaviors of decision makers, and can effectively account for 
negotiation-related uncertainties.  
 
E) Challenges in brownfield negotiations need to be overcome: As an area 
of construction in which negotiation can be applied, this research focuses on 
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brownfield negotiations: a growing problem in the Canadian construction industry 
and elsewhere (De Sousa, 2001 and Ellerbusch, 2006). A brownfield is 
contaminated land that lies unused and unproductive. Due to the enormous 
amount of uncertainty and the number of unexpected events involved in 
brownfield redevelopment, the parties involved (e.g., the current owner and the 
government) spend tremendous amounts of time in multiple rounds of negotiation 
in the hope of reaching an agreement about cleaning up the contaminated site 
(De Sousa, 2000). They must analyze past and current information in order to 
make effective offers and counteroffers that can lead to an agreement about the 
transfer of ownership and the decontamination and redevelopment of a 
brownfield property. The negotiating parties may, however, lack negotiation skills 
and be unable to handle the negotiation process efficiently, communicate their 
concerns and preferences, and make suitable decisions about the problem. 
Although the parties involved are willing to reach a mutual agreement 
cooperatively, the negotiation process in brownfield projects is complex and often 
unproductive, particularly when few practical solutions are suggested by any of 
the parties (Begley, 1997).  
 
A negotiation support system that provides more effective practical guidelines for 
the parties involved is therefore needed (Hipel et al., 2009). Such brownfield 
negotiation tools must take into consideration the risk attitudes and behavioral 
characteristics of the current owner, the government, the stakeholders involved, 
and possibly the future purchaser.  
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1.3. Research Objectives  
The primary objective of this research is to provide a better understanding of the 
negotiation processes among the decision makers involved in construction 
disputes. Accordingly, a systematic negotiation framework has been developed 
that considers decision makers’ attitudes in order to help the negotiating parties 
reach a stable mutual agreement. The proposed negotiation methodology 
provides the parties involved with both strategic decision options and tactical 
(detailed) payoff outcomes. The specific objectives are as follows:  
1. To understand how construction negotiators behave and negotiate in 
practice to reach mutual compromises with respect to conflicting issues; 
2. To identify, with respect to construction, the characteristics of  both 
negotiations (e.g., the parties involved, the type and number of conflicting 
issues, and the type of project) and negotiators (e.g., position, choices);  
3. To study the applications of game theory, negotiation analysis, the Graph 
Model analysis, utility theory to model a construction negotiation process;  
4. To develop an attitude-based negotiation methodology at both the 
strategic and tactical levels of negotiation for addressing and resolving  
construction disputes when multiple decision makers and multiple 
conflicting issues are involved;  
5. To demonstrate the application of the proposed negotiation methodology 
in real-life brownfield case studies; and 
6. To implement the proposed negotiation methodology into a construction 
negotiation decision support system. 
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1.4. Research Methodology  
To achieve the above objectives, relevant theories, techniques, and approaches 
in the literature have been reviewed and appropriately refined and expanded in 
order to arrive at a novel decision-making methodology for engineering purposes 
particularly suited to construction decision making (Yousefi et al., 2008). The 
proposed methodology will systematically incorporate the attitudes of the 
negotiators into the modeling of the negotiation at the level of strategic decision 
analysis as well as at the tactical level. The systematic research methodology is 
depicted in Figure 1.3. 
 
1.5. Summary 
The goal of this research is to develop an innovative negotiation methodology 
that takes into account the attitudes of decision makers at two levels of decision 
making: strategic and tactical. At the strategic level, the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution is systematically employed as a means of determining a potential 
overall agreement, or set of resolutions, that is possible given the competing 
interests of the decision makers involved in the negotiation process. At the 
tactical level, the new methodology allows a possible strategic solution to be 
studied in depth using utility functions to determine the detailed trade-offs or 
concessions needed for the parties to reach a mutually acceptable solution. 
 
This research may help participants facilitate or mediate the negotiation of 
disputes in construction projects. The proposed methodology may assist decision 
 14
makers in overcoming the challenges of conventional negotiation through the 
consideration of the attitudes of the decision makers so that the levels of decision 
making can be conveniently complemented, tradeoffs can be more accurately 
identified, the level of decision makers’ satisfaction can be recognized, and 
optimum solutions can be generated. 
 
 











1. Examine the relevant literature, 
2. Attend brownfield meetings and conduct 
brownfield interviews, 
3. Collect case study data and information, and 
4. Study the characteristics of construction 
negotiations when multiple parties are involved. 
GMCR 















(Chapters 6 & 7) 
1. Identify negotiating issues, decision makers, 
and their choices for each issue, 
2. Define and represent decision makers’ attitudes 
towards themselves and one another, 
3. Determine the ordinal (relative) preferences of 
each decision maker, and 
4. Carry out stability analyses using attitude-
based GMCR to obtain equilibrium outcomes 
and strategic decision options.   
1. Determine negotiable issue(s) from the agreed-
upon strategic resolution, 
2. Ascertain the utility function form for each 
decision maker and each issue,  
3. Determine the integrated utility function form 
for each issue, and  
4. Select the maximum utility value using the 
integrated utility function as the settlement 
point for the tactical solution.  
1. Implement  the proposed negotiation 
methodology, 
2. Identify and design the NDSS components, 
3. Verify the implementation and check the 
designed process, and 
4. Test the proposed NDSS on real-word 
construction negotiations. 
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This chapter has emphasized the need for using negotiation tactic in construction 
due to their lower cost and less hostile attributes compared with other ADR 
tactics, such as litigation and arbitration. The motivation for this research has 
been briefly explained. The objectives of the research have been listed and the 
proposed research methodology outlined. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive 
review of literatures related to conflicts, disputes, negotiation, and decision-
making, with respect to the construction industry, followed by Chapter 3, which 
briefly introduces the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). The 
development of the new negotiation methodology at the strategic level for both 
two and multiple decision makers is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
The negotiation methodology at the tactical level, again for both two and multiple 
decision makers, is presented in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. The 
implementation of the proposed methodology in the design of a construction 
negotiation decision support system is explained in Chapter 8, and Chapter 9 
contains concluding remarks, research contributions, and suggestions for future 











CHAPTER 2  




An overview of conflict and negotiation in construction projects is provided in this 
chapter along with concepts, techniques, and methodologies related to decision 
making that can be used to develop a negotiation methodology for complex 
construction disputes. The fundamentals of decision making, particularly strategic 
and tactical decision making, game theory, and negotiation analysis are 
introduced. The relationship between game theory and negotiation analysis is 
also explained and approaches used in modeling the negotiation process are 
reviewed. Finally, computer applications that support negotiation, particularly in 
the construction domain, are explained and the relevant literature is reviewed 
and summarized.  
 
2.2. Studying Disputes in the Construction Industry 
The construction of a project is an integrated process. Every construction project 
requires detailed planning and involves parties such as the owner, contractor, 
and subcontractors, who are contractually integrated but who have different 
responsibilities and knowledge. In such an environment, conflicts and disputes 
can arise for many reasons, including the complexity and magnitude of the work, 
lack of coordination among the contracting parties, poorly prepared and/or 
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executed contract documents, inadequate planning, financial issues, and 
disagreements about solving many of the on-the-spot site-related problems. Any 
one of these factors can derail a project and lead to complicated litigation or 
arbitration, increased costs, and a breakdown in the parties’ communication and 
relationship (Harmon, 2003). While changes in the work on construction projects 
are not unusual, the manner in which these alternatives are addressed; or not, 
can potentially affect the successful completion of a project by creating additional 
unresolved and unproductive conflicts. If the construction conflicts are not 
adequately addressed and managed, they can evolve into serious disputes 
among the parties involved and, therefore, not only could the working 
environment be damaged, but the cost and duration of projects may also be 
significantly increased (Hartman and Jergeas, 1995).  
 
The parties involved in the construction industry are usually bound contractually 
and thus, the contract is the essential document used in the submission and 
evaluation of claims. In the early stages of a project, the owner decides on a 
contract strategy which takes into account the following aspects, as shown in 
Figure 2.1 (Hegazy, 2002): 
• The project objectives and constraints, 
• A proper project delivery method, 
• A reasonable design/construction interaction scheme, 
• A proper contract form/type, and 
• Administration practices. 
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Different considerations of these factors produce different contractual forms, 












Figure 2.1: Key Considerations in a Contracting Strategy (Hegazy, 2002) 
 
2.2.1. Causes of Conflicts and Disputes in the Construction Industry 
Although each construction project is unique, the causes of conflicts are 
generally similar. They arise from the complexity and magnitude of the work, 
from multiple parties having different objectives, from unrealistic expectations, 
from poorly prepared and/or executed contract documents, from financial issues, 
and from communication problems. A list of the identified causes of disputes in 
construction is shown in Table 2.1; it represents a compilation from many studies 
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(Ock and Han, 2003; Loosemore, 1999; Harmon, 2003; Fenn et al., 1997; 
Cheung et al., 2002).  
 









1. Varied interpretations 
2. Unusual weather 
3. Delays 
4. Accelerations 
5. Contract pressures 
6. Contract factors 
7. Changes in project 










1. Deteriorated relationship 
2. Owner’s failure to act administratively 
3. Improper contractor site management 
4. Site availability problems 
5. Inadequate contractor organization 
6.  Change in regulations 
7.  Problems with neighbors 
8.  Economic conditions 
9. Lack of positive attitudes among the 
involved parties  
10. Lack of proper communication: 
       10.1. In one organization 
10.2. Between two involved   
organizations, and 
10.3. Between the involved and the 
external organizations. 
 
1. Improper planning  
2. Technical mistakes 
3. Technical negligence 
4. Quality of materials 
5. Consultant technical problems 
6.  Defective specifications: 
6.1. Improper workmanship 
6.2. Improper design 







It should be noted that this list is not comprehensive and other causes of 
disputes in construction projects may exist. The parties involved in construction 
projects can significantly influence the number and extent of the causes listed in 
Table 2.1. When a dispute arises on a project, the disputants behave according 
to different perceptions, needs, objectives, constraints, aspirations, interests, 
preferences, and/or levels of reservation (Semple et al., 1994; Harmon, 2003). 
One of the reasons for these differences is the disputants’ varying type of 
expertise in a construction project. For example, architects have an educational 
background in aesthetics, whereas engineers have knowledge of the analysis 
and design of structures and the owner often concentrates on project control and 
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administration. Conflicts and disputes arise when they have to communicate with 
one another about the project because their background and training are very 
different and lead to different perspectives on the project (Fenn et al., 1997). 
None of the parties usually has an in-depth overall view, which may hamper the 
finding of a common meeting ground. 
 
Although conflicts are an inherent part of every construction project, it is very 
important that conflict among parties be reduced. Therefore, any viable means of 
reducing the incidence of conflicts and disputes (e.g., developing positive 
attitudes among the parties involved) should have a positive effect on the 
outcome of the project (Jergeas, 2008). The construction participants are 
themselves aware that unresolved conflicts and their resulting legal and 
consulting fees add no value to construction projects.   
 
2.2.2. Alternative Dispute Resolution  
Traditionally, unresolved conflicts and disputes involving large scales, complex 
construction projects can be resulted in complex construction litigation (Pinnell, 
1999). Litigation is a dispute when it has become the subject of a formal court 
action or law suit. Anyone who has ever been involved litigation knows that it is 
expensive, time consuming, emotionally draining and unpredictable. With 
litigation, until a judge or jury decides who is right and who is wrong, the outcome 
is not certain. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) tactics, such as mediation, 
has been gaining popularity as a method to remedy the shortcomings of litigation.  
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Lengthy and expensive litigation processes have made construction participants 
less eager to have their day in court, opting instead to resolve their disputes 
among themselves, as has been done for a long time (Glasner, 2000). In 
response to the increased cost and duration of litigation, the construction industry 
has gravitated toward ADR tactics (Mix, 1997; Treacy, 1995). Historically, the 
construction industry has been seeking innovative and creative ways to resolve 
conflicts and disputes arising from construction contracts (Henderson, 1996; Mix, 
1997). Not only are the costs of court claims avoided, but there are also 
intangible benefits to avoiding court cases such as maintaining reputation and 
avoiding emotional stresses (Cheung et al., 2002). For example, arbitration and 
mediation are similar in that they are alternatives to litigation, or are sometimes 
used in conjunction with litigation to attempt to avoid litigating a dispute to its 
conclusion. Both arbitration and mediation employ a neutral third party. Both can 
be binding; however, it is customary to employ mediation as a non-binding 
procedure and arbitration as a binding procedure. The characteristics of ADR 
tactics are summarized in Table 2.2. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, ADR techniques can include both binding (formal) and 
nonbinding (informal) procedures (Kellogg, 2001; Honeyman et al., 2004). 
Binding ADR is predominantly arbitration, and the binding method sometimes 
used in construction (Di-Donato, 1993). Nonbinding ADR techniques normally 
include mini-trials, mediation, third-party neutrals, Dispute Review Boards 
(DRBs), and negotiation.  
 22
Table 2.2: The Characteristics of ADR Techniques (Harmon, 2003) 
* Early Neutral Evaluation, **Dispute Review Board 
 
    
Tactics 
Application Advantages Drawbacks 
Litigation 
 
Traditional approach for large 
complex projects. Last 
preferred tactic.  
 
Appropriate for large complex 
disputes, formal win-lose method 
with assigning damage 
compensations via a court appeal. 
 
Expensive, time consuming, fraught 





Alternative to litigation with 
more preference, incorporated 





Very common usage, acceptance of 
evidences, maintains the 
confidentiality of the proceedings, 
more cost-efficient than litigation, 
preserved business relationship 
between parties. 
More time preparation, no quick 
and easy answers to resolving the 
problem, procedural complexities, 
adversarial approach, lack of 




A nonbinding, consensual 
process, a form of distributive 
justice, a form of assisted or 
guided negotiation, better to use 
before arbitration. 
   
 
Faster, less expensive, more 
confidential, and more satisfactory 
way than litigation, minimizing 
future disputes by maintaining open 
communication between the parties, 
creates a win-win outcome that 
satisfies both parties, very flexible.  
 
Procedural complexities, leading to 
a compromise settlement, 
sometimes resulting in subjective 




A hybrid of mediation and 
arbitration, binding mediation, 
considered as a new and 
enhances tactic.  
 
 
Encourages the parties 
to settle rather than lose control of 
the outcome if arbitration 
becomes necessary, includes the 
capabilities of mediation and 
arbitration. 
Creates some dilemmas for either 
pursue or hold back from mediation 






A nonbinding hybrid ADR 
process, it is not a trial, and is 
held after other alternative 
dispute mechanisms have 
failed, but before an actual trial. 
Predicts the results of an actual trial, 
thereby enabling the parties to come 
to a decision to resolve their dispute 
before applying for a full scale trial. 
Presentations at a mini-trial are 
time limited, each party must have 
a relatively good understanding of 
its issues and the opposing parties’ 






Used early in the litigation 
process, a court-ordered 
process, an informal, 
nonbinding procedure. 
Resolves disputes sooner rather than 
later, thereby circumventing the 
need for trial preparation, an 
alternative to expensive discovery 
and resolving complex technical 
issues.  
 
Evaluation can be based on 
predicting the outcome of a trial or 
arbitration, the procedure is not 




Seeks to change attitudes about 
the relationships between 
parties, establishing trust and 
open communication, considers 
as a preventive dispute 
resolution. 
 
Reduces exposure to litigation, cost 
overruns, and delays, promotes 
mutual rather than bifurcated goals, 
restores the spirit of cooperation.  
 
Not a suitable tactic if the root 
causes of disputes are not 
addressed, needs a top-down 
approach, needs a huge amount of 
communication among parties. 
DRB** 
A unique, proactive, non-
adversarial project management 
technique, a panel chosen prior 
to the start of construction.  
 
Facilitates resolving conflicts before 
escalating to disputes, has 
familiarity with the ongoing 
construction and any important 
developments on the project. 
 
Its focus is on circumventing  
disputes rather than merely 
resolving them, only tries to 
highlight and identify the root 
causes of disputes. 
 
Negotiation 
Applied for both non-binding 
and binding ADR as well as a 
preventive tactic.  
Fast growing tactic that is very easy 
to settle between parties. In any 
stage of a contract, either before or 
after, is used officially and/or 
unofficially.  
 
No positive outcome can be 
anticipated despite long discussion 
with the opponents, depends mainly 
on the opponent’s attitude which is 
unpredictable. 
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Because of its low cost and low degree of hostility (Figure 1.2), negotiation is the 
tactic most preferred by construction participants. In construction conflicts and 
disputes, negotiation occurs every time the parties communicate directly with one 
another about disputed issues. Some negotiators seek agreement that offers the 
opportunity to avoid the "disruptive consequences of non-settlement" (Colosi, 
1999). The honest negotiation of changes and claims helps mitigate disputes 
before they damage the relationship and become major problems (Zack, 1995). 
In negotiations, team members often have conflicting goals and values, but when 
properly performed with cooperative mindsets of decision makers towards one 
another, negotiation achieves their objectives while maintaining harmony, and 
reducing time, cost, and hostility. 
 
Richter (2000) illustrates a continuum of ADR procedures, as shown in Figure 
2.2, which clarifies that negotiation not only involves the least cost and degree of 
hostility but also provides the parties involved with the most control over the 
outcome of the disputes. In other words, negotiation is the best tactic for 
participants who would like to make their own choices in a conflict situation. In 
construction, negotiation is sometimes considered a relief from the normal 
administration of the contract, for it offers both parties involved the opportunity to 
break from the daily administrative pressures of the contract and thus provides a 
better environment in which the conflicting issues are discussed in order to reach 
mutual agreement (Hartman and Jergeas, 1995). 
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Figure 2.2: Dispute Resolution Continuum (Richter, 2000) 
 
In a negotiation process, effective negotiation skills are a tremendous asset to 
any successful executive. They are especially significant for construction 
executives who are continually involved in managing and administering complex 
contractual relationships involving substantial amounts of money (Jergeas, 
2008). However, many individuals often fail in negotiation not because they are 
unable to reach an agreement, but because they walk away from the table before 
they achieve the results they are capable of obtaining. Moreover, in spite of the 
importance of negotiation, proper training in negotiation skills is not provided 
within the construction industry. Negotiations are an important activity, but they 
are the subject of little research or education (Dudziak and Hendrickson, 1988). 
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Project managers seem to learn negotiating skills only through experience and 
observation (Smith, 1992). Therefore, negotiation support tools for the 
construction industry may be useful in enabling the participants in a project to 
handle negotiation more productively. 
 
2.2.3. Brownfield Negotiation 
Brownfield projects are reconstruction projects in which the land has already 
been contaminated and the site may contain hazardous materials that pose a risk 
to human health and the environment. In Canada, it is estimated that as much as 
25% of the land area in major urban centers is potentially contaminated because 
of previous industrial activities (Benazon, 1995). Interest on the part of 
developers and lending institutions in redeveloping contaminated sites has 
tended to be minimal because such projects may involve high cleanup costs that 
limit the profit margin. Moreover, developers fear being held liable for any 
negative environmental effects that could be traced to the redeveloped site. On 
the other hand, these sites are potentially valuable because they are often 
located in the core sections of metropolitan areas and thus are prime candidates 
for urban redevelopment and renewal (Bourne, 1995; Barnett, 1995). Therefore, 
Canadians municipalities and local governments have established 
comprehensive programs and incentives in order to facilitate brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment with the hope of achieving the objectives and 
benefits listed in Table 2.3. It should be mentioned that the listed objectives can 
be further completed.   
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Table 2.3: The Objectives of Brownfield Reconstruction (De Sousa, 2000) 
Environmental Social Economic 
 Reduction of development 
pressure on greenfield sites, 
 Protection of public health and 
safety,  
 Protection of groundwater 
resources, 
 Protection and recycling of soil 
resources, 
 Restoration of former 
landscapes, and 
 Establishment of new areas 
deemed to have ecological 
values. 
 
 Renewal of urban cores, 
 Elimination of the negative 
social stigmas of the 
affected communities by 
revitalizing them, and 




values in these 
communities. 
 
 Attraction of domestic and 
foreign investment,  
 Restoration of tax base of 
government especially at 
the local level, 
 Increased utilization of and 
reinvestment in existing 
municipal services, and 




To achieve these objectives, it is essential that government representatives (e.g., 
municipalities) promote cooperation between the current owner(s) of 
contaminated sites and potential investor(s) so that the parties may share the 
cost as well as the benefits of redeveloping brownfield sites. However, because 
of the challenges associated with brownfield reconstruction (e.g., uncertainty 
about liability with respect to the chain of title, lender hesitation, the time to 
occupancy, community support, the proposed land use, the condition of the local 
infrastructure, the support of local politicians, and the availability of financial 
incentives), many unexpected events may occur during the remediation process. 
Such unexpected events may bring the remediation to a temporary halt, resulting 
in delays, cost overruns, and serious conflicts and complex disputes among the 
parties involved (Barnett, 1995). In brownfield conflicts, as in many other 
controversies, a variety of dispute resolution procedures are available, of which, 
as shown in Figure 2.2, negotiation is the most preferred because the local 
government, the current owner, and the future purchaser can negotiate a solution 
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in a less costly and less hostile environment. Cooperative negotiation among the 
parties involved will contribute to a mutual and sustainable agreement among the 
parties, and such agreements may help achieve the objectives of brownfield 
reconstruction.   
 
Productive negotiation of the complex conflicting issues in a brownfield project 
requires that each party has feasible options for each conflicting issue (e.g., cost 
of remediation, extent of liability) and reasonable attitudes towards the other 
parties. The parties sitting on the negotiation table must interact with one another 
in order to find a proper direction in the negotiation process, so they should 
therefore consider the strategic as well as the tactical levels of decision making. 
The difficulty is that the negotiation of brownfield issues is complicated and the 
parties involved, such as the current owner, are most likely not familiar with 
negotiation skills and methodologies. Thus, it is essential to develop appropriate 
formal negotiation methodologies for the parties involved in brownfield projects 
(Yousefi et al., 2009 and Yousefi et al., 2007).  
 
Due to the complexity of brownfield disputes, the proposed brownfield negotiation 
methodologies should assist the decision makers in providing resolutions at both 
the strategic and tactical levels of decision making. The strategic level assists the 
parties to find the proper direction for further negotiations and the tactical level 
provides the parties with specific compromises for each negotiation issue needed 
to reach an agreed-upon settlement with respect to each negotiation issue.    
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2.3. Negotiation Support Systems in the Construction Industry 
Several cases in the literature discuss the application of Information Technology 
and Systems (ITSs) in the construction industry: see, for instance, Aouad and 
Price (1994), Aouad et al. (1996), Ngee et al. (1997); O’Brien and Al-Soufi 
(1994), and Shash and Al-Amir (1997). They have found that ITSs enable 
construction activities to be programmed and executed in a speedy and cost-
effective manner. Many applications that have been impossible in the past are 
now feasible, such as a project information management system that can handle 
tasks like construction programming and information storage and retrieval.  
 
Spreadsheets were among the earliest information management systems that 
had a profound effect on the widespread use of support systems among 
construction participants. They have strong features such as their intuitive cell-
based structure and their simple interface that is easy to use even for a first-time 
user. Underneath the structure and the interface are a host of powerful and 
versatile features, from data entry and manipulation to a large number of 
functions, charts, and word processing capabilities (Hegazy, 2002). In order to 
increase productivity and versatility, programmability options, a number of add-in 
programs, and features that allow Internet connectivity and workgroup sharing, 
have been also added to newer spreadsheet versions. Because of their wide 
uses particularly among construction professionals and participants, 
spreadsheets have proven suitable as a decision support system for developing 
computer models that require ease of use, versatility, and productivity, such as 
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those for decision support methodologies. For example, a decision support 
system for construction conflict resolution is developed by Kassab et al. (2006) 
that uses Ms Excel spreadsheet as the system platform. It should be mentioned 
that Ms Excel spreadsheets have been applied successfully in many 
infrastructure applications such as planning and cost estimation for highway 
projects (Hegazy and Ayed, 1998), Critical Path Method and time-cost trade-off 
analysis (Hegazy and Ayed 1999), construction delay analysis (Mbabazi et al., 
2005), infrastructure asset management (Hegazy et al., 2004), and cost 
estimation for reconstruction of educational buildings (Yousefi et al., 2008). 
 
Negotiation support systems have recently gained attention in the construction 
industry. In particular, construction participants have been motivated to benefit 
from the continual growth in the development of the internet and computer 
technologies, which has led to increased numbers of electronic negotiation 
systems. Electronic negotiations are described as processes that involve 
computer and communication technologies in one or more negotiation activities 
(Bichler et al., 2003).  These technologies include the use of e-mail, internet, 
world wide web, multimedia, traditional databases, decision support systems, 
and knowledge-based systems. Table 2.4 summarizes the applications of 
negotiation systems in the construction industry and some of these efforts are 
briefly explained below. It should be mentioned that the research efforts 
summarized in Table 2.4 are based on the available reviewed literature and other 
related studies can be added to the list.  
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Table 2.4: Reviewed Literature of Negotiation Systems in the Construction Industry 
  
Authors Objective Method Factors Comments 










Players’ utility functions, 
net profit values, time 
value, bargaining costs 
and payoffs. 
Feasible applications of game theory 
in construction in which game 
theory was used to obtain shorter 
range of concession time period 
acceptable by both parties.  
Molenaar  













management ability,  
project complexity, risk, 
allocation, and project 
scope definition. 
 
No basic theoretical concepts; only a 
case study to identify the dispute 
factors; thus, not a solid work for 
future research, but good effort to 
develop a framework for dispute 
negotiations. 
Cheung  
et al. (2004) 
(CoNegO) 











Satisfaction graph and 
rating, the weight of each 
issue. 
Considerable effort to structure 
negotiation process, but lacks some 
basic analytical issues for parties 
such as defining payoff and utility 
functions for each issue and party.   
Ren  









utility functions.  
Rational outcomes, and 
Risk acceptance to the 
contractor agent (Pc-max) 
and engineer agent (Pe-
max). 
 
Many problems still need to be 
addressed (the level of 
empowerment of the MASCOT, the 
encoding of claim participants’ 
knowledge, and the qualitative 
claims negotiation), no potential 
useful research for construction. 











and/or rejection, and 
contractor’s acceptance 
and/or rejection. 
There are some possible future 
developments; the basic concept can 













contract amount, original 





Transactional costs of dispute 
resolution efforts are outlined which 
is a new aspect investigated in the 
dispute discussion; the concepts can 
be considered in developing 
construction negotiation systems.   
Yaoyueyong 
et al. (2005) 







Online user database, real-
time multiplayer system, 
online votes, scoring 
system. 
Applying negotiation concepts to be 
added to the negotiation games; no 











Negotiation issues and 
goals of both parties, case 
negotiation adoption. 
The model cannot 'recognize' the 
'thrown-away' issues and goals at the 
start of a negotiation; further 
research effort is needed to 
investigate the feasibility of 
implementing this ability; potential 
future development to use hybrid AI 
techniques.  
Ngee et al. 
(1997) 
Develop a  
mechanism for 






Financial and contractual 
factors such as tariff, 
concession period, and 
rate of return. 
A practical and well-developed 
negotiation mechanism that can be 
further developed and adapted for 


















cost, schedule, risk, 
environment, contract, 
time, and budget. 
Very well-developed research in 
developing a framework for dispute 
knowledge management by 
converting precedence disputes into 
a source of knowledge for current 
dispute identification; further 
research to refine dispute knowledge 
management can be pursued.    
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1) Shen et al. (2007) successfully applied bargaining-game theory to obtain 
detailed concession periods for construction contracts. Game theory principles 
were used particularly to determine specific time spans between moves. In other 
words, game theory was employed as a complementary technique for the 
methodologies that help decision makers with strategic decisions (i.e., to 
determine a broader range for the concession period). The paper, however, did 
not consider all the factors (e.g., political, risk attitude, reputation, and 
contractor’s economic condition) that may influence the outcome of bargaining. 
Nevertheless, with improvements, the technique used in this research has 
potential benefits for use in the negotiation of construction disputes.  
 
2) Molenaar et al. (2000) developed a systematic framework for quantifying 
dispute factors. The purpose of the research was to explain how and why 
contract-related construction problems occur: logistic regression was used to 
model the likelihood of construction disputes arising. This study provides a 
methodology for quantifying contract disputes. In game theory, these issues are 
considered in terms of cardinal and quantified values. 
 
3) Cheung et al. (2004) developed a construction negotiation support system, 
namely CoNegO, which assists parties by providing a suggested solution for a 
construction dispute. In CoNegO, the communication component is the Internet, 
and the data accessibility component manages the sharing of information. The 
negotiators first study the construction dispute case and then formulate the 
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bargaining ranges for each issue using two cardinal values: the pessimistic value 
represents the baseline of the negotiator with respect to a particular issue (no 
further concession will be offered beyond this value) and the optimistic value 
represents the value that produces the highest satisfaction for the negotiator. 
Negotiators must also determine other parameters for each issue, such as 
relative importance and satisfaction rating. Although the research provides a 
valuable approach to a negotiation methodology, it is based on the subjective 
evaluation of the negotiators. For example, a negotiator may exaggerate his or 
her position to provide a better negotiation position, or either or both parties may 
inflate their opening demands, misrepresent their positions or interests, withhold 
sensitive or potentially damaging information, or use threatening behavior. These 
issues need to be addressed. 
 
4) Ren et al. (2003) developed a system specifically for construction claims 
called MASCOT that utilizes utility theory. Each party is assigned a linear utility 
function which can be determined by two points: the optimum point and the 
reservation point. Each party can then estimate the opponent’s utility function 
based on these two critical points. The proposed methodology was developed 
based on many constraints and idealized assumptions, including quantitative 
negotiation, rationality, and fixed utility function. These assumptions decrease the 
accuracy of the outcomes produced by this system. The research also provides 
some future work to improve the system. 
 
 33
5) Yaoyueyong et al. (2005) developed an online multiplayer construction 
negotiation game called Virtual Construction Negotiation Game (VCON), as an 
innovative tool for negotiation training in the construction industry. In their 
research, the procedure for developing an Internet-based negotiation system is 
clearly explained, and the ideas can be used in the development of future 
computer support systems. Development of the VCON game can be classified 
into four major phases: the identification of game requirements, system design, 
software development, and system testing. The drawback of this system, as with 
many other developed systems, is that the behavioral aspects of decision making 
(negotiating), particularly the changes in the attitudes of the negotiators during 
the negotiation, are not taken into account.        
 
6) Li (1999) designed MEDIATOR a computer system for construction 
negotiation, which employs a Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) technique to 
provide intelligent support for construction negotiations. CBR uses previous 
cases as a basis for addressing new problems. In contrast to conventional expert 
systems (ESs) that use compiled knowledge in problem solving, the system 
selects similar cases to help solve a given negotiation problem. The selected 
cases are then modified and adapted to generate proposals that should move 
negotiators towards a settlement. The system uses three techniques to modify 
and transform selected cases in an attempt to generate new proposals: modify 
the reservation values, introduce new issues and goals, and select additional 
cases. Although the research tried to use Artificial Intelligence techniques (e.g., 
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CBR) in developing a negotiation methodology, there are significant difficulties in 
using CBR, for example, in collecting previous negotiation cases. Direct 
collection is difficult because negotiation history is seldom recorded and 
documented. Hence, it is very difficult to reconstruct and understand how the 
results of the negotiation were arrived at. Another difficulty in using CBR lies in 
capturing the original context of a negotiation. In other words, in special 
economic and political conditions, negotiators may make concessions at any cost 
in order to win with respect to specific issues. When a negotiation case for a 
problem is reused in a different economic climate, it is necessary to know the 
initial context so that it can be adapted consistently. Therefore, one should be 
cautious in using CBR or other AI techniques that use historical data as input to 
the model. 
 
The above studies provide important insights into the application of negotiation 
support systems in the construction industry. A variety of decision-making 
techniques have been used, and many studies have been carried out in order to 
make sure that the decision-making models are as accurate as possible. 
However, the study of available negotiation systems reveals that other aspects of 
decision making need to be considered. For example, the behavioral 
characteristics of the involved parties are not formally considered in the dispute 
negotiation process when many of the negotiation support tools are developed. 
The attributes of each party play a significant role in modeling a negotiation 
process since the attitude of decision makers is the most influential psychological 
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aspect that can change the outcome of negotiation. For example, it is vital to 
consider each party’s attitudes toward risk in order to assign a utility function to 
the player. Decision-making systems can also be enhanced by integrating the 
strategic level of decision making with the detailed (tactical) level of negotiation. 
As Fisher et al. (1991) emphasize, any negotiation takes place at two levels. The 
first level involves “negotiation of the substantive issues” (e.g., contract price). 
The next level of negotiation refers to “the procedure for dealing with the 
substantive issues”. This “upper” level dictates how each side plays the game of 
negotiation. For instance, one can negotiate by hard positional bargaining, by a 
cooperative approach, or by another method (Fisher et al., 1991).  
 
The objective for the research in this thesis is the development of a systematic, 
reliable, and sustainable negotiation methodology that is suitable for application 
to complex construction disputes and that incorporates the behavioral aspects of 
construction professionals and participants not only at the strategic level of 
decision making but also at the tactical level. Because negotiation is an important 
aspect of decision making, it is, therefore, essential to review decision-making 
concepts, techniques, approaches, and methodologies in some depth as shown 
in the remainders of this chapter.  
 
2.4. Decision Making 
Decision making is the process of choosing a preferred option or course of action 
from among a set of alternatives (Raiffa et al., 2002). Decision making permeates 
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all aspects of life: people must decide what to buy, whom to vote for, what job to 
take, and so on. Decisions often involve uncertainty about the external world 
(e.g., What will the weather be like?), as well as conflict regarding one’s own 
preferences (e.g., Should I opt for a higher salary or for more leisure?). The 
decision-making process often begins at the information-gathering stage and 
proceeds through likelihood estimation and deliberation, until the final act of 
choosing (Bell et al., 1988).  
 
Engineering decision making can also be grouped into two extreme levels: the 
strategic level and the tactical level, as shown in Figure 2.3. The flowchart on the 
left side of Figure 2.3 contains the main factors that must be considered in the 
selection of a suitable model for an engineering problem. In addition to proper 
engineering modeling, any alternative solution must be assessed with respect to 
environmental, economical and financial, and political and social feasibility (Hipel 
and Fang, 2005). Appropriate techniques from systems engineering and 
operational research can assist with these evaluations throughout the decision-
making process. The top cell on the left in Figure 2.3 indicates that output from 
all of the analyses provides information to assist decision makers in making an 
eventual overall decision (Hipel et al., 2007).  
 
The right-hand portion of Figure 2.3 depicts the characteristics that are embodied 
in the hierarchical framework of the engineering decision-making process. It 
should be noted that as one moves from the tactical level of decision making to 
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the strategic level, the problem changes from being highly structured and 
quantitative to being unstructured and qualitative. Hence, the overall problem 
contains both hard and soft system components. 
 
Because of these and other factors, an appropriate set of systems tools must be 
selected in order to investigate all relevant aspects of the system, or system of 
systems, being studied. When modeling strategic interactions among decision 
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makers, and information tends to be unstructured and more qualitative, one can 
employ the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang et al., 1993).  
 
Another perspective in engineering decision making is the number of decision 
makers involved in the process of decision making. Raiffa et al. (2002) 
categorized decision making into plural and individual decision making. Individual 
decision making includes descriptive, normative, and prescriptive approaches 
whereas plural decision making consists of “separate and interactive” decision 
making, known as game theory, and joint decision making which is known as 
negotiation theory. The categories of decision making are shown in Figure 2.4. It 
should be noted that in plural decision making, as in individual decision making, 
























Figure 2.4: Perspectives on Decision Making (Raiffa et al., 2002) 
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As shown in Figure 2.4, the individual approach to decision making focuses on 
only one decision maker who is faced with two or more choices whereas in group 
decision making, two or more decision makers interact to some degree to make 
their decisions. In both methods, the decision maker strives to make the best 
decision by using decision analysis tools, techniques, and methods. There are 
three approaches to a decision making context: descriptive, normative, and 
prescriptive (Raiffa et al., 2002). Each approach is briefly explained as follows. 
1. Descriptive decision making: The focus of this approach is how 
decisions are made. The descriptive approach to decision making is 
based on empirical observation and on experimental studies of choice 
behavior. It is concerned primarily with the psychological factors that guide 
behavior in decision-making situations. Experimental evidence indicates 
that people’s choices are often at odds with the normative assumptions of 
the rational theory (Von Winterfeld and Edwards, 1986). The psychological 
aspects of decision making are discussed in details in Subsection 2.4.1.  
2. Normative decision making: This approach concerns how decisions 
should be made, and suggests how idealized and rational people should 
make decisions. Such analyses do not consider the known cognitive 
concerns of real people, such as their shifting values, their inability to 
perform intricate calculations, and their limited attention span. The 
distinctive characteristics of such normative analyses are coherence and 
rationality, which are usually captured in terms of precisely specified 
axioms (Raiffa et al., 2002).  
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3. Prescriptive decision making: This approach focuses on how decisions 
could be made better. The question the prescriptive analyses ask is what 
a real person can actually do to make better decisions. In seeking to craft 
useful theory, prescriptive analyses do not take into consideration 
conceptual ideas and techniques that are useful for idealized, mythical, 
and super-rational people. Instead, prescriptive proposals must be useful 
for real people. Because real people are different, good advice has to be 
tuned to the different needs, capabilities, and emotional makeup of the 
individuals for whom the prescriptive advice is intended (Bell et al., 1988). 
Prescriptive advice should be evaluated based on its pragmatic value and 
its ability to help people make better decision. Advice should also promote 
an understanding of the problems, confidence in the decisions, justification 
for the decisions, and satisfaction with the consequences. Prescriptive 
analysis should be informed by descriptive and normative theories (Raiffa 
et al., 2002).      
 
2.4.1. The Psychological Aspects of Decision Making 
Psychological factors such as human perception, emotion, attention, attitude, and 
effort are certain to influence decision making. Despite economists’ assumptions 
about the perfect rationality of people when they make decisions, the fact is that 
people often have faulty intuition about their own motives and behaviors, and 
they often act to bring about outcomes that they themselves judge to be bad 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Psychologically, people experience conflict and 
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behave differently when they face decision making. They often approach 
decisions as they would problem-solving tasks, trying to gauge the various 
attributes and come up with compelling arguments for choosing one option over 
another. At times, a comparison of the alternatives yields compelling reasons to 
choose one option. At other times, the conflict between the available alternatives 
is hard to resolve, which can lead the decision maker to seek additional options 
or to maintain the status quo. This behavior has implications that are not readily 
apparent: people sometimes need to decide whether to opt for an available 
option or to search for additional alternatives (Camerer, 1995). Psychological 
studies of decisional conflict (e.g., Kagel and Roth, 1995; Morley, 1981; Yousefi, 
et al., 2008; Rabin, 1998) suggest that people are more likely to opt for an 
available option when they have a compelling reason that makes the decision 
easy, and that they are tempted to delay the decision and search further when a 
compelling reason is not readily available and the decision is hard to make. 
Conflict, on the other hand, plays no role in the classical analysis, according to 
which a person is expected to search for additional alternatives if the expected 
value of searching exceeds that of the best option currently available. Important 
psychological aspects of decision making are summarized in Table 2.5   
 
2.4.2. Attitudes and Utility Theory in Decision Making 
Attitude is defined by Krech et al. (1962) as “an enduring system of positive or 
negative evaluations, emotional feelings and pro and con action tendencies, with 
respect to a social object”. In other words, the attitude is a preparation in 
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advance of the actual response, and therefore, constitutes an important 
determination of the ensuing behavior. The attitudes of people significantly 
influence the outcome of a decision-making process particularly with respect to 
attitude toward risk. Risk is an uncertainty that matters in which different things 
matter to different people to a different extent in different circumstances. Risk 
attitude is the chosen response of an individual or group to uncertainty that 
matters, influenced by perception. Understanding risk attitude is a critical 
success factor that promotes effective decision-making in risky situations.  
 




The psychological carriers of value are gains and losses, rather than final wealth 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986); diminishing sensitivity 
yields risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses, but this can reverse in the case 
of very low probabilities, which generally have a non-linear impact on decision 




People are loss averse. i.e., the loss of utility associated with giving up a good is greater 




People divide wealth and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, 
rent, and into separate mental accounts, such as current income, assets, and future 
income (Thaler, 1988); also, people find themselves willing to save and borrow (at a 
higher interest rate) at the same time (Ausubel, 1991). 
 
Emotion 
Negative mood increases the perceived frequency of undesirable events (Johnson and 
Tversky, 1983), and positive mood can lead to greater risk-aversion (Isen and Geva, 
1987). People are less sensitive to the probability of occurrence of emotionally 
powerful stimuli (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), and are willing to pay more to insure 
emotionally meaningful items (Hsee and Kunreuther, 2000). 
Fairness 
People care about fairness and cooperation, even in dealing with unknown others when 
long-term strategy and reputation are irrelevant (Rabin, 1998), and they care about 




A decision maker who prefers to receive an expected value for certain rather 
than an uncertain alternative is called risk averse, while someone who finds 
receiving the expected value for certain to be equally preferred to the alternative 
is called risk neutral, and someone who prefers to receive the uncertain 
alternative rather than the expected value for certain is called risk seeking. In 
order to manage risk attitude, four steps can be considered (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986): 
1. Awareness: Of how perception of a risky situation will shape risk attitude 
and behaviour, 
2. Appreciation: More than understanding, respect for differing views as a 
basis for engaging and changing if necessary, 
3. Assertion: Needs and issues will need to be articulated if risk attitude is to 
change, and 
4. Action: Willingness to take action and be resilient in the pursuit of goals, 
beyond ‘good intentions’ 
 
Utility theory is an attempt to infer subjective value, or utility, from choices. Utility 
theory can be used in both decision making under risk (where the probabilities 
are explicitly given) and in decision making under uncertainty (where the 
probabilities are not explicitly given). Extensions of utility theory include 
subjective probability as well as distortions of probability (Bell et al., 1988). 
Because utility theory is dealing with preferences, it is often convenient to 
represent preferences with a utility function and reason indirectly about 
 44
preferences with utility functions. Therefore, many types of utility functions have 
been proposed and more discussion in this regard is provided in Chapter 6.  
 
A decision maker's attitude toward risk taking determines the shape of his or her 
utility function. Knowing that a decision maker is risk averse can substantially 
restrict the shape of a utility function (Kirkwood, 1997). These varying levels of 
attitude toward risk can be expressed as exponential functions. The exponential 





















In the above equations, “Low” is the lowest level of “x” that is of interest, “High” is 
the highest level of “x”, and “ρ” is the risk tolerance for the utility function. Figure 
2.5 shows examples of exponential utility functions for different risk tolerances 
(ρ). In both parts of this figure, the range of values for the evaluation measure is 
from Low = 0 to High = 10. Part “a” of the figure shows functions with increasing 
preferences (e.g., reconstruction profit for a contractor), and part “b” shows 
functions with decreasing preferences (e.g., cost sharing for the involved parties) 
(Kirkwood, 1997). In Figure 2.5a, for example, the function shape with ρ = 1 
represents a very risk-averse decision maker, whereas the function shape with ρ 
= -1 represents a very risk-taking decision maker. The unlabeled straight line in 
the center of each part of the figure corresponds to the case when ρ = Infinity, 
which means that a decision maker is risk-neutral. Figure 2.5 also shows that as 
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The above concepts have been also used to develop decision-making support 
systems. In a research attempt to incorporate the attitude of decision makers to a 
negotiation system using utility function, Ji et al. (2007) developed an attitude-
adaptation negotiation model that assigned a utility function to each negotiator 
when they interactively negotiate one or several issues in an electric market. To 
enable agents to adapt their attitudes according to negotiation duration, utility 
function was constructed on the basis of a history-adaptation strategy and the 
fixed-attitude strategies were compared by simulation. Also, in another research 
effort, Zhang et al. (2005) used multi-dimensional utility function to develop a 
cooperative negotiation mechanism for multi-agent systems. This mechanism 
uses marginal utility gain and marginal utility cost to structure the negotiation 
process. The idea of multi-dimensional utility function allows decision makers to 
negotiate over multiple attributes of the commitments which make it more likely 










b. Decreasing Preferences a. Increasing Preferences 
ρ = 1 ρ = 1 
ρ = 5 
ρ = 5 
ρ = -5 ρ = -5 
ρ = -1 ρ = -1 
Figure 2.5: Exponential Utility Functions (Kirkwood, 1997) 
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for decision makers to find a solution that increases the global utility by producing 
more options.  
 
With respect to analyzing and modeling, group decision making is more 
complicated than individual decision making because decision makers possess 
different interests, attitudes, goals, and preferences, and each party tries to 
achieve his or her own interests and objectives. The process of group decision 
making consists of offers and counteroffers by decision makers in a specific 
manner which constitutes the dynamics of decision making. Therefore, the study 
of interactions among decision makers is of key importance in analyzing group 
decision making. Two broadly defined methodologies have been developed for 
studying group decision making: game theory and negotiation analysis.  
  
2.5. Game Theory  
Game theory is the mathematical study of interactions among decision makers, 
or players. Known as interactive decision making, game theory is an approach to 
study how to construct different kinds of games as models of real-world decision 
problems and how to analyze and interpret them. It has been applied to a broad 
range of fields, including economics, political science, biology, psychology, 
linguistics, systems engineering, and computer science (Hipel, 2008 a, b; Hipel 
and Ben-Haim, 1999; Sage and Rouse, 1999). It should be remembered that in 
games, as in other models, some details are inevitably missing; however, games 
are useful since they facilitate the study of some aspects of interactive decisions, 
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while ignoring others. Of course, the model is not the real situation, so what is 
learned is limited, but often studying the models provides players with surprising 
insights (Kilgour, 2006). Game theory was initially introduced by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in their book Theory of Game and Economic Behavior (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944 and 1953). This section introduces basic game 
theory, which is referred to in the remainder of this thesis.  
 
2.5.1. Game Theory in Conflict Analysis 
Game theory contributes significantly to the study of the various types of 
conflicts. The application of game theory in conflict resolution is explained in an 
overview paper by Hipel (2003) and in a series of articles about Conflict 
Resolution in the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) (2002), as well 
as in two edited books by Hipel (2008 a, b). Figure 2.6 shows the genealogy of 
formal models for analyzing conflict which are based on a number of underlying 
assumptions. As shown in Figure 2.6, in the quantitative approach, cardinal 
preferences are to be determined whereas in the non-quantitative approach, only 
relative preference information is required. It is very hard sometimes to obtain 
cardinal preferences for the disputants involved in societal disputes. Therefore, 
non-quantitative approaches are especially useful for formally studying social and 
environmental conflicts and disputes because of their inherent qualitative nature. 




2.5.2. Quantitative Approach to Game Theory 
Quantitative game theory is broadly divided into two distinct classes: non-
cooperative and cooperative games, as shown in Table 2.6. The distinction has 
to do with the kinds of interacting choices the players make. In non-cooperative 
games, the general principle is that only those aspects of the players’ interaction 
that are explicitly included in the model are to be taken into account, and players 
act in their own best interests. In cooperative games on the other hand, not only 
can players communicate, but they also have access to a reliable and cost-free 
mechanism, that enables them to make binding agreements at no cost. In other 
words, the question in cooperative games is not so much whether the players will 
cooperate, but how they will share the benefits of cooperation (Kilgour, 2006; 
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     Table 2.6: Game Theory Classification (based on Kilgour, 2006) 
Non-Cooperative 



























It is noted that, in the real world, most human interactions lie somewhere 
between non-cooperative and cooperative, and are usually not at either extreme. 
However, to analyze and model real-world problems using game theory 
approaches, it is important to know both extremes, not only because they are 
relatively easy to formulate and study, but also because the behavior observed, 
predicted, or recommended at the two extremes is a kind of benchmark for what 
can be expected in the real world. 
 
2.5.2.1. Concepts and components of quantitative game theory 
Conceptually, game theory is in essence interactive decision making that 
involves a set of individual players who have a specified set of choices and the 
payoff (utility) to each player depends on the totality of the choices made by all 
players. Each player must choose, sometimes not knowing the choices of the 
others. Each player must consider what the others might do and realize that the 
others are, in turn, considering what the others are thinking. The essence of this 
perspective is that although the individual players make their choices separately 
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from each other, the payoffs they receive are a function of all players’ choices. 
The expected utility hypothesis is widely accepted in the field of game theory. 
The hypothesis states that when faced with uncertainty about which outcomes he 
or she will receive, the player prefers outcomes that maximize his or her 
expected utility.  
 
Each game is played by a finite set of players. Players may be an entity or a 
group of people who are economically rational. That is, players can assess 
outcomes, calculate path(s) to outcomes, and choose actions that yield their 
most preferred outcomes (Morris, 1994). After the game ends, each player 
receives a numerical payoff. This number may be negative, in which case it is 
represented as a loss of the absolute value of the number. To study a game that 
has psychological payoffs (e.g., happiness, satisfaction, prestige), it is necessary 
to replace the non-quantitative payoffs with numerical ones (Morris, 1994). A 
strategy is also a predetermined logic that tells a player which actions to take in 
response to every possible strategy other players might use and which action 
should not be taken. Each player in the game faces a choice of two or more 
possible strategies that must be selected by the player who seeks maximum 
level of satisfaction for his or her chosen strategy. 
 
2.5.2.2. Cooperative game theory 
Cooperative game theory describes only the outcomes that result when the 
players come together in different combinations. In cooperative games, players 
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can and do communicate and, moreover, have a reliable and cost-free 
enforcement mechanism that enables them to make binding agreements at no 
cost. The enforcement mechanism is external to the game (i.e., not explicitly 
modeled). In cooperative games, the question is not whether the players will 
cooperate in their common interest, but how they will share the gains of 
cooperation (Kilgour, 2006). 
 
A game theory approach to bargaining was first introduced by Nash (1950) and 
Nash (1951), who developed a cooperative and static game model. In a two-
person bargaining problem, two players have access to a set of alternatives, 
which is called the feasible set. It is assumed that each player has preferences 
over the alternatives and that the preferences are represented by two functions, 
u1 and u2. In the original approach by Nash, as in many later developments, it 
has been assumed that these utility functions are Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities. The utility functions, u1 and u2, define a subset S of R2, which is the 
image of the set of feasible alternatives. Each point of S represents a solution for 
the bargaining problem that is an agreement between the players. Within the 
feasible set there is also a point called the threat point or disagreement point (d), 
which is the point at which the game ends and no agreement can be reached. 
Therefore, a two-person bargaining problem is a pair (S, d) such that S is 
convex, closed (i.e., it contains its boundary), and a comprehensive subset of R2; 
and d Є S, and there exists at least one x Є S such that x > d. There are also two 
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main bargaining solutions: the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinski (K-S) 
solution, which are further explained by Kilgour (2006). 
 
2.5.3. Non-quantitative Approach to Game Theory 
Because social conflicts tend to be non-quantitative in nature, many studies have 
been carried out using techniques listed in the left branch in Figure 2.6. For 
example, Howard published a pioneering book on metagame analysis (Howard, 
1971). Metagame analysis provides a theoretical basis for modeling the dynamic 
aspects of conflict based on the metaphor of a drama, which is another useful 
non-quantitative methodology (Howard, 1999; Bryant, 2003). Fraser and Hipel 
(1984) explain the scope of metagame analysis further in a systematic process 
called conflict analysis, which provides an analytical and formal platform for 
developing graph model for conflict resolution (Fang et al., 1993). It should be 
mentioned that the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is completely 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.6. Negotiation Overview 
Negotiation is a process by which two or more parties conduct communications 
or conferences with a view to resolving differences between them (Cohen, 2002).  
Negotiation analysis is known as joint decision making. In contrast with 
cooperative game theory in which the players should achieve mutual benefits 
and decide how their gains are to be split up, the negotiation analysis involves 
multiple individuals cooperating to arrive at one joint decision (Kilgour, 2006). 
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The joint decision entails joint consequences, or payoffs, for each individual. It 
should be noted that underlying every negotiation structure is a game-like 
component, and the more one studies negotiations, the more one realizes the 
artificiality of the borders between the two perspectives (Raiffa et al., 2002). 
Raiffa also believed that negotiation is considered to be both art and ability. On 
one hand, negotiation is an art which requires the deliberate application of 
techniques and strategies aimed at a specific goal. This goal is expressed as the 
equitable adjustment of an impacted contract based on time and cost. On the 
other hand, the ability of engineers and managers to negotiate effectively is 
crucial to the success or failure of the project.  
 
2.6.1. Bargaining and Negotiation  
Bargaining is a type of negotiation in which two or more decision makers usually 
negotiate over only one issue. For example, the buyer and seller of goods or 
services bargain over the price that will be paid and the exact nature of the 
transaction that will take place, and eventually come to an agreement. Bargaining 
thus is an alternative pricing strategy to fixed prices. Decision makers in a 
bargaining problem can bargain over the objective (e.g., project duration) as a 
whole at any precise moment in time. The problem can also be divided so that 
parts of the whole objective become subject to bargaining during different stages. 
In a bargaining problem, the result is either an agreement between the interested 
parties or the status quo of the problem. It is clear that studying how individual 
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parties make bargaining decisions is insufficient for predicting which agreement 
will be reached.             
 
Bargaining can be either cooperative or non-cooperative. Cooperative bargaining 
refers to the cooperative character of the strategic interaction that takes place in 
the decision-making process. Most definitions and conceptualizations of 
cooperation in bargaining are focused on the reaching of an agreement 
(Myerson, 1991; Young, 1991). In other words, cooperative bargaining is defined 
as working or acting together willingly for a common purpose or benefit in the 
presence of conflicting interests (Fearon, 1995; Muthoo, 1999). Therefore, 
cooperatively bargaining over one issue is one of the important topics in the 
study of negotiation (Sebenius, 1992). Dunlop (1984) presented four approaches 
to bargaining: 
1. Seek to explain bargaining generally and collective bargaining 
negotiations in particular.  
2. Use experimental or simulated bargaining games in order to determine the 
bargaining outcomes. 
3. Use econometric methods to measure aspects of arbitration or collective 
bargaining. Public-sector bargaining has been used most often because of 
the availability of data. 
4. Use a word-by-word account of the exchanges from the earliest stages of 
negotiation to the achievement of a settlement.  
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2.6.2. Aspects of Negotiation  
Negotiation has been studied from different perspectives by many researchers. A 
summary of aspects of negotiation analysis, investigated by several researchers, 
is highlighted in Figure 2.7. The arrows in the figure show the relationship 
between the aspects. For instance, the positional concept of negotiation analysis 
is related to the hard method of negotiation. These aspects of negotiation 
analysis are briefly explained below. 
 
Concepts: Negotiation can be explained conceptually as either positional 
negotiation or principled negotiation. Positional negotiation is essentially 
adversarial. The negotiators see the process as "win-lose," in which any gains by 
the opponent are losses on the part of the others. A classic example of this type 
of negotiation is contract negotiations in the automobile industry. A union tactic in 
recent years has been to identify one of the "big three" manufacturers, one which 
is particularly vulnerable to the effects of a strike. This company is then targeted 
for hard negotiations around a key issue. When neither side yields on the issue, 
Negotiation 
Concept Behavior Method Strategy 
1) Positional 
 
2) Principled  








1) Distributive  
    (Win-Lose) 
 
 
2) Integrative  













     (Scott and         
Billing 1990) 
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a strike ensues and persists until an agreement is reached or one side collapses 
under the cost of the strike. Although there might be definite winners and losers 
in this type of negotiation, it may consequently be beneficial for the parties 
involved. Principled negotiation, on the other hand, emphasizes that the parties 
involved look for mutual gains.  The theory relies on separating the people from 
the problem, in an attempt to avoid the human issues that can bias a negotiation 
(Fisher et al., 1991).  Hence, principled negotiation implies a level of disputant 
rationality. Principled negotiation, as suggested by its title, focuses on the 
underlying values (or interests) that justify disputants’ positions, as opposed to 
attempting negotiation solely from their positions. Keeney (1992) supported the 
idea of principled negotiation by proposing value-based negotiation. Value-based 
negotiation is an alternative negotiation strategy that challenges positional 
negotiation by proposing that understanding the values disputants place on 
issues is more important in making decisions than staking out the positions 
(Keeney, 1992).  In value-based negotiation, negotiators try to increase the 
number of alternatives for resolving the disputing issues and start negotiation by 
isolating several alternatives to be considered. Fall-back bargaining, for example, 
is an alternative-based negotiation that focuses on negotiation that produces a 
prediction about the negotiation outcome (Brams and Kilgour, 2001). Negotiators 
are begun by insisting on their most preferred alternatives, then falling back, in 
lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives until there is an alternative with 
sufficient support. The outcome of fallback bargaining is a subset of alternatives 
called the compromise set. This set may be compared to the product of a social 
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choice rule. Another alternative-based algorithm is the Even Swaps method 
(Hammond et al., 1999), in which disputants commence negotiations by isolating 
several alternatives under consideration.  During negotiation, the preferences of 
the parties move towards one or a combination of the alternatives.  At this stage, 
it is assumed that the disputants have agreed on an alternative or a group of 
alternatives to form the basis of a settlement.   
 
Methods:  Two methods of negotiation can be distinguished: hard and soft. Hard 
negotiation strategies emphasize results over relationships. Hard negotiators 
insist that their demands be completely agreed to and accepted before any 
agreement is possible. While this approach avoids the need to make 
concessions, it also reduces the likelihood of successfully negotiating an 
agreement and usually harms the relationship with the other party as well. Soft 
negotiation on the other hand, seeks agreement at almost any cost, with the 
parties offering concessions easily in the interests of preserving (or creating) a 
good relationship with the other side. Soft negotiators trust the other side and are 
open and honest about their bottom line. This strategy however, leaves the soft 
negotiators vulnerable to the hard negotiators who act competitively (Lax and 
Sebenius, 1992). However, two hard negotiators competing against each other 
may both lose; hence, the advice to negotiate hard in all cases is not wise. Fisher 
et al. (1991) suggested that principled negotiation, which negotiates interests 
rather than positions, is a better alternative than either hard or soft negotiation. 
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Attitudes: Negotiators’ attitudes play an unavoidable role in the outcome of 
negotiation. Negotiators with aggressive (i.e., negative) attitudes toward other 
negotiators usually believe in the hard method of negotiation in which 
concessions are almost non-existent. On the other hand, negotiators who 
possess constructive (i.e., positive) attitudes are encouraged to follow the soft 
method of negotiation by making concessions with respect to disputing issues. 
With constructive attitudes, negotiators share their concerns and interests 
positively and try to agree on a win-win and mutual solution which would be 
better than leaving the negotiation table with no resolution of the conflict (Scott 
and Billing, 1990). In aggressive negotiation, the parties involved often have 
negative attitudes toward one another and they consider any concession made 
as a positive improvement for their opponents.       
 
Strategies: Negotiation strategies are divided into two categories: distributive 
(claiming the pie) and integrative (enlarging the pie of available resources), 
according to Bazerman (1994). The distributive strategy of negotiation is a zero-
sum game; that is, one party’s gain results in the other’s loss. The strategy for 
such a negotiation is to predict the bottom line of the other and present an offer 
that will maximize one’s own benefit. Such negotiation usually results in a lower 
satisfaction level. On the other hand, the integrative strategy promotes 
cooperation between the negotiators. Because each negotiator has different 
preferences for each negotiable issue and option, the strategy is not to win on all 
issues, but to realize which issues the negotiators care most about and make 
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tradeoffs. Such negotiation usually results in a higher satisfaction level 
(Churchman, 1993; Raiffa et al., 2002). 
 
Behaviors: From the behavioral point of view, there are two types of negotiation: 
passive and assertive. The characteristics of each type are listed in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7: Characteristics of Behavioral Negotiation (Chubb, 2006) 
Passive Assertive 
 Energy wasted, 
 Poor body language, 
 Apologizing a great deal, 
 Placing too much emphasis on feelings 
of others, 
 Stressed, 
 Avoiding conflict, and 
 Considering short-term goals 
 
 High energy levels, 
 Respecting yourself, 
 High self-awareness, 
 Ability to make choices, 
 Confident communication and body 
language, 
 Internal integrity, and 
 Healthy stress 
 
 
There have been some limited attempts to present negotiation process in 
complementary elements. For example, Lukas and Lukas (2008) explained that a 
negotiation process consists of three phases: pre-meeting, meeting, and post 
meeting. They believed that the pre-meeting phase should include three planning 
elements as follows. 
1. Strategic planning: negotiator should identify her/his goals for the 
negotiation along with information about the opponent’s needs. The 
negotiator should conduct fact finding and financial analysis;  
2. Tactical planning: the negotiator should determine the approaches 
and techniques to use during the negotiation to obtain the best 
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possible result, help achieve the goals and defend negotiation 
positions; and 
3. Administrative planning: the negotiator should ensure that the 
necessary information is gathered and logistics are resolved before 
the negotiation begins.     
It should be noted that negotiation is only a tool and is useful for resolving some 
but not all disputes that occur in construction operations. If parties have nothing 
in common, it is useless to try motivating them to settle their differences and 
irrelevant if there are no differences to settle. Therefore, negotiation is often a 
process in which proposals are put forward for the purpose of resolving specific 
disagreements among two or more parties who have both conflicting and 
common interests.  It should be mentioned that there are situations in 
construction operations in which negotiations are conducted between involved 
parties who have no conflict or disputes among one another and they only intend 
to negotiate over non-disputing issues. These negotiations are not the subject of 
this research which focuses on developing negotiation methodology for resolving 
complex disputes in the construction industry.   
 
2.6.3. Modeling Negotiation Processes 
There are three approaches to modeling the negotiation process (Kersten, 2005): 
1) The outcome-based approach: This type of modeling negotiation can be 
characterized by the well-known quotation, “Not ‘How?’ but ‘What?’”.  Three 
models are usually considered: 
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• Game theoretic models in which rationality and known preferences are 
assumed to be available. All alternatives are known explicitly and the 
focus is on equilibria (i.e., positions from which no party wants to move). 
• Multiple Criteria Multiple Decision (MCMD) models in which multiple 
outcomes, the representation of preferences, and the aggregation of 
preferences and outcomes lead to a search for non-dominated solutions 
with regard to distance measures. 
• Negotiation analysis in which prescriptive and descriptive are two common 
approaches to modeling the problem. Known and fixed utility is also 
assumed as well as intelligent and goal-seeking action by the other 
parties. What distinguishes negotiation models from game-theoretic 
models is that the decision makers are not assumed to be fully rational. 
2) Process-based approach: The main question in this approach is how 
concessions are or should be made. The following scenarios can be modeled 
using a process-based approach: 
• War and political models: history, tradition, successful strategies and 
tactics rooted in culture; 
• Models of human and organizational behavior: reciprocity, fulfillment, 
attitude;  
• Analytical models accounting for time, power, pressure, and cost of the 
process; 
• Simulation models: simulation of parties’ behaviors; 
• Heuristics and rule-of thumb models; and 
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• Qualitative process theory: the ability to reason with incomplete 
information, a framework for the application of more detailed qualitative 
and quantitative models. 
 
When each of the above scenarios is modeled, several aspects must be 
considered in the development of the model, including aspiration levels, 
distributive and integrative bargaining, power, hostility, relationships, opposition, 
knowledge, foresight, strategies, the formation of tactics, and evolution. 
 
3) Attitude-based approach: The main concern is how to influence or strengthen 
attitudes. To model a negotiation problem, the following criteria must be 
considered: 
 Cooperation, hostility, relationships, responsibility, and  
 Reward systems. 
 
Wertheim et al. (1992) conceptualized negotiation into a step-by-step iterative 
process, as displayed in Figure 2.8. The flowchart shown in Figure 2.8 helps 
negotiators choose the most appropriate methods for modeling the negotiation 
process, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. This diagram however, does 
not allow issues to be re-evaluated during the negotiation process. It should be 
noticed that although game theory-based negotiation strategy is still the main 
branch of the research on strategy, its assumptions about full knowledge of the 
other parties’ preferences are untenable in real life situations (Ji et al., 2007).    
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Break problem down into several issues











Figure 2.8: Negotiation Process Flowchart (Wertheim et al., 1992) 
 
2.7. Computer Applications to Support Negotiation  
Computers and internet have been significantly involved in the development of 
automated negotiation systems, such as web-based negotiation, E-negotiation, 
and online dispute resolution systems. These systems allow parties located at a 
distance to conduct negotiations. A review of current negotiation systems (e.g., 
Molenaar et al., 2000; Cheung et al., 2004; Ren et al., 2003; Omoto, 2002; 
Gibson and Gebken, 2006; Yaoyueyong et al., 2005; Li, 1996; Zeleznikow, 2002) 
reveals that two groups of negotiation systems can be identified:  
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1) Early Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs), which have been 
restricted to informing parties about past rounds of negotiation, 
parties, preferences, and the progress of current negotiation; and   
2) Recently-developed Negotiation Decision Support Systems 
(NDSSs), which have the advantage of incorporating decision-
making aspects into negotiation support systems to help decision 
makers arrive at better negotiation outcomes. They help decision 
makers overcome the challenges of conventional negotiation 
through a range of analytical tools that can clarify interests, identify 
tradeoffs, recognize party satisfaction, and generate optimal 
solutions (Thiessen and McMahon, 2000). Their aim is to better 
prepare decision makers for negotiation or to support them during 
the negotiation process. 
    
2.7.1. Review of Existing Negotiation Support Systems 
There have been many research efforts conducted in the area of negotiation 
support systems due to their important role in facilitating dispute resolution in 
different communities. The developed negotiation support systems are proposed 
for resolving disputes in various industries such as manufacturing, financial, and 
Information Technology (IT). There are also a few negotiation support system 
developed for resolving family disputes which have different characteristics than 
of those disputes in the construction industry. The reviewed studies are 
summarized in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.8: A Summary of the Literature about Negotiation Support Systems 
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In this chapter, conflict-resolution and decision-making systems and models are 
reviewed and the concepts, theories, requirements, constraints, methodologies, 
and techniques in the modeling of decision-making processes were extensively 
discussed. Conflicts and causes of disputes in construction were briefly 
explained, and various dispute resolution methods (e.g., arbitration, negotiation, 
mediation) were presented. Negotiation was presented as the most preferred 
method for construction participants due to its low cost and low hostility as well 
as the fact that it provides the parties with more control over their options and 
outcomes. Group decision-making approaches, such as game theory and 
negotiation analysis, were explained, and negotiation decision support systems 
were listed and the characteristics of each system were summarized.  
 
The contents of this chapter will be used and addressed in the development of a 
negotiation methodology for construction disputes proposed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 
and 7. The proposed methodology takes into account the attitudes of negotiators 
and combines the strategic level of decision analysis with the tactical level of 
negotiation outcomes. Chapter 3 presents the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR) and overviews its modeling and analysis stages. GMCR is 
used to develop the strategic level of attitude-based negotiation methodology 










Finding suitable tools for resolving social and environmental disputes such as 
brownfield disputes is the objective of many researchers worldwide. They have 
developed many formal modeling techniques and methodologies for 
systematically studying conflicts that have two or more decision makers, each of 
whom can have multiple objectives and interests. In particular, the Graph Model 
for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993) is a methodology for modeling 
and analyzing decision makers’ interactions in a conflict in order to find stable 
states for all decision makers (DMs) which represent feasible resolutions of the 
conflict at the strategic level. GMCR was originated from conflict analysis (Fraser 
and Hipel, 1984) which in turn is an expansion of metagame theory (Howard, 
1971). The Graph Model utilizes concepts and definitions from graph theory, set 
theory, and game theory. Each DM’s possible moves from one state to other 
states are captured using a directed graph in which nodes represent states and 
arcs indicate state transitions controlled by the DM (Hipel et al., 1999). A state is 
a potential outcome, or scenario, of the conflict. It should be mentioned that most 
of the contents of this Chapter are taken from Fraser and Hipel (1984), Hipel 
(2005, 2008 a, b), and Fang et al. (1993).  
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The associated decision support system GMCR II conveniently implements the 
Graph Model for conflict resolution and provides speedy, cost-efficient, and 
accurate advice for the DMs involved in conflict resolution process (Fang et al., 
2003a and b). It incorporates the option form for conflict modeling and 
determines the stability of every state for each DM under a broad range of 
stability types (Hipel et al., 1997). GMCR II is generally able to predict a variety of 
equilibrium information, which enhances the analyst’s understanding of the 
conflict and results in useful advice to DMs about whether possible outcomes are 
strategically stable.  
 
3.2. GMCR Overview 
The systematic procedure for applying the Graph Model follows two main stages: 
modeling and analyzing, as shown in Figure 3.1. In the modeling stage, the 
problem is structured by determining the DMs, the states, the possible state 
transitions controlled by each DM, and each DM’s relative preferences with 
respect to the states. In the analysis stage, the stability of each state from each 
DM’s viewpoint is determined. The objective is to find some stable states that 
represent a resolution of the conflict. The essential parts of a graph model in 
option form are the DMs and the options available to each DM. In general, a DM 
may exercise any combination of the options he or she controls to create a 
strategy. When every DM has selected a strategy, a state is defined.  
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There may be restrictions on the option choices or changes to the options 
available to a DM. When these are specified, the feasible states, which constitute 
the actual set of states in the model, are determined. Often there are logical 
reasons why a particular combination of options does not represent a feasible 
state. If so, the combination is removed since it is not a feasible state. The 
following are the most common types of infeasibility (Fraser and Hipel, 1984): 
 






















Figure 3.1: Systematic Procedure for Applying GMRC (Hipel et al., 2005) 
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1. The availability of an option depends on the selection of another option. 
For example, option “A” can be selected only if option “B” is selected; 
2. An option must be taken when another option is taken (i.e., “A” must be 
taken when “B” is taken, and “A” cannot be taken when “B” is not taken); 
3. From a group of options, at least one must be taken; and 
4. From a group of options, only one can be taken (mutually exclusive). For 
instance, option “A” or option “B” or neither can be chosen, but not both.  
 
The state-to-state transitions controlled by a DM are exactly those implied by a 
unilateral change in the DM’s option selection. These steps produce the usual set 
of directed graphs, and the graph model is completed by the incorporation of 
each DM’s relative preferences among the feasible states. Since each DM’s 
graph has the same set of nodes, it is often useful to show all DMs’ graphs on 
the same diagram by simply combining them as a single graph and labelling 
each arc to indicate the DM who controls it. Such a graph is referred to as the 
integrated graph of the model.  
 
The Graph Model can handle both transitive and intransitive preferences. 
However, in most real-life conflicts, a DMs’ preferences can be assumed to be 
transitive and thus expressed as a ranking (ordering) of the states from most to 
least preferred, in which ties are allowed. Some of the advantages of applying a 
graph model compared with the classical normal form (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944) include the following: 1) the graph model can handle 
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irreversible moves; 2) it provides a flexible framework for defining, comparing, 
and characterizing solution concepts; and 3) it can be applied easily in practice. 
 
In GMCR, the set of all states that DM i can unilaterally reach from state s in one 
step is the reachable list (R). A Unilateral Improvement (UI) from a particular 
state for a specific DM is a more preferred state (for that DM) to which he or she 
can unilaterally move in one step. It follows that R can be partitioned into three 
subsets: 1) the set of unilateral improvements from state s for DM i, the set of 
unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i, and the unilateral changes to 
equally preferred states. 
 
3.3. Stability Analysis 
The stability of states for DMs is defined by various solution concepts, or stability 
definitions as listed in Table 3.1. Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951) reflects a DM 
who thinks only one step ahead. In general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 
1971) and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), a DM considers 
exactly two steps ahead, whereas in symmetric metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 
1971), the DM takes into account three steps by assessing available escapes 
from any sanctions that may be imposed by the opponents. A disimprovement 
refers to the tendency of a DM to move to a less preferred state in order to reach 
a more preferred state eventually, or to block the unilateral improvements of 
other DMs. In both Nash and sequential stabilities, disimprovements are never 
permitted, while in general and symmetric metarationality only disimprovements 
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by the opponents for the purpose of sanctioning are allowed. Since different 
solution concepts may be appropriate for different DMs, states that are stable 
under many solution concepts are considered to have strong stability. Thus, it is 
important to consider more than one kind of solution concept for each DM in 
order to ensure a robust prediction of the conflict resolution. 
 
3.3.1. Definitions of Solution Concepts 
A state is considered to be stable for a DM if and only if (iff) that DM is not 
tempted to move away from it unilaterally. A state is in equilibrium, or is a 
possible resolution under a particular solution concept, if all DMs find it to be 
stable under that solution concept. Solution concepts are defined below for the 
case of two DMs and are summarized in Table 3.1. These definitions can be 
easily generalized to apply to conflicts involving multiple DMs. 
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1. Nash stability: Under the Nash solution concept, a DM will move to a 
more preferred state whenever possible, regardless of any possible 
countermoves by the opponent. Hence, a state s is Nash stable for DM i iff 
i has no unilateral improvements from s. 
2. General metarationality (GMR): A state s is general metarational stable 
for DM i iff for every UI i can take advantage of, the opponent, DM j, can 
subsequently move to a state that is at most as good for i as the original 
state s. In other words, DM j can sanction each of i’s UIs by moving to a 
state that is less than or equally preferred to state s by DM i. Therefore, a 
DM who follows general metarationality selects his or her unilateral moves 
in light of the opponent’s possible reactions, irrespective of the opponent’s 
preferences. 
3. Symmetric metarationality (SMR): A state s is symmetric metarational 
stable for DM i iff not only every UI for i from s is sanctioned by the 
opponent, but also no unilateral counter-reply by DM i can leave it better 
off than the original state s. It is noted that the above solution concepts are 
used only for rational or regular stability analysis. 
4. Sequential stability (SEQ): A state s is sequentially stable for DM i iff 
every UI for i from s is credibly sanctioned by the sanctioner DM j. A 
credible sanction is a sanction that directly benefits the sanctioner. In 
other words, the second possible movement is a UI for the sanctioner. A 
DM who follows sequential stability takes into consideration not only his or 
her own possible moves, but also the opponent’s unilateral improvements. 
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When the above solution concepts are used within the paradigm of GMCR it is 
important to consider the relationship between the proposed solution concepts 
and the stability of states so that different equilibrium states can be reached. The 
following theorems are taken into account to determine the stability of a state: 
Theorem 1 (Fang et al., 1993): For i є N and c є C, if c є 
Nash
iC , then c є 
SMR
iC ; if c 
є 
SMR
iC  , then c є 
GMR
iC . Theorem 2 (Fang et al., 1993): For i є N and c є C, if c є 
CNash i , then c є  CSEQ i ; if c є CSEQ i , then c є CGMR i . Then, a state is 
said to be an equilibrium state for Nash stability, general metarationality, 
symmetric metarationality and sequential stability, if and only if it is Nash stable, 
generally metarational, symmetrically metarational, and sequentially stable for all 
DMs, respectively.    
  
3.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
Sensitivity analysis is used to make sure that uncertainty in the DMs’ preferences 
and other model preferences, as well as sudden or unforeseen events cannot 
affect the robustness of the stability analyses. A sensitivity analysis focuses on 
the implications of changes in model parameters, by considering, for example, 
how the preferences of a DM would have to be changed in order to produce 
more preferable equilibria for another DM. A reasonable range of possible 
preferences can be analyzed in order to ascertain how equilibria are affected. If 
the equilibria do not change as preferences are modified, one can have greater 
confidence in the results of the analysis. Alternatively, when small preference 
changes produce dramatic equilibria changes, then the analyst must ensure that 
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the model is as accurate and reliable as possible. The following are types of 
sensitivity analyses: 
• Preference changes, 
• Option modification or expansion, 
• Other decision makers added into the game, 
• Consideration of other kinds of human behaviour and attitudes (different 
solution concepts), and 
• Consideration of coalitions. 
 
3.5. Summary 
In this chapter, Graph Model for Conflict Resolution was presented and its 
methodology and involving stages were reviewed. The Graph Model is a 
promising methodology to model complex conflicts and provide the involved 
decision makers with potential resolutions at strategic level. Therefore, the Graph 
Model approach is first improved in Chapter 4 to incorporate the attitudes of 
decision makers into the Graph Model methodology. Subsequently, the proposed 
attitude-based Graph Model is utilized to develop an attitude-based negotiation 
methodology at the strategic level for resolving complex disputes in construction 
operations. The strategic negotiation methodology proposed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
will be complemented by a tactical negotiation methodology proposed in 




CHAPTER 4  
Attitude-Based Strategic Negotiation 




The primary objective of this chapter is to propose an attitude-based strategic 
negotiation methodology for resolving complex construction disputes using the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) technique. Because controversies 
and differences of opinion and attitudes are so pervasive in human decision 
making, there is a great need for flexible decision technologies to assist in the 
understanding, modeling, analyzing, and managing of strategic conflicts. The 
need for such decision methodologies is intensified when human factors, such as 
attitudes, are added to the consideration of conflict analysis.  
 
This chapter focuses on the strategic level of negotiation, which defines a set of 
the most beneficial decision options that can be further negotiated at a tactical 
level discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. This chapter first introduces the proposed 
negotiation framework for construction disputes. To provide an understanding of 
construction negotiations, the characteristics of negotiations in construction 
projects are identified, and the behavior of the parties involved in negotiations is 
discussed. Attitude-based solution concepts for conflicts in construction projects 
are then formally defined, and the performance of the proposed attitude-based 
stability analyses within the paradigm of GMCR is described. The proposed 
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strategic negotiation methodology is systematically developed using a brownfield 
construction case study in order to clarify the advantages and capabilities of the 
methodology. Finally, the resulting strategic decision options provided by the 
methodology are discussed.  
 
4.2. Proposed Negotiation Framework 
The proposed negotiation framework consists of three major components which 
constitute three major stapes (i.e., objectives): 1) understand construction 
negotiations, 2) develop negotiation methodology, and 3) design a negotiation 
decision support system. These three components conveniently constitute a 
systematic negotiation model that consider the strategic as well as the tactical 
levels of decision making. Each component of the framework also encompasses 
key subcomponents. A diagram of the proposed negotiation framework is 
provided in Figure 4.1. This chapter addresses the first component of the 
proposed framework, as well as the strategic level defined within the second 
component when only two decision makers (DMs) are involved in the negotiation 
process.  
 
4.3. Understand Construction Negotiations 
Generally, if a negotiation model is to be developed for a specific purpose, it is 
vital to understand the nature and the characteristics of the problem at hand. To 
this end, an extensive literature review was carried out in Chapter 2, relevant 
case study data were obtained, and several meetings were held with construction 
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professionals and participants at Kitchener City Hall. These meetings were useful 
in a practical sense to identify the key issues involved in construction 
negotiations, particularly when the municipality is a key DM in a construction 
conflict. Negotiations in the construction industry are normally studied from three 
perspectives: the characteristics of construction negotiations (e.g., parties 
involved, types and number of conflicting issues, and project types), the 
characteristics of the negotiators (e.g., attitudes, positions, and choices), and the 
inherent challenges and needs of the decision making. These perspectives are 









































































4.3.1. General Negotiation Characteristics                
With respect to negotiations for resolving construction disputes, the following 
characteristics reflect the series of factors construction participants consider 
when negotiations take place (Pena-Mora and Wang, 1998): 
 
A) Domain-dependent knowledge: Participants in construction operations are 
normally experts in only one domain of knowledge and, as such, often know little 
about other domains. For example, architects are experts in the aesthetics of 
structures whereas engineers have experience in the design and analysis of 
structures. Each group views a project from its own perspective. Therefore, none 
of the involved participants has an in-depth global view of all knowledge domains 
(Odeh and Battaineh, 2002). The unfamiliarity with other knowledge domains 
within projects can cause disagreement when conflicts arise and may hinder the 
finding of a common meeting ground for the participants. 
 
B) Competitive-cooperative environment: In the construction industry, disputes 
are dealt with according to the objectives of the project and the participants. The 
participants (rationally) have the common goal of successful project completion 
because it ensures a profit for all. If the project fails, some or all of them will lose 
because not only will they not profit from the project but they will also be liable for 
its failure. Consequently, they are willing to cooperate with each other in order to 
finish the project on time and within the budget (Hegazy, 2002). At the same 
time, they will also try to maximize their own profits at the expense of the other 
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parties, thus departing from the cooperative nature of the construction team. This 
competitive-cooperative environment has an impact on the participants’ 
strategies and, subsequently, on the outcomes of the negotiation.    
 
C) Strategy-influenced outcome: Because of the competitive-cooperative nature 
of construction work, the DMs involved try to maximize their gain without losing 
cooperation (Fellow et al., 1994). They take a course of action (called a strategy) 
that influences the outcome of the negotiations. Since a competitive-cooperative 
condition exists throughout the project’s life cycle, these strategies are employed 
frequently and have a strong influence on the outcome of negotiations. The most 
common strategy and the one most easily used by participants is domain-
dependent knowledge. Participants can influence the outcome of the issues 
related to their specialty by exaggerating their contributions without being held 
fully accountable because others are not fully familiar with the issues. This 
domain-dependent barrier can prevent participants from fully realizing the 
situation that any other participant faces. Bringing in an expert in a given area to 
inform teams who are unfamiliar with the issues can prevent the use of this 
strategy. However, the complexity of the problem increases as more people 
become involved in the negotiations and their preferences must also be 
considered. Therefore, given the competitive-cooperative nature and the 
prevalence of domain-dependent barriers, using a manipulative strategy is 
common in construction particularly when the involved DMs have aggressive 
behavior and negative attitudes toward one another (Walton et al., 2000). 
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4.3.2. Negotiators’ Characteristics 
The participation of people in the construction industry, such as the owner, the 
government, the contractor, and the stakeholders, depends on their position. 
When conflicts and disputes arise, the DMs involved use different strategies to 
maximize their benefits during the negotiation process (Essex, 1996). The DMs 
involved in construction projects will certainly have different attitudes about 
different projects and will try to prioritize the conflicting issues that are common in 
projects (Heng, 1996). For example, the two main conflicting issues between the 
owner and the contractor are usually time extensions and cost overruns, and 
both DMs know their own advantages and disadvantages with respect to these 
issues. The contractor knows his costs exactly, can adjust prices for the 
maximum revenue, and can accept or reject a settlement. The owner, on the 
other hand, has a strong advantage in that he owns the project and controls the 
money. The owner is, however, bound by the procurement rules, regulations, and 
approvals put in place by the government. The contractor has a larger degree of 
freedom in making his proposal and accepting a settlement and thus, he has the 
advantage of setting the pace and direction of the negotiation (Levin, 1998). 
 
4.3.3. Challenges and Needs 
The construction industry is facing increasing challenges due to the growing 
complexity of the design, construction, operation, and maintenance stages. Such 
complexities boost the level and the number of risks and uncertainties involved in 
construction operations. Moreover, construction projects are often behind 
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schedule or have cost overruns and the DMs involved prefer to blame other DMs 
for construction delays (Hegazy, 2002; Glasner, 2000). These challenges can 
increase the possibility of conflict among participants and also influence the 
decision-making process, particularly with respect to conflict negotiation. 
Construction negotiations are more challenging because the participants lack 
negotiation skills and they belong to different knowledge-dependent domains 
(Mnookin et al., 2000). These challenges can significantly hinder the progress of 
construction projects, and they must therefore be appropriately addressed in any 
effective decision-making methodology. Models that address these challenges 
will better mimic the societal activities of those participating in conflict resolution.  
   
Table 4.1 summarizes discussions in Subsections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 with 
respect to a brownfield reconstruction case study. Table 4.1 points out the 
characteristics of the parties involved in a brownfield redevelopment project when 
they intend to negotiate conflicting issues, such as redevelopment costs. These 
characteristics have been compiled based on previous studies (e.g., 
Stipanowich, 1997; Fellow et al., 1994; Odeh and Battaineh, 2002) and several 
meetings with the consultants, researchers, and representatives of the City of 
Kitchener, located in southern Ontario, Canada, who are concerned with 
Kitchener’s brownfield sites. It should be noted that the types and number of 
parties involved in a construction project depend on the type of project. Although 
contractors are often involved in negotiations in many situations, such as in 
brownfield projects, initial negotiations normally take place between the current 
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property owner and the government; the contractor may be hired later. In the 
brownfield case study used in this chapter, it is assumed that the two DMs 
involved are the current property owner and the government, who are both 
directly concerned about the costs and duration of the project. In future research, 
a purchaser may be included later in the process. This case study will be also 
used to systematically develop the proposed negotiation methodology as 
explained in the following sections. 
  




• Lack of funds or the will to cleanup the contaminated property, 
• Expects government help in marketing the land, 
• Wants to share its liabilities for cleanup through negotiation, 
• Sometimes refuses to cooperate when the owner must clean the land, 
• Avoids revealing his or her identity, 
• Tries to understand the concerns of the perspective purchaser, 
• Very concerned about the costs of redevelopment, and 
• Not concerned about the future risk of site contamination.  
Purchaser 
 
• Prefers to have environmental testing and certificate, 
• Wants to receive incentives from other parties, 
• Takes into account the preferences and interests of the owner, 
• Considers other options for investments, 
• Very concerned about the risks of buying the property, 
• Usually one purchaser is considered in buying the contaminated property, and 
• Considers time and cost of redevelopment and responsibilities of future 
contamination not caused by purchaser. 
Government 
• Provides available resources of municipalities to make a deal among parties, 
• Has fair working relationship with both the owner and the purchaser, 
• Plays key role to initiate negotiation process in various phases, 
• Provides inducements for both the owner and the purchaser, 
• Wants to have contaminated property cleaned and redeveloped, 
• Considers private-owned brownfield sites as being different from public-owned 
brownfield sites, 
• Uses reactive approach to deal with brownfield problems, 
• Has concerns about the justification of the resources used for brownfield 
redevelopment, 
• Tends to be more risk averse, and 
• Non-remedied contamination is his key future concern. 
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4.4. Attitude-Based GMCR  
Based on the previously discussed characteristics of construction negotiations, 
the development of the proposed negotiation methodology involving only two 
DMs at the strategic level is described in the remainder of this chapter, while the 
development of the proposed methodology involving two DMs at the tactical 
level, which complements that at the strategic level, is explained in Chapter 6. 
 
At the strategic level, the proposed methodology uses the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution, (GMCR) with its powerful modeling and stability analysis 
stages. GMCR (Fang et al., 1993) is a comprehensive systems engineering 
technique that provides strategic advice to a negotiator through a prescription for 
actions that will achieve his or her preferred outcome. It also suggests to a 
mediator which possible resolutions of the conflict would be stable and reveals to 
a policymaker how the strategic structure of the situation shapes the outcome. 
This strategic advice reflects the capacity of GMCR to identify individually stable 
states and equilibria. It should be noted that GMCR is intended to be used 
prescriptively to advise a negotiator in a negotiation round rather than 
descriptively or normatively to predict which choices will be made or to determine 
which choices “should” be made (Kilgour, 2007).  
 
4.4.1. GMCR Formal Definition 
Formal definition of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR): A graph model 
of a conflict is a 4-tuple (N, C, (Si)i є N , (≥i) i є N ). N is the set of all (DMs). C is the 
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set of all states of the focal decision making situation, where |C| ≥ 2. For i є N , Si 
is a function from C to the power set P(C) of C such that c ∉  Si(c) є P(C) for all c 
є C. Si is called the irreflexive reachable list function of DM i є N and Si(c) is 
called the irreflexive reachable list of DM i є N from c є C. ≥i is the preference of 
DM i є N on C. Defining Ei as the set {(c, c' ) є C × C | c' є Si(c)}, there is the 
graph (C, Ei) of DM i є N, denoted by Gi, where C is the set of all vertices of the 
graph and Ei is the set of all arcs of the graph (Fang et al., 1993). 
 
For i є N and c, c' є C, c ≥i c' means that c is more or equally preferred to c' by 
DM i. c ~i c means that c ≥i c' and c' ≥i c, that is, c is equally preferred to c' by DM 
i. c >i c' means that c ≥i c' and “not (c' ≥i c)” that is, c is strictly more preferred to c' 
by DM i. DM i’s preferences ≥i is said to be transitive, if and only if for all c, c' , c" 
є C, if c ≥i c' and c' ≥i c" then c ≥i c".≥i is said to be anti-symmetric, if and only if 
for all c, c' є C, if c ≥i c' and c' ≥i c then c = c' . ≥i is said to be complete, if and 
only if for all c, c' є C, c ≥i c' or c' ≥i c (Fang et al., 1993). 
 
4.4.2. Attitude Representation 
In construction conflicts and disputes, the attitudes of construction participants 
can affect the outcome of their negotiations. Therefore, analyzing the conflict as 
well as the accompanying attitudes of the DMs is useful for a better 
understanding of the negotiation process.  It is also beneficial to model DMs’ 
attitudes and incorporate them into construction negotiation methodology so that 
the influence of DMs’ attitudes can be examined. 
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In this research, three types of attitudes are proposed, that is, positive, negative, 
and neutral attitudes in which a DM’s attitudes toward her/himself as well as 
toward others are considered. Moreover, it is assumed in this research that 
positive, negative, and neutral attitudes of a DM toward others derive “altruistic”, 
“sadistic”, and “apathetic” behaviors, respectively, and those toward her/himself 
derive “selfish”, “masochistic”, and “selfless” behaviors, respectively (Inohara et 
al., 2008). Table 4.2 shows these assumptions on the relationships between 
attitudes and DMs’ behavior. These assumptions imply that a DM modeled in this 
research is not “rational” in the classical game-theoretic sense, but is consistent 
with those of DMs’ emotions in the ‘soft’ game theory (Howard 1990; Howard 
1998), drama theory (Bennett and Howard 1996; Howard 1994 - Parts 1 and 2), 
and confrontation analysis (Bennett 1998). 
         
Table 4.2: Assumptions on Relationships between Attitudes and Behaviors 
                  (Inohara et al., 2008) 
 
Attitudes 
Types Toward Others Toward her/himself 
Positive Altruistic Selfish 
Negative Sadistic Masochistic 
Neutral Apathetic Selfless 
 
This research proposes a negotiation methodology that incorporates the attitudes 
of the DMs into the methodology at both the strategic and tactical levels.  It 
represents a major contribution and expansion of GMCR: combining attitudes 
within the paradigm of GMCR furnishes a flexible analytical tool which reflects 
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how the DMs’ attitudes may change the strategic outcomes of the negotiation. 
The range of definitions for attitudes in this section follows those defined by 
Inohara et al. (2007).  
 
4.4.3. Formal Definition of Attitude 
In this research, three basic types of attitude are defined and used to develop the 
negotiation methodology. A DM’s attitude is defined toward him/helself as well as 
toward other DMs involved in negotiation. 
 
   
 
In order to formally define attitude, at least two decision makers “DM i” and “DM j” 
should be considered. For DMs i, j є N, let Ei = {+, 0, –}N represent the set of 
attitudes of DM i. An element ei є Ei is called the attitudes of DM i for which ei = 
(eij) is the list of attitudes of DM i toward DM j for each j є N where eij є {+, 0, –}. 
The eij is referred to as the attitude of DM i to DM j where the values eij = +, eij = 0 
or eij = – indicates that DM i has a positive, neutral, or negative attitude toward 
DM j, respectively. 
 
According to the above definition, the attitudes of the DMs can be represented in 
a matrix format, as shown in Table 4.3 in which each cell entry can take on a 
Attitude Type 
Positive       (+) 
 
Neutral       (0) 
 
Negative       (-) 
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value of ‘+’, ‘0’ or ‘–‘. For example, for a rational game between two DMs (DM ‘o’: 
owner; DM ‘g’: government) in which it is assumed that each DM decides 
rationally, the attitude matrix is represented as displayed in Table 4.4. As can be 
seen, the owner and the government are positive toward themselves since eoo = 
+ and egg = + and neutral toward each other (eog = 0 and ego = 0). Such type of 
attitude matrix represents regular or rational attitudes of two DMs. 
  
Table 4.3: Tabular Representation     Table 4.4: Attitudes of DMs ‘o’ and       
of Attitudes (Inohara et al., 2007)                     ‘g’ in a Regular Analysis   
                                       




4.4.4. Attitude-Based Solution Concepts 
The solution concepts presented in Chapter 3 (Subsection 3.3.1) are referred to 
as “rational” or regular solution concepts since the DMs do not consider the 
various attitudes of other DMs. These solution concepts are now refined and 
expanded to explicitly account for the DMs’ attitudes and, hence, are 
appropriately called attitude-based or “relational” solution concepts. Prior to 
providing these stability definitions, a range of preference structures and special 
types of movements among states are defined (Inohara et al., 2008). According 
to the attitude tables shown in Table 4.3, corresponding moves among the 
decision states can be one of the following possibilities:  
 
DM o g 
O eoo = + eog = 0 
G ego = 0 egg = + 
DM i j 
i eii eij 
j eji ejj 
 89
Devoting Preference (Positive Attitude): The devoting preference (DP) of DM i є 
N with respect to DM j є N is ≥j, denoted by DPij, such that for s, t є S, “s DPij t” if 
and only if s ≥j t. In other words, the devoting preference means that if DM i has a 
devoting preference for state s with respect to state t for DM j, then DM j must 
prefer state s to state t. For example, if an owner has devoting preference or 
positive attitudes toward a contractor in a construction negotiation, and the 
contractor prefers state 2 to state 5, then the owner also prefers state 2 to state 
5. A similar definition can be written for aggressive preference. 
 
Aggressive Preference (Negative Attitude): The aggressive preference (AP) of 
DM i є N with respect to DM j є N is NE(>j), denoted by APij, where NE(>j) is 
defined as follows: for s, t є S, s NE(>j) t if and only if “s >j t” is not true. That is, 
for s, t є S, s APij t if and only if s NE (>j) t (if and only if t ≥j s under completeness 
of ≥j). In contrast to the devoting preference, the aggressive preference means 
that if DM i has an aggressive preference for state s with respect to state t for DM 
j, then DM j must prefer state t to state s. Using these concepts, as well as an 
indifference preference represented by I, the relational preference can then be 
determined. For example, if an owner has aggressive preference or negative 
attitudes toward a contractor in a construction negotiation, and the contractor 
prefers state 2 to state 5, then the owner must prefer state 5 to state 2.  
 
Using these attitude-based possible moves, the following attitude-related terms 
are defined and used in the stability analysis within the structure of GMCR: 
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Relational Preference (RP): The relational preference RP(e)ij of DM i є N with 
respect to DM j є N at e is defined as follows: 
 
In the above equation, Iij indicates that DM i is indifferent with respect to j’s 
preference, and hence, s Iij x means that DM i’s preferences between state s and 
x is not influenced by DM j’s preference. Here, the types of preferences are 
matched with the three different attitudes. What this means is that if DM i has a 
positive attitude toward DM j, DM i will have a devoting preference with respect to 
DM j. If DM i has a negative attitude toward DM j, DM i will have an aggressive 
preference with respect to DM j. Thus, a DM behaves according to his or her 
attitudes. 
 
Total Relational Preference (TRP): The total relational preference of DM i є N at 
e is defined as the ordering of TRP(e)i such that for s, t є S, s TRP(e)i t if and 
only if s RP(e)ij t for all j є N. A state satisfies a total relational preference for the 
situation in which it is a relational preference for DM i according to the attitudes of 
DM i toward all of the DMs in the conflict. Thus, if state s is a total relational 
preference of DM i relative to state t with respect to himself and DM j, and there 
are only the two DMs in the conflict, then state s is a total relational preference by 
DM i relative to state t. 
 
DPij  if  eij = + 
 
APij  if  eij = – 
 
Iij  if  eij = 0 
RP(e)ij = 
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Total Relational Reply (TRR): The total relational reply list of DM i є N at e for 
state s є S is defined as the set {t є Ri(s) U {s} | t TRP(e)i s} ⊂  Ri(s) U {s}, 
denoted by TRR(e)i(s). 
 
Relational less preferred or equally preferred states:  RΦ(e)i (s) is the set of all 
states which are “relationally less or equally preferred” to s by DM i (under 
attitude e). It should be noted that NE(x TRP(e)i s) means that “x TRP(e)i s” is not 
true. The same concept is defined for rational Φi (s). 
 
It should be mentioned that the above attitude-based definitions are used in this 
research for the first time to develop an attitude-based negotiation methodology 
for resolving complex disputes among participants involved in the construction 
industry. Employing the above proposed definitions, attitude-based solution 
concepts can be defined as an extension of rational solution concepts when 
attitudes are taken into account. Table 4.5 displays rational and attitude-based 
solution concepts within the structure of GMCR. In Table 4.5, “N” is the set of 
DMs, Ri(s) is the DM i’s reachable list, and R+i(s) is the DM i’s unilateral 
improvement list. Attitude-based general metarationality (RGMR) is best 
described as a situation in which a DM makes a unilateral move and opposing 
DMs sanction that move with moves of their own. In RGMR, these sanctioning 
moves do not have to be total attitude-based replies by the other DMs; they only 
have to be possible moves by the sanctioning DMs. As in the case of RGMR, the 
sanctioning moves need be only possible moves by the other DMs and do not 
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have to be either credible or relational. Sequential stability also occurs when one 
DM makes a move according to his or her total attitude-based reply list, and 
opposing DMs can sanction the move by moving to a state in their total attitude-
based reply lists. 
 
Table 4.5: Rational and Attitude-Based (Relational) Solution Concepts in GMCR  
Solution 
Concept No Attitude (Rational)  Attitude-Based (Relational) 
Nash Stability 
Nash: For i є N, state s є S is Nash 
stable for DM i, denoted by 
s є SiNash , if and only if 
Ri+(s) = Φ 
RNash: For i є N, state s є S is attitude-based 
Nash stable at e for DM i, denoted by s є 
SiRNash(e) , if and only if TRR(e)i (s) = {s}. 
 
Description Decision maker cannot move to a more preferred state. 
Sequential 
Stability 
SEQ: For i є N, state s є S is 
sequential stable for DM i, denoted 
by s є SiSEQ, if and only if for all x є 
Ri+(s), R+N\{i}(x) ∩ Φi(s) ≠ Φ 
RSEQ: For i є N, state s є S is attitude-based 
sequential stable at e for DM i, denoted by s 
є SiRSEQ(e), if and only if for all x є 
TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, TRR(e) N\{i}(x) ∩ RΦ(e)i(s) 
≠ Φ 
Description All decision makers’ improvements are sanctioned by subsequent moves by others 
Symmetric 
Metarationality 
SMR: For i є N, state s є S 
is symmetric metarational for DM i, 
denoted by s є SiSMR, if and only if for 
all x є Ri+(s), there exists y є RN\{i}(x) 
∩ Φi(s) such that z є Φi(s) for all z є 
Ri(y). 
RSMR: For i є N, state s є S 
is attitude-based symmetric metarational at e 
for DM i, denoted by s є SiRSMR(e), if and 
only if for all x є TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, there 
exists y є RN\{i}(x) ∩ RΦ(e)i(s) such that z є 
RΦ(e)i(s) for all z є Ri(y). 
Description All decision makers’ improvements are still sanctioned even after a possible response by the original decision maker to sanctioning. 
General 
Metarationality 
GMR: For i є N, state s є S is general 
metarational for DM i, denoted by s є 
SiGMR, if and only if for all x є Ri+(s), 
RN\{i} ∩Φi (s) ≠ Φ 
 
RGMR: For i є N, state s є S is attitude-
based general metarational at e for 
DM i, denoted by s є SiRGMR(e), if and only if 
for all x є TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, RN\{i}(x) ∩ 
RΦ(e)i (s) ≠ Φ 
Description All decision makers’ improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral moves by others. 
 
With respect to attitude-based stability analysis, DMs may have different attitudes 
toward each other. According to Table 4.2, DM i may have a positive, negative, 
or neutral attitude toward herself or her opponent, DM j. That is, each cell in 
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Table 4.2 can take one of the three possibilities (+, –, 0). Because there are only 
two DMs, four cases represent the DMs’ attitudes toward themselves and each 
other. Accordingly, the number of attitude cases or scenarios representing the 
DMs’ attitudes is calculated as follows. 
Attitude Scenarios = (number of possible attitudes)^(number of DMs’ positions) =(3)4=81. 
Since one scenario has been already considered for rational analysis (Table 4.3), 
the remaining attitude scenarios for attitude-based analysis equal 81-1 = 80 
attitude scenarios. For example, if 3 DMs are involved, then the number of 
scenarios becomes (3^9) = 19,683 attitude scenarios of the DMs’ attitudes toward 
themselves and one another. These scenarios constitute an attitude-based 
stability analysis that can be implemented in a graph model technique to arrive at 
strategic decisions for conflict analysis when the DMs’ attitudes are considered. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the systematic graph model procedure using rational and 
attitude-based approaches. 
        
 




Regular Solution Concepts 
Regular Stability Analysis 
Attitude-Based Analysis 
Attitude-based Solution Concepts 
Attitudinal Stability Analysis 
Equilibrium Outcomes 
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4.4.5. Propositions on Relationships among Attitude-based Stability Types 
One of the contributions of this research is to investigate how incorporating the 
DMs’ attitudes into the stability concepts can change the relationship among the 
stability concepts. In other words, when the attitudes of DMs change then the 
different relationships are considered for the attitude-based stability concepts. 
Three propositions on the relationships among attitude-based stability concepts 
within the paradigm of the GMCR are proposed in the following. The proofs of 
these propositions are presented by Inohara et al. (2008).   
 
Proposition 1: Consider a graph model (N, C, (Si)i є N , (≥i) i є N) of a conflict and a 
list e = (ei) i є N of attitudes ei of DM i for i є N. For i є N; Where N is the set of all 
decision makers (DMs). C is the set of all states of the focal decision making 
situation, where |C| ≥ 2. For i є N, Si is a function from C to the power set P(C) of 
C such that c є Si(c) є P(C) for all c є C. Si is called the irreflexive reachable list 
function of DM i є N and Si(c) is called the irreflexive reachable list of DM i є N 






iC  and 
)(eRNash




iC . In other words, if 
states 1 and 2, for example, are attitude-based Nash stable for DM i, they have 
also attitude-based Symmetric Metarationality stability and further, they have 
attitude-based General Metarationality stability. Moreover, if states 1 and 2, for 
example, are attitude-based Nash stable for DM i, they have also attitude-based 
Sequential stability and further, they have attitude-based General Metarationality 
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stability. It should be noted that these relationships among the relational stability 
concepts are logically true from their definitions shown in Table 3.4 
 
Proposition 2: Consider a graph model (N, C, (Si)i є N , (≥i) i є N) of a conflict and a 
list e = (ei) i є N of attitudes ei of DM i for i є N. Assume that N = {1, 2} and the 
DMs’ attitudes e = (ei) i є N are positive toward both themselves and other DMs. 
Also, assume that DMs’ preferences ≥1 and ≥2 are transitive and antisymmetric. 
Then, for i є N and c є C, c є
)(eRNash




Proposition 3: Consider a graph model (N, C, (Si)i є N , (≥i) i є N) of a conflict and a 
list e = (ei) i є N of attitudes ei of DM i for i є N. Assume that N = {1, 2} and the 
DMs’ attitudes e = (ei) i є N are negative toward both themselves and other DM. 
Moreover, assume that DMs’ preferences ≥1 and ≥2 are transitive, antisymmetric, 
and complete. Then, for i є N and c є C, c є
)(eRNash




The interpretation of Propositions 2 and 3 indicates that when DMs have totally 
positive (or totally negative) attitudes toward themselves and one another, then 
attitude-based Nash Stability (RNash) and attitude-based sequential stability 
(RSEQ) are equivalent to each other, respectively.     
 
4.5 Strategic Negotiation Methodology: A Brownfield Case Study 
The attitude-based solution concepts, defined in the foregoing section, are 
incorporated into GMCR technique to propose a negotiation methodology for 
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construction conflicts. To clarify the development of the methodology, the 
procedure is demonstrated using a brownfield construction case study. More 
information about brownfield negotiations have been provided in Subsection 
2.2.3. In the proposed case study, the land of a privately owned property is 
contaminated, and according to the municipality’s laws, the property is 
considered a brownfield site which needs to be redeveloped in two steps: 
remediation, which means that the contaminated soil must be replaced, and 
redevelopment, which means that a new structure is to be constructed. Due to 
the enormous costs, responsibilities, risks, and uncertainties involved with 
brownfield construction, conflicts have often arisen between the current property 
owner and Kitchener municipality. To illustrate these conflicts, a hypothetical 
case study is considered in which the DMs are the owner and the government 
(Yousefi et al., 2009). In the real world, the owner is very often a company, and 
the government represents a body of people. However, since this research deals 
with personal attitudes, it is more convenient to refer to the DMs as individuals. 
Therefore, for the purpose of the analysis, the owner will be referred to as “she”, 
“her”, “herself”, etc. The government will be referred to as “he”, “him”, “himself”, 
etc.  
 
With respect to the modeling stage of GMCR, first, the DMs involved in the 
brownfield conflict and their available options are to be determined. It can be 
assumed that both DMs in this case study have reviewed the different choices 
available to them and selected the following options: 
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Each option can be either accepted or rejected by each DM and since there are 
four choices in total, the number of states is 2^4 = 16. Four of the 16 states are 
infeasible, so the total number of feasible states is 12. Infeasible states and the 
process of deleting them are explained by Fraser and Hipel (1984). The two 
DMs, whose goals differ, would prefer first to have strategic-level advice which 
can help them decide which conflicting issues they may further negotiate at the 
tactical level. GMCR is an appropriate technology for analyzing this case-study 
conflict. As Kilgour (2007) pointed out, GMCR provides an understanding of and 
insight into strategic decisions, and therefore DMs can benefit from the strategic 
advice provided by GMCR. At the strategic level, GMCR will also allow the two 
DMs to define the most beneficial decisions among the 12 states. In Chapter 6, a 
complementary negotiation methodology is introduced that will support the 
tactical level of negotiations such as negotiating the exact amount of brownfield 
redevelopment cost each DM should pay in order to reach a sustaible mutual 
agreement. 
 
4.5.1. Feasible States and Preferences 
Table 4.6 shows the 12 feasible states for the case study. Each state is assigned 
a number label for referencing purposes. In a given column, a “Y” means “yes”, 
the option is selected by the DM controlling it, whereas an “N” indicates “no”, it is 
not taken. For example, state 2 in Table 4.6 represents a scenario in which 
1) Accept Liability 
 
2) Sell Property 
Owner’s Options 





Owner does not accept liability (N), sells the property (Y), Government does not 
share the costs (N), and does not file the case in court (N). 
 
Table 4.6: Feasible States for the Case Study 
 
12 Feasible States 
DMs Options 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1)Accept Liability N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Owner 
2) Sell Property N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
3) Share Costs N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Government 
4) Lawsuit N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
 
 Figure 4.3 is the integrated graph model representation for the case study and 
the ranking of the states for each DM from the most preferred to the least 
preferred state. The government’s graph model, for example, consists of four 
groups of graphs in which each node represents a feasible state and an arc with 
arrowheads depicts the movement that the DM unilaterally controls between the 
two states. Part C of Figure 4.3 displays the ordinal ranking of the states for both 
DMs, sorted from the most preferred states on the left to the least preferred 
states on the right. Accordingly, the owner most prefers that the government 
shares the costs of redevelopment with the owner (state 4) and least prefers to 
accept liability and have the case filed in court (state 9). The most preferred state 
for the government is state 1, in which the current owner accepts liability and no 
other actions are taken (i.e., Government does not take the case to court), and 
the least preferred state is state 4, in which the government shares the costs of 
the brownfield redevelopment. 
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4.5.2. Reachable List 
The reachable list is a record of all the states that a given DM can reach from a 





















A) Owner’s Moves 
B) Government’s Moves 
Figure 4.3: Integrated Graph Model and State Preference for DMs 
    DMs Ordering of States from Most to Least Preferred 
Most Preferred         --------------     Least  Preferred 
Owner  4     5     6     7     2     0     3     1     10     8     11     9 
 
Government  1     5     7     11   3     2     6     9     10     8      0      4   
C) DMs’ Ordinal State Preferences 
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as follows (Hamouda et al., 2004): for i є N and s є S, DM i’s reachable list from 
state s is the set {t є S │(s, t) є Ai}, denoted by Ri(s) ⊂  S. For the case study, the 
reachable lists for both DMs are displayed in Table 4.7. The reachable lists of the 
DMs will be used to determine unilateral improvement states for each DM when 
their attitudes are incorporated into their decision to either move to another state 
or remain in the current state. 
 
4.5.3. Stability Analysis 
A stability analysis is the systematic study of potential moves and countermoves 
by the DMs as they jostle for more preferred positions during the evolution of the 
conflict and determine whether they can reach the most likely resolution (Hipel, 
2007). The solution concepts, defined in Table 4.5, are used to test the feasible 
states in order to determine whether each of the DMs’ movements is stable or 
unstable. 
                           Table 4.7: Reachable Lists for the Case Study 
 
State R (owner) - State R (government) - State 
0 1,2,3 4,8 
1 0,2,3 5,9 
2 0,1,3 6,10 
3 0,1,2 7,11 
4 5,6,7 0,8 
5 4,6,7 1,9 
6 4,5,7 2,10 
7 4,5,6 3,11 
8 9,10,11 0,4 
9 8,10,11 1,5 
10 8,9,11 2,6 
11 8,9,10 3,7 
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The mathematical forms for the solution concepts, shown in the centre column of 
Table 4.5, are interpreted for the two DMs in this case as follows (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984): 
1. Nash: In this situation, a DM has no Unilateral Improvement (UI) to make 
from the state. In other words, the already selected strategy is the best 
that can be chosen given the strategy selection of the other DM. A UI is 
a state to which a particular DM can unilaterally move by a change in 
strategy, assuming that the other DM’s strategy remains the same. The 
Nash (rational) state is a stable outcome and is denoted by “Nash.”  
2. Unstable: In this situation, the DM has at least one UI from which the 
other DM can take no credible action that results in a less preferred state 
for the given DM. An unstable outcome is denoted by “U.” 
3. Sequentially sanctioned: In this case, for all UIs available to one DM, 
credible actions can be taken by the other DM in which a less preferred 
state than the one from which the DM is improving will be resulted. A 
credible action is one that results in a more preferred state for the DM 
taking the action. The possibility that a worse state could result from a 
DM changing strategy deters the DM from unilaterally attempting a 
position improvement and induces a stability type labeled as “SEQ.”  
 
4.5.4. Analysis of the DMs’ Neutral Attitudes towards Each Other 
The attitudes of the DMs can be integrated into the stability analysis using a 
stability analysis tableau which consists of each DM’s state ranking (i.e., 
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preference vector), moves, stability types, and equilibrium results in an organized 
format. A tableau helps in the systematic modeling and analysis of the moves 
and countermoves by the DMs to reach possible resolution for a conflict. More 
details about stability analysis tableau are provided by Fraser and Hipel (1984).    
 
For the brownfield case study, a stability analysis tableau has been developed for 
the two DMs who initially have rational attitudes (Table 4.3). Rational DMs have 
positive attitudes with respect to themselves and have neutral or zero attitudes 
toward each other as shown in Figure 4.4.  
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DMs Case 1: Positive attitudes 
towards themselves 
























DMs Case 1: Positive attitudes 
towards themselves 





Figure 4.4: Stability Analysis Tableau for Two DMs with Rational Attitudes 
4.5.4.1. Assessment of the stability 
As displayed in Figure 4.4, the moves from a state that are preferred by a DM are 
listed blow the state and also appear to the left of that state in the state ranking. 
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The procedure for determining the types of stability are quite straightforward and 
is extensively explained by Fraser and Hipel (1984). In order to check the Nash 
stability, for example, Figure 4.4 is examined for states in the DMs’ state rankings 
that do not have any moves listed under them. Since the DMs can not move from 
these states, they are Nash stable and can be immediately marked with “Nash”. 
In Figure 4.4, states 2, 4, and 10 are Nash stable for the owner, whereas states 
1, 7, 2, and 8 are Nash stable for the government. Each of the remaining states 
in the two state rankings can be assessed for their stability, which is normally 
done for each DM sequentially. The owner can unilaterally move to state 4 from 
state 5. However, the examination of the government’s vector reveals that the 
government has an improvement from 4 to 8 and then to zero. As shown in the 
owner’s state ranking (i.e., preference vector), both 8 and zero are less preferred 
than 5, and the owner is therefore deterred from improving from 5 because of the 
possibility that 8 or zero could result. Because the government would improve its 
position by unilaterally moving from 4 to 8 or to zero, the sanction is credible. 
Consequently, sate 5 is sequentially stable and a “SEQ” is written below state 5 
in the owner’s state ranking. In the actual conflict, state 5 means that the owner 
keeps sharing liability for the costs with the government who shares the costs of 
brownfield redevelopment as well. Otherwise, if the owner does not share the 
liability costs, then the government may either reject sharing the costs with the 
owner or take the case to court. The same procedure applies for the government 
regarding state 5. If the government unilaterally moves to state1, then the owner 
has an improvement from 1 to 2 which is less preferred by the government and 
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more preferred by the owner. Thus, state 1 is sequentially sanctioned by the 
owner and hence, outcome 5 is “SEQ” for the government. The same stability 
analysis process is used to test the remaining states, as summarized in Table 
4.8.       
 
If a state possesses some types of stability for all DMs, it is called an equilibrium 
state which constitutes a possible resolution to the conflict (Fraser and Hipel, 
1984). All other outcomes are unstable for at least one of the DMs, and therefore 
are not normally considered possible resolution. Equilibria are indicated by “E” 
placed below the corresponding state (i.e., states 2, 5, and 7) on the last row in 
the stability analysis tableau (Figure 4.4). An outcome that is unstable for at least 
one DM is not marked by “E” In a stability tableau. 
  
4.5.5. Analysis of the DMs’ Negative Attitudes towards Each Other 
In the previous case, it was assumed that the DMs have rational attitudes toward 
each other, and therefore, the DMs attitudes were not investigated. In this case 
however, a situation is examined in which the DMs do not behave rationally and 
the DMs’ various attitudes affect the outcome of their negotiation. To examine the 
influence of DMs’ attitudes toward each other in this case, a situation is 
considered in which the DMs change their attitudes from rational to relational 
attitudes and possess negative attitudes toward each other and positive attitudes 
toward themselves. In other words, the owner has a positive attitude toward 
herself and negative attitude toward the government, whereas the government 
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has a positive attitude toward himself and negative attitude toward the owner. 
The results of the change in DMs’ attitudes are displayed in Figure 4.5 and 
discussed below. The interactive decision-making analysis, defined within the 
structure of GMCR, is performed and the attitude-based solution concepts 
defined in Table 4.5 are applied. The results of the attitude-based stability 
analysis indicate that outcomes 5, 7, 2, 10, and 8 (Figure 4.5) were resulted 
since they are Relational Nash (RN) and Relational Sequentially Sanctioned 
(RSEQ) stables for both DMs. In the previous scenario explained in Subsection 
4.5.4, different equilibria (2, 5, and 7) were obtained. Thus, the changes in the 
attitudes cause the changes in the resulting equilibria. 


































Case 2: Positive attitudes 
towards themselves 
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towards themselves 





Figure 4.5: Attitude-Based Stability Analysis for Two DMs with Negative Attitudes 
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4.5.5.1. Assessment of the stability 
As shown in Figure 4.5, below a given state in the state ranking for each DM are 
the DM’s possible moves or the Total Relational Reply (TRR) lists determined 
according to the attitudes shown above the tableau in Figure 4.5. The stability of 
each sate in the sate ranking has been evaluated and shown below the DMs’ 
state ranking. State 6, circled in Figure 4.5, is assessed, for example, for the 
owner. According to the reachable list of the owner in Table 4.7, Rowner (6) = {4, 5, 
7}. As the owner has a positive attitude with respect to herself, the owner has a 
devoting preference (defined in Subsection 4.4.2) toward herself. From the 
ranking of the states in Figure 4.5, it can be seen that states 4 and 5 are more 
preferred and 7 is less preferred to state 6 for the owner within the reachable list 
for state 6, therefore, 4, 5 RP (eowner, owner= +) 6. Since the owner has a negative 
attitude toward the government, the owner wants to ensure that her improving 
move from 6 to 4 or 5 will not benefit her opponent. From the ordering of the 
states for the government in Figure 4.5, it can be seen that 5 is more preferred 
and 4 is less preferred to 6 and thus, 4 RP (eowner, government= -) 6. It can be 
concluded that 4 TRP (eowner) 6 and thus TRR (6)owner ={4}, which is circled in 
Figure 4.5. The same procedure is carried out for other states to determine TRR 
for each DM. Once TRR (6) for the owner is obtained, the stability of state 6 is 
examined. If the owner moves from 6 to 4, then the government can move from 4 
to 8. Although 8 is less preferred to 6 for the government, state 8 is also less 
preferred to 6 for the owner and because the owner has a positive attitude 
toward herself she is deterred to move from 6 to 4. Thus, state 6 becomes RSEQ 
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for the owner and an “RSEQ” is written below state 6 for the owner’s state 
ranking.  
 
The stability of state 6 is now assessed for the government. According to his 
reachable list in Table 4.7, Rgovernment (6) = {2, 10}. As the government has a 
positive attitude with respect to himself (Figure 4.5), he has a devoting 
preference toward himself. It can be seen from his state ranking that state 2 is 
more preferred and 10 is less preferred to state 6 within the reachable list for 
state 6. As such, 2 RP (egov.,gov.= +) 6. Since the government has a negative 
attitude toward the owner, he wants to ensure that his improving move from 6 to 
2 will not benefit his opponent (the owner). It can be noticed from the ordering of 
the states for the owner that 2 is less preferred to 6, and thus, the government 
can escalate the conflict by unilaterally moving to state 2. It should be noted that 
the government is not deterred to move to 2 from 6 because state 2 is “RN” for 
the owner. State 6 then becomes unstable for the government and an “U” is 
written below state 6 for the government’s state ranking. It can be concluded that 
2 TRP (egov.) 6, so TRR (6)gov. ={2}. The same stability analysis is performed for 
the other states, and the results are summarized in Table 4.8.       
 
4.5.6. Analysis of the DMs’ Positive Attitudes towards Each Other 
A situation is now considered in which both DMs have positive attitudes with 
respect to themselves and toward each other. Such situation is in contrast to the 
preceding situation in which the DMs had negative attitudes toward each other. 
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The objective is to examine how the possible strategic negotiation outcome 
changes when the DMs’ attitudes change. The interactive decision-making 
analysis, defined within the structure of GMCR, is performed and the attitude-
based solution concepts defined in Table 4.4 are applied. Accordingly, states 1, 
2, 4, and 5, shown in Figure 4.6, were resulted as equilibria since they are 
Relational Nash (RN) stable for the DMs. It should be remembered that in the 
previous scenarios, different equilibria were obtained. It can again be seen that 
the changes in the DMs’ attitudes cause corresponding changes in the resulting 
equilibria. In this scenario, states 1, 2, 4, and 5 constitute equilibrium states, 
indicating that the positive attitudes of the DMs have provided both DMs with 
better equilibrium states; thus, the DMs may reach a better strategic resolution to 































Case 3: Positive attitudes 
towards themselves 










































Case 3: Positive attitudes 
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Figure 4.6: Attitude-Based Stability Analysis for Two DMs with Positive Attitudes 
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4.5.6.1. Assessment of the stability 
For this situation, the stability of state 6, circled in Figure 4.6, is evaluated for 
both DMs. It should be noted that state 6 was already examined for previous 
situation in Subsection 4.5.5. According to the reachable list of the owner in 
Table 4.7, Rowner (6) = {4, 5, 7}. Because the owner has a positive attitude with 
respect to herself, she has a devoting preference (defined in Subsection 4.4.2) 
toward herself. From the ranking of the states in Figure 4.6, it can be seen that 
states 4 and 5 are more preferred and 7 is less preferred to state 6 for the owner 
within the reachable list for state 6, so 4, 5 RP (eowner, owner= +) 6. Since the owner 
has also a positive attitude toward the government, the owner wants to ensure 
that her move from 6 to 4 or 5 will not lower her opponent’s position. Thus, from 
the ordering of the states for the government in Figure 4.6, it can be seen that 5 
is more preferred and 4 is less preferred to 6 and thus, 5 RP (eowner, government= +) 
6. It means that the owner’s move from 6 to 5 benefits the DMs and, thus, the 
owner has a possible move from 6 to 5. It is concluded that, 5 TRP (eowner) 6, so 
TRR (6)owner ={5}, circled in Figure 4.6. 
 
The stability of state 6 is now assessed for the government. According to his 
reachable list in Table 4.6, Rgovernment (6) = {2, 10}. Because the government has 
a positive attitude with respect to himself (Figure 4.6), he has a devoting 
preference toward himself. It can be seen from his ranking states that state 2 is 
more preferred and 10 is less preferred to state 6 within the reachable list for 
state 6, so 2 RP (egov.,gov.= +) 6. Since the government has a positive attitude 
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toward the owner, he wants to ensure that his unilateral move from 6 to 2 will not 
lower his opponent’s position. Thus, it can be seen from the ordering of the 
states for the owner that 2 is less preferred to 6, and thus the government is 
deterred from escalating the conflict by moving to state 2. Accordingly, the 
government has no possible move from state 6 according to his attitude. 
 
Once the TRR lists for the DMs are determined, the stability of state 6 is 
examined. If the owner moves from 6 to 5, the government has no move from 5 
and, therefore, the owner can move from 6 to 5 and, thus, state 6 becomes 
unstable for the owner. Because the government has no move from 6, state 6 
becomes RNASH stable for the government as shown in Figure 4.6. It can be 
concluded that Φ TRP (egov.) 6, so TRR (6)gov. ={ Φ }. The same stability analysis 
has been performed for the other states, and the results are summarized in Table 
4.8. Separate stability analyses for the owner and the government are also 
shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, respectively. The resulting outcomes of the three 
situations in the case study are discussed as follows.           
 
4.6. Discussion of the Resulting Strategic Decisions 
In the previous section, a brownfield case study was studied considering three 
attitude cases: 1) the DMs had neutral (zero) attitudes toward each other; 2) they 
had negative attitudes toward each other; and 3) they had positive attitudes 
toward each other. The objective is to examine how changes in the DMs’ 
attitudes can influence the negotiation outcome.  
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Table 4.8: Summary of the Stability Analysis for the Case Study 
Note 1: “O” stands for owner and “G” stands for government. 
Note 2: The grayed states are equilibria for each situation. 
Note 3: States with gray cells stand for equilibria or possible solutions 
DMs’ Attitudes toward each other State 
 
DMs 
 Neutral (zero) Negative Positive 
O 
Unstable: O is not deterred to 
move to 2, because 2 is Nash 
stable state for G.   
Stable: O is deterred to move to 
her only UI state 2, because 2 is 
more preferred to 0 for G and O 
does not want to improve G’s 
position. 
Unstable: to improve her position 
and G’ position, O moves to her 
only state 2 which is more 
preferred state to 0 for O and G.  
0 
G 
Unstable: if G moves to 8, O can 
countermove from 8 to 10 which is 
more preferred state than 8 for G.   
Unstable: to lower O’s position , 
G moves to his only state 8 which 
is less preferred to 0 for O. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 
her only UI state 8, because 8 is 
less preferred to 0 for O and G 
does not want to lower O’s 
position. 
O 
Unstable: O is not deterred to 
move to 2, because 2 is Nash 
stable state for G.   
Unstable: to lower G’s position, O 
moves to 2,0, and 3 which are less 
preferred to 1 for G. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 
UIs 2, 0, or 3 because they are less 
preferred to 1 for G, and O does 
not want to lower G’s position. 
1 
 
G Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within G’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
O Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within O’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within O’ reachable list 2 
 G Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within G’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
O 
Unstable: O is not deterred to 
move to 2, because 2 is Nash 
stable state for G. 
Unstable: to lower G’s position, O 
moves to 0 and 2 which are less 
preferred states to 3 for G. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 
UIs 2 or 0, because they are less 
preferred to 3 for G, and O does 




Stable: if G moves to UIs 7 or 11, 
then O countermoves to states 4 
and 10 respectively which are less 
preferred to 3 for G. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 
11 since O has a credible sanction 
from 11 to 10 which is less 
preferred to 3 for G.  
Unstable: to improve his position 
and O’ position, G moves to UI 
state 7 which is more preferred 
state to 3 for G and O; also, G is 
deterred to lower O’s position by 
moving to his UI state 11.  
O Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within O’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within O’ reachable list 
4 
 G 
Unstable: if G moves to 8, O can 
countermove from 8 to 10 which is 
more preferred state than 4 for G. 
Unstable: to lower O’s position , 
G moves to 8 and 0 which are less 
preferred to 4 for O. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 
UIs 8 or 0, because they are less 
preferred to 4 for O, and G does 
not want to lower O’s position. 
O 
Stable: if O moves to UI 4, then G 
countermoves  from 4 to 8 or 0 
which are less preferred to 5 for O. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 4 
since G has a credible sanction 
from 4 to 8 which is less preferred 
to 5 for O. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 
her only UI state 4, because 4 is 
less preferred to 5 for G, and O 





Stable: if G moves to UI 1, then O 
countermoves from 1 to 2, 0, or 3 
which are less preferred to 5 for G. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 1 
since O has a credible sanction 
from 1 to 2 which is less preferred 
to 5 for G. 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
O 
Stable: if O moves to UI 4 or 5, 
then G can countermove  from 4 or 
5 to 8, 0, or 1 which are less 
preferred to 6 for O. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 4 
since G has a credible sanction 
from 4 to 8 which is less preferred 
to 6 for O. 
Unstable: O moves to 5 to 





Unstable: G is not deterred to 
move to 2, because 2 is Nash 
stable state for O.   
Unstable: to lower O’s position, G 
moves to his only state 2 which is 
less preferred state to 6 for O. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 
his only UI state 2, because 2 is 
less preferred to 6 for O, and G is 
deterred to lower O’s position. 
7 
 O 
Stable: if O moves to UIs 4, 5, or 
6 then G can countermove  from 4, 
5, and 6 to 8, 0, 1, and 2 
respectively which are less 
preferred states to 7 for O. 
Stable: O is deterred to move to 4 
or 6 since G has credible sanction 
from 4 and 6 to 8 and 2 
respectively. 8 and 2 are  less 
preferred to 7 for O. 
Unstable: to improve her position 
and G’ position, O moves to UI 
state 5 which is more preferred 
state to 7 for G and O; also, O is 
deterred to lower G’s position by 
moving to her UIs 4 or 6 which are 
less preferred to 7 for G. 
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DMs’ Attitudes toward each other State 
 
DMs 
 Neutral (zero) Negative Positive 
G Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
O 
Unstable: if O moves to 10, then 
G can countermove from 10 to 2 
and 6 which are more preferred 
state than 8 for O. 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within O’ reachable list 
Unstable: to improve her position 
and G’ position, O moves to her 
only UI state 10 which is more 
preferred state to 8 for O and G. 
8 
 
G Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within G’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
O 
Unstable: if O moves to 8, 10, or 
11, then G can not deter O because 
9 is the least preferred state for O. 
Unstable: to lower G’s position, O 
moves to 8 or 10 which are less 
preferred states to 9 for G who has 
no credible sanction from 8 or 10. 
Unstable: to improve her position 
and G’ position, O moves to UI 
state 11 which is more preferred 
state to 9 for G and O; also, O is 
deterred to lower G’s position by 
moving to her UIs 8 or 10 which 




Stable: if G moves to 1 or 5, O 
can countermove from 1 to 0 and 
from 5 to 4. 0 and 4 are less 
preferred than 9 for G. 
Stable: G is deterred to move to 1 
or 5, because 1 and 5 are more 
preferred to 9 for O and G is 
deterred to improve O’s position. 
Unstable: to improve his position 
and O’ position, G can move to his 
both UIs 1 and 5 which are more 
preferred states to 9 for G and O. 
O Nash Stable: no unilateral moves Nash Stable: no improvement moves within O’ reachable list 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within O’ reachable list 
10 
G 
Unstable: G is not deterred to 
move to 2, because 2 is Nash 
stable state for O.   
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
Unstable: to improve his position 
and O’ position, G can move to his 
both UIs 2 and 6 which are more 
preferred states to 10 for G and O. 
O 
Unstable: O is not deterred to 
move to 8, because 8 is Nash 
stable state for G. 
Unstable: to lower G’s position, O 
moves to 8 or 10 which are less 
preferred to 11 for G who has no 
credible sanction from 8 or 10.  
Stable: O is deterred to move to 
her UIs 8 or 10, because they are 
less preferred to 11 for G, and O is 
deterred to lower G’s position. 11 
G 
Stable: if G moves to 7, then O 
can countermove from 7 to 4 or 6 
which are less preferred states than 
11 for G. 
Nash Stable: no improvement 
moves within G’ reachable list 
Unstable: to improve his position 
and O’ position, G moves to his 
only UI state 7 which is more 
preferred state to 11 for G and O.  
 
 














































































































Table 4.8 (Cont.) 
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To achieve this objective, the attitude-based stability analysis was performed. 
Due to the changes in the DMs’ attitudes regarding the three attitude cases, 
three different sets of outcomes, were obtained. The resulting equilibrium states 
are reviewed and one agreed-upon equilibrium state as the most beneficial 
strategic decision of the brownfield negotiation is determined. The results of the 
stability analysis for each attitude case are shown in Figure 4.7, and a brief 
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2, 5, 7, 8, 10
1, 2, 4, 5
 
Note: Decision 2 is considered a beneficial strategic decision  
Figure 4.7: Three Sets of Equilibria for Three Attitude Cases 
 
4.6.1. Attitude Case 1 
In this attitude case, the DMs have neutral (zero) attitudes toward each other. 
Using the proposed attitude-based stability analysis, three possible strategic 
solutions (i.e., states 2, 5, and 7) were obtained for this case as shown in Figure 
4.7. The DMs evaluate the three resulting decision options and try to find the 
 114
most beneficial strategic outcome for the conflict. One key outcome of the 
stability analysis for this case study is outcome 2, which means that the owner 
does not accept liability and sells the property, and that the government does not 
share the costs of the brownfield redevelopment and does not take the case to 
court. Another possible solution to the conflict is outcome 5, which corresponds 
to saying that the owner accepts her liability regarding the property remediation 
and does not sell her property, and the government shares the costs of 
remediation and does not file a court case. The third possible solution to the 
conflict is outcome 7, which means that the owner accepts liability and the 
government shares the costs. Once the land is remediated, the owner sells the 
property to the government and the government does not take the case to court. 
 
4.6.2. Attitude Case 2 
In this attitude case, the DMs have negative attitudes toward each other. The 
results of the proposed attitude-based stability analysis show that the set of 
equilibria changed toward more hostile possible solutions when the DMs 
changed their attitudes from neutral to negative toward each other. In this case, 
the equilibrium set includes 5, 7, 2, 8, and 10. It is observed that outcomes 2 and 
5 (possible solutions in Case 1) are also resulted and thereby, are still 
considered in this case as possible solution options although the DMs have 
changed their attitudes. It can also be noticed that outcomes 8 and 10 are less 
preferred solutions for both DMs in comparison to outcomes 2, 5, and 7. 
Equilibrium state 8 for the conflict corresponds to saying that the owner neither 
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accepts liability nor sells her property and that the government does not share 
any cost and takes the case to court. In other words, both DMs escalate the 
conflict because they have negative attitudes toward each other. Since they have 
positive attitudes only with respect to themselves, they strive to improve their 
own position and lower their opponents’ position in the conflict. Equilibrium state 
10 also corresponds to saying that the owner does not accept liability and sells 
the property and that the government rejects any cost sharing and tries to lower 
the owner’s position by taking the case to court. Hence, the owner rejects liability 
since she considers liability acceptance as a positive point for the government, 
and this positive move is in contrast with her negative attitude toward the 
government. As can be seen, if DMs with negative attitudes interact, the strategic 
solutions that result are more hostile. 
 
4.6.3. Attitude Case 3 
With respect to this attitude case, the DMs have positive attitudes toward 
themselves and each other. In this scenario, outcomes 1, 2, 4, and 5 are 
considered as possible solution options for the conflict. Equilibrium state 1 means 
that the owner accepts liability and does not sell her property and that the 
government does not share the costs and does not take the case to court. 
Equilibrium state 4 means that the owner neither accepts liability nor sells her 
property, and that the government does accept all the costs and does not take 
the case to court. It can be observed that better possible solution options were 
obtained in this attitude case due to the positive attitudes of the DMs toward each 
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other. It is noted that outcomes 2 and 5 (possible solutions in Cases 1 and 2) are 
also resulted in this case and thereby, are still considered as possible solution 
options although the DMs have changed their attitudes. Considering the results 
of the three attitude cases, the following observations are considered: 
1. The increase in the number of solution options (equilibria) in a conflict 
may help the involved DMs choose a better possible solution from the 
resulting equilibrium states; 
2. Outcomes 2, 4, and 5 are more preferred for both DMs than the outcomes 
8 and 10 obtained from Case 2. In other words, the positive attitudes of 
the DMs toward themselves and each other not only mitigate the degree 
of hostility involved in outcomes 8 and 10 but also shift the range of 
solution options in the DMs’ state ranking (i.e., preference vector) from 
right (less preferred states) to the left (more preferred states). Considering 
the DMs’ state rankings in Figure 4.3 c, it can be seen that the positive 
attitudes of the DMs help shift the set of equilibria in the state rankings 
from the subset of 5, 7, 2, 8, and 10 on the right to the better subset of 1, 
2, 4, and 5 on the left for both DMs; 
3. One important observation is that the resulting equilibria for the three 
scenarios share equilibria 2 and 5, as shown in Figure 4.7. Solution 
options 2 and 5 are the only common equilibria obtained from the stability 
analysis based on three different DM attitudes because no matter what 
type of attitudes (neutral, negative, or positive) the DMs have toward each 
other, these outcomes provide equilibrium solutions. Thus, the DMs 
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involved may (or may not) consider each of the equilibrium states a 
reasonable decision and a strategic outcome of their conflict and may 
cooperatively continue their interactive negotiation to develop a tactical 
level of tradeoffs for the conflicting issue involved in solutions 2 and 5. It 
should be noted that the only conflicting issue in equilibrium state 2 is that 
the owner sells the property as indicated by “Y” in Table 4.6. The issues 
indicated by “N” for that equilibrium are not considered to be conflicting 
issues. Equilibrium state 5 consists of two conflicting issues indicated by 
two “Y” in this outcome: the amount of liability that the owner accepts and 
the amount of cost that the government shares. From the two possible 
solutions 2 and 5, the owner and the government can strategically agree 
on outcome 2, which has only one conflicting issue, and continue to 
negotiate in order to find a concession price for the owner’s property. 
Such negotiations have to be carried out at the tactical level rather than at 
the strategic decision-making level. The tactical level of negotiation 
methodology involving two DMs is proposed in Chapter 6.  
 
4.7. Summary  
The primary objective of this chapter was to present meaningfully and 
constructively the strategic level of the proposed negotiation methodology 
involving two decision makers. The proposed methodology systematically 
employs GMCR and incorporates the decision makers’ attitudes into the 
methodology. In this chapter, the proposed negotiation framework was initially 
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introduced. As shown in Figure 4.1, three major components constitute the 
proposed negotiation framework: understanding the construction negotiation, 
developing an attitude-based construction negotiation methodology, and 
designing a negotiation decision support system. The requirements for 
understanding construction negotiations were explained, and the characteristics 
of construction negotiations as well as construction participants were highlighted. 
An attitude-based negotiation methodology at the strategic level was then 
developed. To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed methodology, a 
case study of a brownfield construction conflict involving two decision makers 
was used in order to develop the negotiation methodology. The brownfield case 
study has been also used in Chapter 6 to develop a negotiation methodology at 
the tactical level when.    
 
The proposed negotiation methodology at the strategic level has been developed 
when only two decision makers are involved in the negotiation process to arrive 
at a mutual strategic agreement. The proposed strategic negotiation 
methodology in this chapter has been adapted and further developed, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 in order to include multiple decision makers involved in 








CHAPTER 5  
Attitude-Based Strategic Negotiation 





In this chapter, the negotiation methodology, presented in Chapter 4 for two 
Decision Makers (DMs), is developed further, and an attitude-based negotiation 
methodology for multiple DMs and multiple conflicting issues is proposed. A real 
life brownfield negotiation involving multiple DMs is used to clearly demonstrate 
the advantages of the proposed methodology. The historical background of the 
case study is therefore summarized, and the DMs involved, along with their 
options and the conflicting issues are also presented. The proposed negotiation 
methodology has been developed using an attitude-based Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution which has been expanded to include both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses.  
 
5.2. Real-Life Brownfield Case Study 
Downtown Kitchener, located in southern Ontario has a number of aging 
buildings, older industrial plants, brownfield lands, and underutilized sites that 
were once productive contributors to the economy of the community. These 
lands and buildings need to be brought back into production.  
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The case study used for this research is a brownfield land at the corner of King 
Street and Victoria Street in Kitchener. For approximately 75 years, B.F. 
Goodrich manufactured plastic and rubber components for the automotive 
industry in a five-story, 5,000 m2 factory and several adjacent outbuildings on an 
8-hectare site near the intersection of King and Victoria Street, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. Large quantities of fuels and chemicals were used and stored at the 
site, including solvents. Because of the lack of proper maintenance and the 
absence of environmental regulations in 1919 when B.F. Goodrich began 
operation, the land became contaminated, in large part from 75 years of leaks 
and spills from underground storage tanks, most of which contained naphtha, 
and some of which held chlorinated solvents and heavy metals. During the 
remediation process, elevated concentrations of beryllium and zinc, and to a 
lesser extent, copper were detected in the upper 1.0 m of soil, primarily on the 
south side of the site. 
 
Figure 5.1: Satellite Image of the Former Brownfield Site 
N 
Constructed UW  
School of Pharmacy 
Former Brownfield Site 
Heavily Contaminated 
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In 1983, B.F. Goodrich sold the site (factory) to Epton. As part of the transaction, 
Goodrich Canada indemnified Epton for specific claims that could arise from 
environmental contamination that may have occurred prior to 1983. In 1993, 
Goodrich (USA) spun off its Geon Vinyl Division as an independent publicly 
traded U.S. corporation: the Geon Company. Geon Canada thus became the 
successor to the interests of Goodrich Canada with respect to the brownfield site. 
The Geon Company later became PolyOne Corporation, and Geon Canada was 
renamed PolyOne Company.   
 
In March of 1994, Epton demanded that PolyOne accept responsibility for the 
environmental contamination at the site, based on the indemnifications from 
Goodrich to Epton in the 1983 sale of the facility.  Epton was experiencing 
financial difficulties at the time and was operating pursuant to a proposal made in 
1993 under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. Although PolyOne had no 
obligation to respond affirmatively to Epton’s demand, Epton and PolyOne 
decided to undertake a joint environmental investigation in order to clean up the 
land since both parties already knew that the site was contaminated. They 
agreed that costs were to be split 50-50 and then reallocated later when and if 
liability was established. It should be mentioned that no legal remediation 
requirements had been enacted by any governmental organization at that time, 
but future Ministry of Environment (MOE) involvement was probated, in which 
case, parties involved, such as PolyOne and Epton, could be asked to complete 
the brownfield remediation process.  
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5.2.1. The Causes of the Conflict  
Despite its initial agreements with PolyOne and its primary responsibility for the 
cleanup, Epton filed for bankruptcy in 1995 and disputes therefore arose as to 
the allocation of the environmental liabilities of the parties involved, including 
PolyOne, the creditors, the banks, the Trustee in bankruptcy, and the interim 
operator. In other words, when Epton, the party primarily responsible, filed for 
bankruptcy, the potential liability for the environmental conditions at the site fell 
upon numerous other parties, including prior property owners (including 
Goodrich/Geon), the Trustee itself, secured creditors, specific interim operators, 
and others that had been involved with plant operations over the years.  In 
addition, the property itself became an albatross. Anyone taking possession, 
control, or ownership of any of the Epton site automatically became potentially 
responsible for the existing contamination at the site. Therefore, all the parties 
involved denied responsibility for brownfield liabilities. Moreover, Epton’s 
creditors and mortgagees, and the The City of Kitchener possessed liens for 
several million dollars against the real property and other assets. The existence 
of the liens, claims, and counterclaims, as well as the issue of allocating 
environmental liability, virtually guaranteed disputes among the parties involved. 
For example, the The City of Kitchener (The City) had liens of over $1 million on 
the property, including the debt of accruing property taxes and unpaid hydro 
charges. In November 1995, the Trustee in bankruptcy wrote to The City officials, 
informing them that the Epton buildings would be stripped, the utilities and fire 
protection would be terminated, and the site would be abandoned.   
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5.3. Identifying DMs and Their Options 
The brownfield negotiations between the The City and PolyOne concerning the 
status of the property were started during 1995. It is therefore important to note 
that this real-life negotiation is modeled and analyzed based on the information 
available at that time. The The City had become increasingly concerned about 
the abandoned buildings and the contaminated land, which presented an 
extreme fire and safety hazard. On the other hand, PolyOne showed its 
willingness to take responsibility for remediating the land on its own under 
specific conditions: 1) full control of the land during the remediation so that it 
would be fast and inexpensive, they would then transfer the site to the The City 
by donating it for public use; 2) other incentives from the The City to facilitate the 
remediation process.  
 
Although PolyOne had the option of litigation, they concluded that even if they 
assumed the entire burden of the site remediation, it would probably cost less 
than even a small share of the enormous transactional costs of a traditional 
lengthy litigation-driven remedy.  
 
Because the The City feared that PolyOne would be discouraged from taking 
possession if they had to pay the back taxes, the The City offered a write-off of 
the taxes. In order to facilitate the remediation process, the land was also 
transferred from the Trustee to PolyOne for only one dollar.    
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Due to these cooperative negotiations, the site was transferred to PolyOne in 
October 1996, and the main remediation process was begun. Before the 
completion of the remediation and the transfer of the land back to the The City, 
another set of negotiations started regarding the redevelopment plan for the land. 
The City reviewed the proposed plans and eventually selected a plan to construct 
an educational center on the remediated site. The City accordingly, asked the 
University of Waterloo (UW) to provide a proposal for such educational center. In 
1997, UW thus became involved in the brownfield negotiation in order to assess 
whether it could construct a school of pharmacy on the remediated site. At this 
point, UW wanted work on the school of pharmacy to proceed quickly, but 
PolyOne had no incentive to speed up the remediation process. Multiple 
negotiations were therefore begun among three main DMs: 1) PolyOne, 2) the 
The City of Kitchener, and 3) the University of Waterloo. The DMs and their 
options are listed in Table 5.1.    
 




1. Slow remediation of the site (Slow) 
2. Fast remediation of the site (Fast) 
The City of 
Kitchener 
3. Provide incentives for PolyOne and UW (Incentives), 








Each DM can either accept (Y) or reject (N) any of its options and since there are 
five options in total, the number of decision states is 2^5 = 32. However, some 
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states are infeasible and can be deleted, as explained in Subsection 3.2. The 
sets of infeasible states for this case study are displayed in Table 5.2 and are 
explained in the following section.   




a b c d e 
1) Slow Y N N Y - 
PolyOne 
2) Fast Y N N Y Y 
3) Incentives Y N N - - 
The City 
4) Legal Actions Y N N - Y 
UW 5) Construction Y N Y - - 
 
5.4. Infeasible States 
• State a (Y, Y, Y, Y, Y, Y): It is impossible that all DMs simultaneously accept 
all their options. 
• State b (N, N, N, N, N): It is impossible that all DMs simultaneously reject all 
their options. 
• State c (N, N, N, N, Y): When PolyOne and the City choose “No” for all their 
options, it is impossible that UW accepts the option to construct the project. 
• State d (Y, Y, -, -, -): It is impossible that PolyOne simultaneously accepts its 
two options no matter which options are accepted or rejected by the other 
DMs. 
• State e (-, Y, -, Y, -): It is impossible that PolyOne remediates the land by on 
its own and donates the site for public use and that the City simultaneously 
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takes legal action no matter which options are accepted or rejected by the 
other DMs. 
 
According to the above reasoning, the number of infeasible states is 14 and they 
have been removed from the total number of states (2^5 = 32). The remaining 18 
feasible states are labeled and listed from 0 to 17 and are shown in Table 5.3 in 
which each column represents a state for which Y means “Yes” and N indicates 
“No.”  
Table 5.3: Resulting Feasible States for the Case Study 
 
18 Feasible States 
DMs Options 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1) Slow Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N 
PolyOne 
2) Fast N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
3) Incentives Y N Y Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N Y 
The City 
4) Legal Action Y N N N Y N Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y Y N 
UW 5) Construction Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N N Y Y 
N: No (reject) ; Y: Yes (accept) 
 
5.5. DMs’ State Rankings 
Once the feasible states are obtained, the ranking of the states is determined for 
each DM from the most preferred state on the left to the least preferred state on 
the right as shown in Table 5.4. For example, PolyOne most prefers state 2, 
according to which PolyOne accepts only partial liability after a long-term conflict, 
completes remediation with delays and with incentives from the City, and finally 
sells the site to UW to construct a school of pharmacy when the remediation 
process is complete. PolyOne least prefers state 15, according to which PolyOne 
 127
cleans up the site neither in the long term ( with delays) nor in the short term, the 
City refuses to provide incentives and takes legal action against PolyOne, and 
UW rejects the construction of a school of pharmacy. 
 




Most Preferred -------------------------------------------------  Least Preferred 
PolyOne 2 3 5 1 8 10 9 11 17 14 0 6 4 7 12 13 16 15 
The City 9 8 11 10 17 14 12 13 16 15 5 2 0 4 7 1 6 3 
UW 8 17 10 9 11 12 14 16 15 13 2 0 4 5 7 6 1 3 
 
 
The City most prefers state 9 in which the City takes no action, and PolyOne 
does not postpone the remediation process, cleans the site over the short term, 
and donates the site to UW in order for UW to construct a school of pharmacy. 
The City least prefers state 3, according to which PolyOne cleans the site with 
delays and sells the site, the City provides incentives, and UW does not construct 
a school of pharmacy. Finally, UW most prefers state 8, in which PolyOne 
completes the remediation process and donates the site, the City provides 
incentives for both UW and PolyOne, and UW constructs a school of pharmacy. 
UW least prefers state 4 which means that PolyOne completes the remediation 
process of the contaminated site after a long period of time, the City takes legal 
action against PolyOne, and UW constructs a school of pharmacy when the site 
was decontaminated after a long time.          
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5.6. Stability Analysis 
When a strategic negotiation is modeled using GMCR, one point in time should 
be specified for the start of negotiation. In the Graph Model, the initial state of the 
conflict is referred to as the status quo. In this case study, the status quo 
occurred in 1997 and is represented by state 1, in which PolyOne completes the 
remediation process over the long term and with delays, the City neither provides 
incentives nor takes legal action, and UW does not construct a school of 
pharmacy. 
 
5.6.1. Reachable List 
The set of states in the reachable list for each DM are the states in which the 
particular DM can change his or her strategy while the strategies of all the other 
DMs remain fixed (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). The reachable lists for UW School of 
Pharmacy negotiation are displayed in Table 5.5.  
 
It should be noticed that irreversible moves for DMs are considered when the 
reachable lists are constructed. An irreversible move is a move in which a DM 
can move from state a to state b but can not move back from state b to state a 
(Fang et. al 1993). If DMs choose irreversible moves, they can influence the 
attitude-based stability analysis that is dependent on the DMs’ moves and 
countermoves. As shown in the first row of Table 5.5, PolyOne, for example, can 
not move from state 0 to state 12, but can move from state 12 to state 0, as 
shown in row 12. This means that once PolyOne accepts its first option (i.e., 
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accept partial liability and eventually remediate and sell the site), it cannot 
logically or practically move to its second option (i.e., clean up the land on its own 
in the short term and donate the site for public use). 
 
                Table 5.5: Reachable Lists for the School of Pharmacy Negotiation 
 
PolyOne The City UW From 
State To Sate To Sate To Sate 
0 -- 2, 4, 5 -- 
1 -- 3, 6, 7 5 
2 -- 0, 4, 5 -- 
3 -- 1, 6, 7 2 
4 -- 0, 2, 5 -- 
5 -- 0, 2, 4 -- 
6 -- 1, 3, 7 0 
7 -- 1, 3, 6 4 
8 2, 17 9 -- 
9 5 8 -- 
10 3, 14 11 8 
11 1 10 9 
12 0 16, 17 -- 
13 6 14, 15 12 
14 10, 3 13, 15 17 
15 7 13, 14 16 
16 4 12, 17 -- 
17 2, 8 12, 16 -- 
 
 
Once the reachable list is constructed for each DM, the Graph Model 
representation can be developed as shown in Figure 5.2, in which the arrows 
represent the moves of the DMs and the circles represent the states.  The Graph 
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Model approach permits an efficient representation of irreversible moves, for 
example, PolyOne’s irreversible move between states 0 and 12. The direction of 
the arrow shows that once PolyOne moves from state 12 to state 0, it can not 
move back from state 0 to state 12. However, when PolyOne moves from state 
10 to state 14, it can also move back to state 10, and vice versa. Based on the 
historical background of the case study and as shown in Figure 5.2 b, the City 
has no irreversible moves.     
 
5.6.2. Attitude-Based Stability Analysis for Three DMs 
Once the reachable lists and the Graph Model representation of the states for the 
DMs were developed, the interactive decision-making analysis, defined within the 
structure of GMCR, can be performed and the attitude-based solution concepts 
defined in Table 4.4 applied. Attitude-based stability analysis was carried out for 
the school of pharmacy negotiation which included three DMs, with each DM 
having three possible types of attitudes toward itself and the others: positive, 
negative, and neutral. Three DMs constitute a 3 × 3 matrix in which each cell of 
the matrix can be +, ─, or 0, representing the positive, negative, or neutral 
attitudes of the DMs, respectively. Therefore, the total number of the attitudes of 
the DMs toward themselves and one another becomes 39, in which 3 represents 
the three types of attitude and 9 represents the number of cells in a 3 × 3 matrix. 
The total number of attitude scenarios thus equals 19,683. However, many of 
these scenarios are infeasible and can be removed. The process of removing 

































B) The City’s Moves 



















Figure 5.2: Graph Model for the DMs Involved in the School of Pharmacy    
Negotiations 
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5.6.3. Proposed Algorithms for Removing Infeasible Attitude Cases  
During negotiation, DMs may have a variety of attitudes toward themselves and 
one another. Each attitude case corresponds to a situation in which the DMs 
involved in the negotiations have one specific type of attitude (e.g., negative or 
positive) toward themselves and one specific type of attitude (e.g., negative or 
positive) toward other DMs. Among the total set of attitude cases, there are 
always many attitude cases that cannot be taken into account and they are 
referred to as infeasible attitude cases. Removing infeasible attitude cases 
depends primarily on the real negotiation process. A negotiator in a negotiation 
process may exhibit a variety of behaviors toward other negotiators. Inohara et 
al. (2008) assumed that positive, negative, and neutral attitudes of a DM toward 
others derive from “altruistic,” “sadistic,” and “apathetic” behaviors, respectively, 
and those toward her/himself derive from “selfish,” “masochistic,” and “selfless” 
behaviors, respectively, as shown in Table 4.2. Darling and Mumpower (1990) 
identified eight strategic behavioral orientations for negotiators: 1) individualistic, 
2) cooperative, 3) altruistic, 4) sacrificing, 5) self-destructive, 6) nihilistic, 7) 
punitive, and 8) competitive, as shown in Figure 5.3. While such orientations are 
uncommon and may sometimes be pathological, under specific circumstances 
they may be useful concepts for achieving the broader purposes of negotiators.  
 
The essence of the proposed algorithm for removing infeasible attitude cases is 
based on the logic that DMs involved in construction negotiations cannot have 
negative attitudes toward themselves. Therefore, all attitude cases in which a DM 
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or all DMs have negative attitudes toward themselves, either individually or 




With respect to Figure 5.3, this study cannot include a situation in which a DM 
has an attitude of “harm self” and therefore follows the orientations of nihilistic, 
self destructive, and sacrificing. Therefore, cases in which a DM has a negative 
attitude toward itself are removed from the total number of strategic orientations. 
The proposed algorithm for negotiations that involve two DMs and three DMs are 
summarized in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, respectively. The proposed algorithm 
has also been generalized for negotiations involving n DMs, as shown in Table 
Nihilistic 
S = - 0.5 
O = - 0.5 
Self Destructive 
S = - 1.0 
O = + 0.0 
Sacrificing 
S = - 0.5 
O = + 0.5 
Cooperative 
S = + 0.5 
O = + 0.5 
Competitive 
S = + 0.5 
O = - 0.5 
Individualistic 
S = + 1.0 
O = + 0.0 
Punitive 
S = + 0.0 






S = + 0.0 
O = + 1.0 
S : Attitude Toward Self 
O : Attitude Toward Others 
Figure 5.3: Eight Strategic Orientations of DMs’ Negotiations (Darling and 
Mumpower 1990) 
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5.8. The computer programming codes for these algorithms are provided in 
Appendix A. 
  
Table 5.6: Algorithm for Removing Infeasible Attitude Cases in Negotiations with 
Two DMs  
 
Step Infeasible Matrix Description Infeasible Cases 
1 
 
 DM1 DM2 
DM1 ─  
DM2  + or 0  
Remove all cases in which DM1 has negative 
attitudes toward itself and DM2 has only neutral 
and positive attitudes toward itself, no matter 




 DM1 DM2 
DM1 + or 0  
DM2  ─  
Remove all cases in which DM2 has negative 
attitudes toward itself and DM1 has only neutral 
and positive attitudes toward itself, no matter 




 DM1 DM2 
DM1 ─  
DM2  ─  
Remove all cases in which DM1 has negative 
attitudes toward itself and DM2 has negative 
attitudes toward itself, no matter what attitudes 
the DMs have toward each other. 
1×3×3×1=9 
4 Total Number of Infeasible Attitude Cases 18+18+9 = 45 
5 Total Number of Attitude Cases 3^4 = 81 





Table 5.7: Algorithm for Removing Infeasible Attitude Cases in Negotiations with 
Three DMs 
 
Step Infeasible Matrix Description Number of Infeasible Cases 
1 
 
 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 ─     
DM2   + or 0   
DM3     + or 0  
Remove all cases in which DM1 has 
negative attitudes toward itself and 
DM2 and DM3 have only neutral 
and positive attitudes toward 
themselves, no matter what attitudes 




 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 + or 0     
DM2   ─   
DM3     + or 0  
Remove all cases in which DM2 has 
negative attitudes toward itself and 
DM1 and DM3 have only neutral 
and positive attitudes toward 
themselves, no matter what attitudes 




  3 
 
 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 + or 0     
DM2   + or 0   
DM3     ─  
Remove all cases in which DM3 has 
negative attitudes toward itself and 
DM1 and DM2 have only neutral 
and positive attitudes toward 
themselves, no matter what attitudes 




 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 ─     
DM2   ─   
DM3     + or 0  
Remove all cases in which DM1 and 
DM2 have negative attitudes toward 
themselves and DM3 has only 
neutral and positive attitudes toward 
itself, no matter what attitudes the 




 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 ─     
DM2   + or 0   
DM3     ─  
Remove all cases in which DM1 and 
DM3 have negative attitudes toward 
themselves and DM2 has only 
neutral and positive attitudes toward 
itself, no matter what attitudes the 




 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 + or 0     
DM2   ─   
DM3     ─  
Remove all cases in which DM2 and 
DM3 have negative attitudes toward 
themselves and DM1 has only 
neutral and positive attitudes toward 
itself, no matter what attitudes the 




 DM1 DM2 DM3 
DM1 ─     
DM2   ─   
DM3     ─ 
Remove all cases in which DM1, 
DM2, and DM3 have negative 
attitudes toward themselves, no 
matter what attitudes the DMs have 
toward each other. 
1×3×3×3×1×3×3×3×1=729 
4 Total Number of Infeasible Attitude Cases 13851 
5 Total Number of Attitude Cases 3^9 = 19683 




5.6.4. Determining the Most Relevant Feasible Attitude Cases 
The proposed algorithms summarized in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 help a conflict 
analyst remove a considerable number of infeasible attitude cases so that only 
feasible attitude cases are considered. However, the remaining number of 
feasible attitude cases is still too large to be evaluated using stability analysis. 
Moreover, when the number of DMs increases, the resulting number of feasible 
attitude cases increases exponentially, as shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Cont. 
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Table 5.8: Algorithm for Removing Infeasible Attitude Cases in Negotiations with n 
                   DMs 
 
Because carrying out stability analysis manually for the whole set of feasible 
attitude cases is impossible, a reasonable strategy is needed in order to reduce 
Step Infeasible Matrix Description Number of Infeasible Cases 
1 
 
 DM1 DM2 … DMn 
DM1 ─       
DM2   + or 0     
…
 
    …   
DMn       + or 0  
Remove all cases in 
which only one 
DM has negative 
attitudes toward 
itself and other 
DMs have only 




attitudes all DMs 
have toward each 
other. 
[ ])1()1( 321 −− ×× nnnn  
2 
 
 DM1 DM2 DM3 … DMn 
DM1 ─         
DM2   ─       
DM3     + or 0     
…
 
      …   
DMn         + or 0  
Remove all cases in 





other DMs have 
only neutral and 
positive attitudes 
toward themselves, 
no matter what 
attitudes all DMs 




)1( −− ××− nnnnn  
3 
 
 DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 … DMn 
DM1 ─           
DM2   ─         
DM3     ─       
DM4       + or 0     
…
 
        …   
DMn           + or 0  
Remove all cases in 





other DMs have 
only neutral and 
positive attitudes 
toward themselves, 
no matter what 
attitudes all DMs 




)2)(1( −− ××−− nnnnnn  
4 Total Number of Infeasible Attitude Cases [1] + [2] + [3]  
5 Total Number of Attitude Cases 3^n  
6 Total Number of Feasible Attitude Cases 3^n – {[1] + [2] + [3]} 
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the number of feasible attitude cases.  One such strategy is to select only the 
feasible attitude cases that are most relevant to the negotiation situation under 
investigation. In other words, determining the most relevant attitude cases 
depends on each specific negotiation situation and how the DMs involved are 
expected to behave before and during the negotiation. This strategy helps the 
analyst focus on a small number of attitude cases with the highest degree of 
relevance so that going through the whole set of feasible cases is unnecessary.  
 
With respect to the brownfield negotiation case study, the historical background 
was reviewed and the attitudes of the three DMs toward one another were 
studied. A list of the six most relevant attitude cases was then determined, and 
these six cases were examined using attitude-based stability analysis. The six 
attitude cases and a brief description of each are listed in Table 5.9. 
 
5.6.5. Analysis of the Most Relevant Attitude Cases 
Once the six most relevant attitude cases were selected, the stability analysis 
within the paradigm of GMCR was carried out in order to obtain equilibrium 
states or possible solutions for the conflict. A separate attitude-based stability 
analysis was carried out for each of the six attitude cases selected, as shown in 
the stability tableaus displayed in Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. It is 
noted that the tableaus used in the conventional GMCR were expanded in order 
to include the attitude based stability analysis. 
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Table 5.9: The Most Relevant Attitude Cases for the School of Pharmacy 
Negotiations 
 
Case Attitude Matrix Description 
1 
 
 PO City UW 
PO + 0 0 
City 0 + 0 
UW 0 0 +  
DMs have positive attitudes toward themselves and 
neutral attitudes toward others. 
2 
 
 PO City UW 
PO + - 0 
City - + 0 
UW 0 0 +  
DMs have positive attitudes toward themselves and 
neutral attitudes toward others except PO and The City 
that have negative attitudes toward each other. 
3 
   
 PO City UW 
PO + - + 
City 0 + 0 
UW - - +  
PO has negative toward The City, positive attitudes 
toward itself and UW; The City has positive attitudes 
toward itself, neutral attitudes toward others; and UW has 




 PO City UW 
PO + - - 
City - + - 
UW - - +  
DMs have positive attitudes toward themselves and 
negative attitudes toward others. 
5 
 
 PO City UW 
PO + + + 
City + + + 
UW + + +  
DMs have positive attitudes toward themselves and 
positive attitudes toward others. 
6 
 
 PO City UW 
PO + - - 
City + + 0 
UW + + +  
PO has positive attitudes toward itself, negative attitudes 
toward others; The City has neutral attitudes toward UW, 
positive attitudes toward others; and UW has positive 
attitudes toward itself and others. 












Figure 5.5: Stability Tableau for Case 2  
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Figure 5.6: Stability Tableau for Case 3 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Stability Tableau for Case 4 
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Figure 5.8: Stability Tableau for Case 5 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Stability Tableau for Case 6 
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5.7. Discussion of the Results of the Stability Analyses 
As shown in Figures 5.4 – 5.9, because of the changes in the attitudes of the 
DMs, six different sets of equilibrium states were obtained, corresponding to the 
six different attitude cases. The equilibrium states involved in each attitude case 
represent possible strategic solutions for the multi-DM negotiations. These six 
sets of resulting decision options were then evaluated in order to determine the 
best strategic decision. The resulting equilibrium states are shown in Figure 5.10, 
and a brief discussion of each case follows.  
        Equilibrium States   
Case 1: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + 0 0 10 11      
 City 0 + 0 
 
       
 UW 0 0 +           
               
Case 2: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + ─ 0 0 4 10 11 14   
 City ─ + 0 
 
       
 UW 0 0 +           
               
Case 3: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + ─ + 7 9 11 14 17   
 City 0 + 0        
 UW ─ ─ + 
 
       
               
Case 4: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + ─ ─ 0 1 3 4 6 7  
 City ─ + ─        
 UW ─ ─ + 
 
       
               
Case 5: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + + + 2 8 9     
 City + + + 
 
       
 UW + + +           
               
Case 6: DMs PO City UW        
 PO + ─ ─ 2       
 City + + 0        
 UW + + + 
 
       








It should be mentioned that of the 14 resulting equilibrium states, equilibrium 
state 5 is a false equilibrium and is not listed in Figure 5.10 because state 5 is the 
only state that remained RNASH stable for all DMs and in all attitude cases 
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984). In other words, state 5 is the only state in which the 
involved DMs can not find one move from that state to other states in the six 
attitude cases investigated above. Moreover, status quo analysis shows that 
state 5 can not be an equilibrium state (Li et al., 2004). Status quo analysis 
addresses concerns about the reachability of any specified state from the status 
quo. Since the Graph Model introduces the notion of irreversible moves (DMs 
can cause the conflict to move in one direction but not the other) to reflect no-
return decisions, the reachability of a state from a status quo is not automatically 
guaranteed. If some of the moves are specified as irreversible at the modeling 
stage, it is possible that some of the predicted resolutions cannot be attained 
from the status quo state, and an analyst may safely eliminate such states (e.g., 
equilibrium state 5) from the potential resolution list and concentrate on a refined 
list (Li et al., 2004).   
 
5.7.1. Qualitative Analysis of the Findings 
Case 1: Figure 5.4 displays a scenario in which the DMs have positive attitudes 
toward themselves and neutral attitudes toward other DMs. The stability analysis 
was carried out, and outcomes (i.e., equilibrium states) 10 and 11 resulted for 
this case. Outcome 10 is more preferred to outcome 11 for PolyOne and UW. 
Also, outcome 11 is more preferred to outcome 10 for the city. Outcome 10 
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means that PolyOne (PO) cleans up the property in the short term (fast), UW 
refuses to construct a school of pharmacy in the remediated site, and the City 
does not take legal action against PO and provides incentives for both PO and 
UW. Outcome 11 means that PO cleans up the land quickly, the City neither 
takes legal action nor provides incentives, and UW does not construct a school of 
pharmacy on the site. It should be mentioned that an attitude case (i.e., case 0) 
was considered in which the DMs have neutral attitudes towards themselves and 
towards other DMs. When such attitude case was considered, the same 
individual stability and equilibrium results, as for case 1, were obtained. 
 
Case 2: Figure 5.5 shows another attitude case in which the DMs have positive 
attitudes toward themselves and neutral attitudes toward others except for PO 
and the City who have negative attitudes toward each other. In this attitude case, 
the resulting set of possible solutions includes outcomes 0, 4, 10, 11, and 14. A 
comparison of the sets of outcomes for Case 1 and Case 2 (Figure 5.10) 
indicates that Case 2 is identical to Case 1, except that the set of solutions also 
includes outcomes 0 and 4. Considering the DMs’ state rankings, it can be seen 
that of the set of outcomes in Case 2, outcomes 0 and 4 are the least preferred 
for all DMs. Outcome 4, for example, means that PO cleans up the land over the 
long term (slow), the City does not provide incentives and takes legal action 
against PO, and UW constructs a school of pharmacy without any incentives. It 
can be concluded that because two DMs (i.e., PO and the City)  have negative 
attitudes toward each other, the set of possible solutions in Case 2 has been 
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shifted to the right side of the DMs’ state rankings which represent states that are 
less preferred by the DMs.       
Case 3: Figure 5.6 shows the attitude scenario that occurs when PO has a 
negative attitude toward the City, a positive attitude toward itself and UW; the 
City has a positive attitude toward itself, a neutral attitude toward the others; and 
UW has a positive attitude toward itself, and a negative attitude toward the 
others. This attitude scenario examines a situation in which the attitudes of the 
DMs toward one another are not consistent. In other words, while DM 1 has a 
negative attitude toward DM 2, it is possible that DM 2 has a positive attitude 
toward DM 1. For example, PO has a negative attitude toward the City; whereas 
the City has a neutral attitude toward PO, as shown in Figure 5.6. In addition, 
when UW has a negative attitude toward the others, PO and the City have 
positive and neutral attitudes toward UW, respectively. The resulting set of 
possible solutions for Case 3 includes outcomes 7, 9, 11, 14, and 17. According 
to the DMs’ state rankings, some of the outcomes are less preferred and some 
are more preferred so that no single outcome is the most beneficial for all DMs. A 
comparison of the sets of outcomes in Cases 2 and 3 shows that outcome 7 
appears in Case 3, in which the DMs have more hostile attitudes toward one 
another than in Case 2 (i.e., Case 2 has two negative symbols (─) in its attitude 
matrix, whereas Case 3 has three negative symbols (─) in its attitude matrix, as 
shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, respectively). Outcome 7 is also the only outcome 
that is the least beneficial outcome for all DMs. Outcome 7 means that PO cleans 
up the land, the City does not provide incentives and takes legal action against 
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PO, and UW does not construct a school of pharmacy. The reason that this 
outcome is the least preferred can be explained by the legal action taken by the 
City. In other words, the DMs least prefer the costly and lengthy litigation 
involved in taking a conflict case to court. It can be concluded from this attitude 
scenario that because of the inconsistency in the attitudes of the DMs toward one 
another, a less coherent set of outcomes is obtained, and as a result, some 
outcomes are shifted to the left side (more preferred) and some outcomes are 
shifted to the right side (less preferred) of the DMs’ state rankings. In this case, it 
is very hard for an analyst to provide a single beneficial solution for the DMs 
involved in the strategic negotiations.             
 
Case 4: Figure 5.7 shows an attitude scenario in which the DMs have a positive 
attitude toward themselves and a negative attitude toward the other DMs. This 
case represents the most hostile attitude scenario in which all the DMs involved 
have negative attitudes toward one another. The resulting set of outcomes for 
this attitude scenario consists of outcomes 0, 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. A comparison of 
the six sets of outcomes, which correspond to the six attitude cases, indicates 
that the set of outcomes in Case 4 is the worst set of outcomes resulting from the 
attitude-based stability analysis. In other words, considering the DMs’ state 
rankings, the resulting outcomes have been shifted substantially to the left side of 
the state ranking for each DM. For example, outcome 3 is the least preferred 
state in the state rankings of the City and UW (Table 5.10). Moreover, outcomes 
0, 4, 6, and 7 include a situation in which the City takes legal action, which is the 
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least preferred action for all the DMs. It can be concluded that when the DMs 
involved in the strategic negotiations possess a negative attitude toward one 
another, the resulting outcomes represent the least beneficial decisions for the 
DMs involved.       
 
Case 5: Figure 5.8 shows an attitude scenario in which the DMs have a positive 
attitude toward themselves and a positive attitude toward one another: the 
opposite of the previous case (Case 4) in which the DMs have a negative attitude 
toward one another. The stability analysis for case 5 results in a set of outcomes 
2, 8, and 9. This set is shifted to the far left side of the DMs’ state rankings and 
are therefore more preferred by the DMs. With such an attitude scenario, 
outcome 8, for example, is the most preferred outcome for UW, the second most 
preferred outcome for the city, and the fifth most preferred outcome for PO. 
Outcome 8 means that PO cleans up the land fast, the city does not take legal 
action against PO and provides incentives for PO and UW, and UW constructs a 
school of pharmacy on the decontaminated site. It can be concluded that, in 
multi-DMs brownfield negotiations, when the DMs possess positive attitudes 
toward one another, more beneficial outcomes result and the DMs have a better 
opportunity to agree on one outcome at the strategic level and then continue with 
detailed negotiations at the tactical level. It should be mentioned that if the level 
of information indicates that the DMs indeed have positive attitudes toward one 
another, outcome 8 can be considered as potential final solution to the 
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negotiations at the strategic level. Further discussion has been provided in 
Subsection 5.7.2.           
 
Case 6: Figure 5.9 shows an attitude scenario in which PO has a positive attitude 
toward itself and a negative attitude toward the others, the city has a neutral 
attitude toward UW and a positive attitude toward itself and PO, and UW has a 
positive attitude toward itself and the others. This attitude scenario examines how 
the outcome of the negotiation changes when a DM (e.g., PO) that has a 
negative attitude negotiates with the other DMs (e.g., the City and UW) that have 
a positive attitude. The resulting set of outcomes is limited to outcome 2. 
Considering the DMs’ state rankings, it can be observed that outcome 2 is more 
preferred by PO and less preferred by the City and UW and that, it is very difficult 
the DMs involved to reach mutual agreement with this attitude case. It can be 
concluded that when DM 1 has a negative attitude toward DM 2 and DM 3, but 
DM 2 and DM 3 have a positive attitude toward DM 1, only a few outcomes can 
be resulted from negotiations, and the outcomes mostly benefit DM 1. There is 
also a low likelihood that the DMs will agree on one outcome as a possible 
solution. 
       
The qualitative analysis of the above six attitude cases indicates that the 
resulting outcomes in case 4 are more hostile for all DMs and may therefore be 
less preferred. On the other hand, the resulting outcomes in case 5 are more 
beneficial for all DMs and may therefore be more preferred if the level of 
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negotiation information is sufficient to indicate that all DMs involved indeed have 
had positive attitudes toward one another. As well, of the 14 resulting equilibrium 
outcomes, some are repeated in some of the attitude cases. For example, 
outcome 11 resulted in cases 1, 2, and 3. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
frequency with which a state becomes a possible solution in different attitude 
cases may indicate that the state is a stable state and that no matter how the 
attitudes of the DMs change, the stable state can still result as an equilibrium 
state (outcome). As a result, the likelihood of such stable states becoming the 
best strategic outcome of the negotiations is increased. It should be noted, 
however, that the attitudes of the DMs can significantly influence the final 
outcome of the strategic negotiations. Therefore, to assess the impact of the 
DMs’ attitudes on the choice of the final strategic solution, a quantitative analysis 
was conducted, as explained in the following subsection.       
 
5.7.2. Quantitative Analysis of the Findings 
Qualitative analysis of the resulting equilibrium states is a common procedure in 
the conventional GMCR. However, when the number of resulting equilibrium 
states is increased, it is cumbersome to qualitatively recommend one possible 
solution to the conflict. Therefore, to support the qualitative analysis of the 
stability results discussed in the previous subsection, quantitative analysis was 
also conducted for the brownfield case study negotiations as an ad hoc analysis. 
The objective was to provide quantitative measures 1) to show how different 
types of DMs’ attitudes can influence their level of satisfaction with the 
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multilateral negotiations conducted in the case study and 2) to provide a 
complementary tool for the qualitative approach in order to determine the most 
beneficial strategic decision resulting from the negotiation. To achieve these 
objectives, attitude case 6 (Figure 5.10), for example, was considered and the 
quantitative analysis was carried out using the proposed framework shown in 
Figure 5.11. The following steps were involved in developing the quantitative 
approach.   
 
 
Figure 5.11:  The Proposed Framework for the Quantitative Analysis  
 
5.7.2.1. Step 1: Determine the attitude values 
In each attitude case, the DMs possess positive, neutral, or negative attitudes 
toward themselves and one another. In the proposed approach, the qualitative 
attitudes (i.e., positive, neutral, and negative) are transferred to quantitative 
Step 1
DMs PO City UW Sum of Attitude
PO + ? ? -0.33
City + + 0 0.67
UW + + + 1
Step 3
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values so that a value of +0.33 is assigned to a positive attitude (+), a value of 
0.00 is assigned to a neutral attitude (0), and a value of -0.33 is assigned to a 
negative attitude (-). With respect to attitude case 6, for example, the attitude 
value for each DM would be algebraically calculated as follows, and the results of 
which are shown in the Attitude column in Table 5.10 as well as in Step 1 in 
Figure 5.11.  
 PO Value = (+0.33) + (-0.33) + (-0.33) = -0.33 
 The City Value = (+0.33) + (+0.33) + (0.00) = +0.67 
 UW Value = (+0.33) + (+0.33) + (+0.33) = +1.00 
 








5.7.2.2. Step 2: Determine the average satisfaction values 
The value of DM’s satisfaction represents the degree of the DM’s preference for 
a state. The more preferred a state for a DM, the higher the satisfaction value for 
the state. Values of 100 and 1 represent the highest and lowest percentage of a 
DM’s satisfaction level, respectively. Table 5.4 is used in order to assign a 
satisfaction value to a DMs’ state ranking. First, a satisfaction value between 1 
and 100 is assigned to each state of each DM’s state ranking. Accordingly, the 
highest satisfaction value (100) is assigned to the most preferred state and the 
DMs PO City UW Attitude 
PO + ─ ─ -0.33 
City + + 0 0.67 
UW + + + 1.00 
   Sum: 1.33 
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lowest satisfaction value (1) is assigned to the least preferred state, with other 
values at a decreasing rate of 100/17 being assigned to the rest of states from 
left to right for each DM, as shown in Table 5.11. It is assumed in this situation 
that there is a fixed rate of satisfaction between the two adjacent states with 
respect to all of the DMs. As an alternative approach, it would be possible to 
assign different satisfaction values to the states with a variable rate. Because of 
the connection between a DM’s satisfaction and preference in this research, the 
satisfaction value is sometimes referred to as the preference value when the 
influence of the DMs’ attitudes is not considered.        
 
Table 5.11: Satisfaction Values for States in the DMs’ State Rankings  
 
Satisfaction and State Rankings 
DMs 
Most Preferred --------------------------------------------------  Least Preferred 
Satisfaction 100 94 88 83 77 71 65 59 53 48 42 36 30 24 18 12 7 1 Poly
One 
State 2 3 5 1 8 10 9 11 17 14 0 6 4 7 12 13 16 15 
Satisfaction 100 94 88 83 77 71 65 59 53 48 42 36 30 24 18 12 7 1 
City 
State 9 8 11 10 17 14 12 13 16 15 5 2 0 4 7 1 6 3 
Satisfaction 100 94 88 83 77 71 65 59 53 48 42 36 30 24 18 12 7 1 
UW 
State 8 17 10 9 11 12 14 16 15 13 2 0 4 5 7 6 1 3 
 
One of the benefits of Table 5.11 is that the average satisfaction value of the 
equilibrium states (Figure 5.10) can be calculated for all DMs. Such a satisfaction 
value is designated the combined average satisfaction value since the combined 
satisfaction relates to all DMs. It should be remembered that the equilibrium 
states constitute a subset of a DM’s state ranking. The average satisfaction value 
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for equilibrium states 6 and 8, for example, are calculated as shown in Table 
5.12. It is assumed that the DMs have similar valuation for their satisfaction. 
 
The same procedure is carried out in order to calculate the average satisfaction 
value for the remaining equilibrium states, the results of which are shown in 
Figure 5.12. It should be mentioned that the average satisfaction value is also 
referred to as the combined satisfaction value since the value represents the 
satisfaction level of all DMs. 
 




To facilitate a better understanding of the importance of this approach, the 
equilibrium states are sorted based on their calculated average satisfaction 
value. Accordingly, the values and states in Figure 5.12 are replaced and sorted 
as shown in Figure 5.13. It should be noted that the results shown in Figures 
5.12 and 5.13 do not reflect the influence of the attitudes of the DMs and that 
these figures represent only a regular quantitative preference for the resulting 
equilibrium states when the DMs equally prefer the states. 
  PO The City UW 
Equilibrium 8 6 8 6 8 6 
Satisfaction 77 36 94 7 100 13 
Average 
Satisfaction 






















































Figure 5.12: Combined Satisfaction Level of the Equilibrium States Disregarding 






































Figure 5.13: Sorted Satisfaction Level of the Equilibrium States Disregarding the 
Influence of the DMs’ Attitudes   
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 Once a satisfaction value is assigned to every state, as shown in Table 5.11, the 
equilibrium states for each attitude case are considered, and their satisfaction 
values are calculated. In attitude case 6, for example, the resulting equilibrium 
state is outcome 2. With respect to equilibrium state 2, satisfaction values of 100, 
36, and 42 are determined for Polyone, the City, and UW, respectively. These 
values are shown in Figure 5.11 (Step 2). 
Once the satisfaction level for each equilibrium state has been determined, the 
average satisfaction value for each DM in each attitude case can be calculated. 
With respect to attitude case 6, for example, because there is only one 
equilibrium state, the average satisfaction value for each DM is calculated to be 
the same as its original value in the attitude case, as shown in Step 2 in Figure 
5.11.  
 
5.7.2.3. Step 3: Draw the attitude-satisfaction graph  
Once the average satisfaction value is obtained for every DM, the attitude values 
obtained in Step 1 and the average satisfaction values determined in Step 2 are 
used to draw an attitude-satisfaction graph. This graph indicates how a DM’s 
attitudes change his or her level of satisfaction and also helps the analyst 
investigate the position of DMs with respect to every attitude case. In other 
words, for an attitude-based negotiation involving multiple DMs, the graph shows 
how much each DM gains when a particular attitude case (which represents the 
DMs attitudes toward themselves and others) is considered. The attitude-
satisfaction graph for attitude case 6, for example, is displayed in Figure 5.14. 
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The graph shows that when PO possesses an overall negative attitude value of -
0.33, PO gains the highest level of satisfaction (100 %). On the other hand, when 
UW has a very positive attitude (+1), its level of satisfaction reaches the lowest 
value of 42 %. These results may indicate why attitude case 6 is very 
encouraging for PO and very discouraging for UW. With respect to the City, 
although the City’s overall attitude value is positive (+0.67), its level of 
satisfaction is not so high (36 %) and the City may thus not prefer attitude case 6. 














Figure 5.14: The Attitude-Satisfaction Graph for Attitude Case 6 
 
The same quantitative procedure, as explained above for attitude case 6, was 
carried out for the remaining five attitude cases. The resulting values and attitude 
matrices are displayed in Table 5.13, and the resulting attitude-satisfaction 
graphs are shown in Figures 5.15 and 5.16. A brief discussion of each attitude 
case is also provided below.  
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Case 1: With respect to attitude case 1, the DMs involved have gained almost 
the same satisfaction with the same positive attitude value (+0.33), as shown in 
Figure 5.13. This type of attitude scenario is reasonable and encouraging for the 
DMs since every DM gains almost equally and no DM loses. It should be noted 
that the level of satisfaction of the DMs is also reasonable.  
 
Table 5.13: Attitude and Satisfaction Values for Six Attitude Cases 
 
Attitude Case 1 Attitude Case 2 
 
DMs PO City UW 
DM’s 
Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + 0 0 0.33 59 
City 0 + 0 0.33 81 
UW 0 0 + 0.33 77  
 
DMs PO City UW DM’s Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + ─ 0 0.00 50 
City ─ + 0 0.00 59 
UW 0 0 + 0.33 59 
Attitude Case 3 Attitude Case 4 
 
DMs PO City UW DM’s Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + ─ + 0.33 50 
City 0 + 0 0.33 71 
UW ─ ─ + -0.33 67 
 
DMs PO City UW DM’s Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + ─ ─ -0.33 51 
City ─ + ─ -0.33 16 
UW ─ ─ + -0.33 18 
Attitude Case 5 Attitude Case 6 
 
DMs PO City UW DM’s Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + + + 1.00 81 
City + + + 1.00 77 
UW + + + 1.00 75 
 
DMs PO City UW 
DM’s 
Attitude 
Ave.  DM’s 
Satisfaction 
PO + ─ ─ -0.33 100 
City + + 0 0.67 36 
UW + + + 1 42 
 
Case 2: In attitude case 2, UW and the City have achieved better level of 
satisfaction because of UW’s positive attitude value. In this case PO and the City 
have a negative attitude toward each other and PO’s overall gain is thus 
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diminished, whereas UW has gained because of its neutral attitude.  In other 


























































Figure 5.16: Attitude Satisfaction Relationship for Attitude Cases 3 and 6 
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It should be mentioned that to facilitate the analysis, Figures 5.15 and 5.16 are 
divided into four distinct areas: 
• Areas 1: low attitude value and high level of satisfaction, 
• Area 2:  high attitude value and high level of satisfaction, 
• Area 3: high attitude value and low level of satisfaction, and 
• Area 4: low attitude value and low level of satisfaction. 
 
Case 3: In this case, the City has a neutral attitude toward the other DMs and 
has therefore gained slightly more than PO and UW. The attitude situation in this 
case indicates that PO has a positive attitude toward UW, whereas UW has a 
negative attitude toward PO. In other words, the attitudes of the DMs toward one 
another are not necessarily logical, and consequently, when UW, for example, 
has a negative attitude value, its satisfaction level exceeds that of PO whose 
attitude value is positive. 
 
Case 4: This attitude case is the most hostile attitude scenario, in which the DMs 
have a negative attitude toward one another and a positive attitude toward 
themselves. The DMs’ attitude values are therefore similarly (-0.33). Interestingly, 
the PO’s satisfaction level is much higher than the City’s and UW’s. This result 
means that when the DMs negotiate in a hostile situation, PO can benefit, while 
UW and the City may lose significantly. Although this situation may be beneficial 
for PO, it is certainly not preferable for all the DMs involved. 
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Case 5: This case represents situation opposite to that in Case 4, in which the 
DMs all have a positive attitude toward one another. Therefore, both their attitude 
and their satisfaction level have reached the highest value (Figure 5.13). 
Because all DMs gain almost equally and no DM loses, this situation is very 
encouraging for DMs who are involved in cooperative negotiations. 
 
Case 6: In this case, PO has a negative attitude toward the other DMs, whereas 
UW has a positive attitude toward the other DMs. The result of negotiating in this 
situation is that PO, who has the lowest attitude value (-0.33), has gained 
significantly, and UW, who has the highest attitude value (+1), has lost 
considerably, as shown in Figure 5.13. This situation is therefore very useful for 
DMs who find out that other DMs in negotiations have a positive attitude toward 
other DMs no matter how the other DMs’ attitudes may change during 
negotiations.  
 
5.7.3. Determining the Most Beneficial Strategic Decision  
The results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses explained in the previous 
subsections were used to determine which equilibrium state is the most 
beneficial decision option in the multiple-DM brownfield negotiation. In 
Subsection 5.7.2, the relationship between satisfaction level and the DM’s 
attitude was described from each DM’s perspective. Six distinct attitude cases 
were considered for each of which the satisfaction level of each individual DM 
was discussed and compared with the levels of satisfaction for the other DMs. In 
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this subsection, the influence of a DM’s attitude on the level of satisfaction is 
analyzed from the perspective of an analyst (e.g., a mediator). In other words, it 
is assumed that an analyst examines the results regardless of the perspective of 
each DM, and provides the DMs with advice that indicates the best outcome of 
the negotiation at the strategic level.  
 
To determine the best strategic solution, the equilibrium states are examined. 
Table 5.14 shows the resulting values for the DMs’ attitude and level of 
satisfaction and Figure 5.17 shows the six attitude cases represented by gray 
column bars that list their corresponding equilibrium states. The upward arrow in 
each column indicates for each attitude case the preference for the equilibrium 
states, based on Figure 5.13. The dotted line in the graph represents continuous 
changes and the gray columns represent the discrete changes in the combined 
level of the DM’s satisfaction.  
 
Table 5.14: Values of the DMs’ Attitude and Satisfaction 
PO The City UW Attitude 






1 0.33 59 0.33 81 0.33 77 1.00 72 
2 0 50 0 59 0.33 59 0.33 56 
3 0.33 50 0.33 71 -0.33 67 0.33 63 
4 -0.33 51 -0.33 16 -0.33 18 -1.00 28 
5 1 81 1 77 1 75 3.00 78 
6 -0.33 100 0.67 36 1 42 1.33 59 
   
The attitude cases and their associated states are placed in the graph based on 
the average of the satisfaction levels and the algebraic sum of the attitude values 
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for the three DMs. In other words, the values in Figure 5.17 are not calculated for 
an individual DM, but represent the combined position for all DMs, assuming that 
the valuation of satisfaction is the same for all the DMs. The satisfaction and 
attitude values for every attitude case, as shown in Figure 5.17, are determined 
using the two columns on the right-hand side of Table 5.14 and the matrices 
shown in Table 5.13. For example, with respect to attitude case 6, the algebraic 
sum of the attitude values and the average combined satisfaction values are 
calculated as shown in Table 5.15. It can be noted that the sums of the attitude 
































































Figure 5.17: Satisfaction and Attitude Values for the Six Attitude Cases  
Attitude Value
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Once the equilibrium states have been prioritized for each attitude case, the 
overall preference for the equilibrium states can be examined using the following 
equation: 

















where i stands for the attitude case and n represents the number of attitude 
cases (i.e., n = 6). Using the above equation, the overall preference for every 
equilibrium state can be calculated as shown in Table 5.16. The sorted results 
are shown in Figure 5.18. 
 
The overall preference for the equilibrium states includes the attitudes of the DMs 
and shows the significance of their attitudes in determining the overall outcome 
of the negotiation (Figure 5.18). As shown in Figure 5.18, equilibrium state 11 
has the highest preference value and is therefore the most preferred by the DMs 
involved in the case study negotiation. 
DMs PO The City UW Attitude Satisfaction 
PO + ─ ─ -0.33 100 
The 
City + + 0 0.67 36 
UW + + + 1 42 
     SUM = 1.33 Ave. = 59 
Overall Preference 
for an Equilibrium State = 
Figure 5.17 Figure 5.13 
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Table 5.16: Overall Preference for the Equilibrium States 
Equilibrium
State Calculations Result 
0 (28 + 56) × 36 3,024 
1 (28) × 36 1,008 
2 (59 + 78) × 59 8,083 
3 (28) × 32 896 
4 (28 + 56) × 28 2,352 
6 (28) × 18 504 
7 (28 + 63) × 20 1,820 
8 (78) × 90 7,020 
9 (63 + 78) × 83 11,703 
10 (56 + 72) × 81 10,368 
11 (56 + 63 + 72) × 75 14,325 
14 (56 + 63) × 61 7,259 












11 9 10 2 14 8 17 0 4 7 1 3 6
Overall Peference
 
Figure 5.18: Overall Preference Sorted for the Resulting Equilibrium States 
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State 11 represents a situation in which PO cleans up the site quickly, the City 
neither provides incentives nor takes legal action, and UW does not construct a 
school of pharmacy. On the other hand, equilibrium state 6 has the lowest 
preference value and is therefore least preferred by the DMs.  Equilibrium state 6 
represents a situation in which PO cleans up the site slowly, the City both 
provides incentives and takes legal action, and UW does not construct a school 
of pharmacy in the decontaminated site.     
 
5.7.3.1. Updated level of information for the case study  
As mentioned in Section 5.3, this real-life brownfield negotiation was modeled 
and analyzed based on the amount of information available in 1997 at the 
beginning of the multiple-DM negotiations among PO, the City and UW. 
Therefore, the overall results obtained and shown in Figure 5.18 are based on 
the amount of information available at that time and are also based on the 
attitudes of the DMs during the negotiations that took place in 1997. Because this 
particular real-life brownfield negotiation was very lengthy, and many rounds of 
negotiation took place, a number of new circumstances arose and a great deal of 
the information (e.g., the attitudes of the DMs toward one another) was updated. 
Based on this updated information, the brownfield negotiation was therefore 
remodeled and reanalyzed using the proposed negotiation methodology.  
 
The overall results show that equilibrium state 8 has the highest preference 
among the DMs involved and therefore, equilibrium state 8 was selected as the 
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final most beneficial decision option at the strategic level for the real-life 
brownfield negotiation. Equilibrium State 8 represents a situation in which PO 
cleans up the land quickly, the City does not take legal action and provides 
incentives for PO and UW, and UW constructs a school of pharmacy on the 
decontaminated site. This strategic outcome was further negotiated in detail by 
the DMs at the tactical level. The proposed negotiation methodology at the 
tactical level involving multiple DMs is discussed in Chapter 7.          
 
5.8. Evolution of the Brownfield Conflict  
The best overall strategic decision, obtained in the previous sections was found 
using the proposed strategic negotiation methodology. The objective of this 
section is to present discussions about how this real-life conflict was actually 
resolved over time. To achieve this objective, a state transition chart is used as 
shown in Table 5.17. To interpret this table, the states are considered from left to 
right for which an arrow indicates an option change between two adjacent states. 
 
Table 5.17: State Transitions for the Brownfield Conflict 
Status Quo State                                                                      Final State
DM Options 1 3 14 10 8 
 1) Slow Y Y N N N 
PolyOne 
 2) Fast N N N Y Y 
 3) Incentives N Y Y Y Y City 
 4) Legal Action N N N N N 
UW  5) Construction N N N N Y 
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As shown in Table 5.17, state 1 represents the status quo of the conflict or the 
initial situation of the conflict among PolyOne, the city, and UW. It should be 
noted that state 1 was also one of the equilibrium states when attitude case 4 is 
assumed (Figure 5.10). Attitude case 4 represents a situation in which the DMs 
have negative attitudes towards one another. After initial rounds of negotiations, 
the city decided to provide incentives for the other DMs and, thus, the conflict 
moved from state 1 to state 3. As shown in Figure 5.10, although state 3 is an 
equilibrium under attitude case 4, there was less degree of hostility among the 
DMs at this stage of the conflict. Due to further rounds of negotiations, PolyOne 
decided to stop slow remediation and, hence, the conflict moved to state 14, 
which is also one of the equilibrium states for attitude case 2, which represents a 
situation in which the DMs do not have negative attitudes towards one another 
anymore. 
 
The cooperative negotiations among the DMs continued until PolyOne decided to 
remediate the site quickly and, therefore, the conflict moved to state 10 (Table 
5.17) which is one of the equilibrium states for attitude cases 1 and 2. In the final 
stage of cooperative negotiations, UW decided to construct a school of pharmacy 
at the decontaminated site and eventually the conflict moved to state 8 or the 
final stage of the conflict, as shown in Table 5.17. State 8 represents the situation 
that actually occurred with respect to this case study. Therefore, the following two 
insights can be concluded: 
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1. The conflict resolution proposed by the negotiation methodology, 
developed in this chapter, is consistent with the real resolution for this 
real-life conflict; and 
2. As shown in Figure 5.10, state 8 is an equilibrium state for only attitude 
case 5 which represents a situation when all of the DMs have positive 
attitudes towards one another. In other words, when the DMs decide to 
have positive attitudes towards one another, a more beneficial and 
preferable outcome (i.e., state 8) is reached. 
 
The results of coalition analysis of this real-life case study show that PolyOne 
and UW have a possible joint move from state 14 to state 8 (Table 5.17). In other 
words, PolyOne could accept to remediate the brownfield site quickly and at the 
same time, UW could accept to build a school of pharmacy at the 
decontaminated site. If such possible move could happen, state 10, which was 
an equilibrium state, would be unstable because of an equilibrium jump and 
could not be considered as an equilibrium state when coalition analysis is carried 
out. More discussion about coalition analysis is provided by Kilgour et al. (2001), 
Inohara and Hipel, (2008a), and Inohara and Hipel, (2008b).                         
 
5.9. Summary  
This chapter has presented an attitude-based strategic negotiation methodology 
that was developed with multiple DMs. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
(GMCR) was systematically employed in order to study the negotiations at two 
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stages: modeling and analysis. In the modeling stage, the DMs and their options 
were determined, infeasible states were removed, and the DMs’ state rankings 
were determined. In the analysis stage, stability analysis that considered the 
attitudes of the DMs was conducted. Algorithms were proposed for removing 
infeasible attitude cases in negotiations involving multiple DMs. From the 
resulting feasible attitude cases, six relevant cases were selected, and attitude-
based stability analysis was performed.  
 
To discuss the results of the stability analysis, two approaches were applied: 
qualitative and quantitative. In the qualitative approach, which is the regular 
method used in GMCR, the resulting equilibrium states were examined and the 
preference for the states was investigated. To support the qualitative approach, a 
quantitative approach or an ad hoc analysis has been performed for discussing 
and examining the resulting equilibrium states in order to determine a 
quantitative relationship between the DMs’ attitudes and the DMs’ satisfaction 
values. The quantitative approach supports the qualitative approach in 
determining which equilibrium state is most preferred in overall by the DMs when 
the influence of the attitudes of the DMs on the outcome of the negotiation is 
taken into account.  
 
The results of the analyses were used to determine the most beneficial outcome 
of the negotiations at the strategic level. The findings of the discussion were 
summarized in a proposed equation for obtaining the overall preference for every 
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equilibrium state. Based on the updated amount of information for this real-life 
brownfield negotiation, the final result indicates that equilibrium state 8 is the 
most preferred and beneficial decision option at the strategic level. To examine 
the proposed resolution, a state transition table was developed and the real-life 
conflict evolution was discussed. The results of the discussions indicate that 
state 8 represents the situation in which this real-life case study was actually 
resolved over time and, thus, the proposed resolution can be confirmed. 
Therefore, equilibrium state 8 will be further negotiated at the tactical level as 
proposed in Chapter 7. 
 
This research provides valuable insight into the influence of the attitudes of the 
DMs on the outcome of strategic negotiations. The importance of the research in 
this chapter lies in proposal of a negotiation methodology that helps DMs 
determine which attitudes are needed in order to guide negotiations to more 
preferable decisions and prevent attitudes that can result in unwanted 
















CHAPTER 6:  
Attitude-Based Tactical Negotiation  





This chapter presents the tactical level of the attitude-based negotiation 
methodology for resolving construction conflicts when two decision makers are 
involved. To demonstrate the benefits of the proposed methodology, the 
brownfield negotiation case study, introduced in Chapter 4, is used to develop 
the methodology. The tactical level of the negotiation methodology complements 
the strategic level developed in Chapter 4 and therefore, this chapter supports 
and complements Chapter 4 where a brownfield conflict case study with two 
Decision Makers (DMs) was used to model the strategic level of the negotiation 
methodology. The DMs considered their attitudes toward each other and 
interactively negotiated in order to reach strategies that would improve their own 
positions in their pair-wise negotiation. Using GMCR approach, three negotiation 
situations, corresponding to the three types of DMs’ attitudes toward each other, 
were modeled. Three sets of possible outcomes, expressed as strategic solution 
options for the conflict, were then obtained and evaluated by the DMs in order to 
find the most beneficial decision. Consequently, the DMs chose equilibrium state 
2 as the strategic decision.  
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Although it is crucial for the DMs to agree on a strategic decision, it is not the 
final and sustainable solution for the conflict. The strategic decision identifies only 
a DM’s best course of action and advises the DM which actions are in a 
particular DM’s interest and which responses would be in the interests of the 
other DM. The strategic decision does not provide further detailed information 
(e.g., the specific amount of the redevelopment costs) about the resulting 
strategic decision for which a detailed mutual agreement can be reached. 
Therefore, a tactical negotiation approach is needed with the goal of specifying 
the specific amount of compromise that each DM should make with respect to 
each conflicting issue. The primary objective of Chapter 6 is to propose such 
complementary tactical negotiation approach when only two DMs are involved in 
the tactical negotiation. 
 
6.2. Tactical Negotiation Methodology: A Brownfield Case Study 
The brownfield negotiation case study presented in Chapter 4 is further 
developed in this section to model the tactical negotiation methodology. It is 
assumed that the negotiations between the DMs (i.e., the owner and the 
government) in the case study, take place before the start of the brownfield 
redevelopment. It is also assumed that both DMs have agreed on outcome 2 as 
the most beneficial strategic outcome obtained from the strategic analysis using 
GMCR. The development of tactical negotiation consists of some steps 
demonstrated in the following subsections. 
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6.2.1. Step 1: Identify Conflicting Issues within the Strategic Decision 
 The outcomes chosen at the strategic level as possible solutions for the conflict 
include one or more negotiating issues that can be further negotiated at a more 
detailed level. The negotiation issues can be continuous (numeric or accurate; as 
it is in this case study), discrete (nonnumeric or linguistic) or the combination of 
both continuous and discrete issues. Because the owner and the government 
have strategically decided to consider outcome 2 as the possible solution, they 
need to explicitly identify and define the conflicting issues involved in outcome 2 
and develop a scale for each issue to represent potential points of compromise 
between their initial negotiation positions. Outcome 2 represents a scenario in 
which the owner does not accept liability and sells the property, and the 
government neither shares the costs nor takes the case to court. Hence, the 
selling price of the owner’s property is the only numeric negotiation issue 
involved in outcome 2. It is reasonable to presume that the owner expects to sell 
her property at the highest price and that the government prefers to buy it at the 
lowest price. The goal of the proposed negotiation approach is to provide the 
owner and the government with the amount of compromise needed to reach a 
reasonable mutual agreement about the selling price. To achieve this goal, the 
concept of utility function is employed and explained as follows,   
 
6.2.2. Step 2: Determine the DMs’ Utility Functions 
Utility analysis deals generally with relative satisfaction from the results of 
decision making. A utility is a function of an action and the state of the 
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environment (i.e., U (A, E)). If a DM has to rank the consequences in order of his 
preferences, it is convenient to represent preferences with a utility function and 
reason indirectly about the preferences by means of these utility functions. Utility 
function forms represent and describe, for each DM, the tradeoffs between 
consequences (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). If an appropriate utility is assigned to 
each possible consequence and the expected utility of each alternative is 
calculated, then the best course of action is the alternative with the highest 
expected utility (Du and Chen, 2007).  In other words, when cardinal utility 
analysis is used, DMs try to maximize their own expected utility, and if they 
cooperatively negotiate, they strive to maximize their joint expected utility value. 
More discussions about utility theory are provided by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) 
and Kilgour (2006). 
 
The key characteristic of utility functions is that they are often monotonic, which 
means that they are constantly increasing and never decreasing or constantly 
decreasing and never increasing in value (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). For 
example, when a monetary asset position is appropriate for summarizing 
consequences, most DMs prefer a greater amount to a lesser amount, and the 
utility function increases monotonically. When the preferences for response time 
to calls for emergency services are considered, a smaller response time is 




The expected utility theory was originally developed by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944). The theory states that a DM chooses between risky or 
uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values (i.e., the weighted 
sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their 
respective probabilities). A critical step in many applications of decision analysis 
under the utility hypothesis is the specification and estimation of a suitable utility 
function form. For this purpose, several studies have been carried out such as 
those by Du and Chen (2007), Halter and Dean (1971), Cheung and Suen 
(2002), Musser et al. (1984), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Pena-Mora and Wang 
(1998), Mumpower (1988), Darling and Mumpower (1991), Zuhair et al. (1992), 
Lin et al. (1974), Kersten (2001), Ji et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2005), Lin and 
Chang (1978), and Zeleznikow et al. (2007). The form of a utility function 
depends on the characteristics of the DMs who have a specific attitude with 
respect to their risk and preferences for consequences. These attitudes can be 
mathematically expressed in terms of some of the properties of the DMs’ utility 
functions. For example, a DM’s utility function can be considered to be an 
exponential function such as f(x) = -e-bx. If parameter “b” represents the attitude 
of the DM, then changes in the value of “b” cause changes in the exponential 
function form, so the expected utility value for the DM changes. If a DM 
subscribes to a specific attitude, his utility function is restricted to a degree, and 
hence, the real assessment of his utility function is simplified.  
 
 176
Of the utility functional forms suggested in the literature, the polynomial and 
exponential functions seem to be the most popular (Zuhair et al., 1992). Buccola 
(1982) reported that polynomial and exponential functions give the same optimal 
portfolio. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) extensively studied the form and properties of 
some utility functions. Kirkwood (1997) believed that exponential utility functions 
are convenient to work with but they may not reflect all DMs’ preferences. 
Additionally, some researchers, such as Howard (1971) and Savage (1971), 
considered exponential utility functions as reasonable approximations of the 
preferences of the DMs. On the other hand, Eliashberg and Winkler (1978) 
studied the linear and nonlinear forms of utility functions. They reported that 
some nonlinear graphs, such as polynomial function forms, may provide a better 
understanding of the effect of utility functions on the solutions to the conflict. In 
contrast to the exponential utility function, which imposes only risk aversion on all 
DMs, the polynomial utility functions are more flexible for assigning risk attitudes 
(either risk aversion or risk preference) to DMs (Zuhair et al., 1992; Pena-Mora 
and Wang, 1998). Accordingly, the utility function forms proposed for the DMs 
involved in this case study are derived from Polynomial functions defined in the 
following:   
Polynomial function:       f(x) = anxn + an-1xn-1 + ... + a1x + a0   [1] 
 
Where f(x) is the utility function, “x” is an input variable, “a” is a real number 
coefficient, and “n” is the power of function. The value of “n” must be a 
nonnegative value and the degree of the polynomial function is the highest value 
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for “n” where “a” is not equal to zero. Polynomial utility functions have some 
appealing properties and characteristics that make them attractive as preferred 
utility function forms. These characteristics can also help an analyst ensure the 
accuracy of a selected polynomial function form for a DM. The following 
properties of polynomial functions were pointed out by Hanoch and Levy (1981): 
• The sum of polynomials is a polynomial;  
• The product of polynomials is a polynomial;  
• The derivative of a polynomial is a polynomial;  
• The primitive or anti-derivative of a polynomial is a polynomial; 
• The expected utility depends on the skewness of the distribution; 
• They provide greater flexibility and better approximation; and 
• They can represent risk preference (convexity). 
 
A DM’s preferences and the utility function that accurately reflects these 
preferences are unique to each DM, so it is unlikely that one form of utility 
function will correctly predict the behavior of all DMs. At best, a utility function 
which predicts behavior correctly for the DMs, such as the reformatted 
polynomial utility function in this study, may be identifiable. However, the DMs 
may prefer different utility function forms other than polynomial functions. Once 
the utility function forms are selected for the DMs, the following assumptions are 
applied for using utility functions in this research (Figure 6.1):  
1. Utility values vary with function forms and conflicting issues; 
2. Utility values reflect the same monetary valuation for various DMs;  
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3. DMs rationally make positive concessions when they negotiate; and 










Figure 6.1: Changes in Utility Value with Changes in Function Form 
 
When the proposed utility function is used in this research, some constraints and 
boundary conditions for the utility function need to be defined (Pena-Mora and 





 : The first derivative of the utility function (U) is less than zero. It 








: The second derivative of the utility function is less than or equal 
to zero. It means that the marginal payoff in the concession is 
decreasing, assuming a convex shape for the function (Figure 6.2). 
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3.  1000 ≤≤ x : The concession value is normalized between zero and 100. 
4. 1000 ≤≤U : The maximum and minimum values for the expected utility 
are 100 and zero, respectively. It means that if 100% of the payoff has to 
be made, no compromise should be made (x = 0); that is, U(0) = 100. 
The payoff is minimized to zero if a complete concession is made; that is, 
U(100) = 0. 
 
It can be noted that the above assumptions, constraints, and boundary conditions 
can also assist DMs in selecting an appropriate utility function form which is 
calibrated based on the DMs’ attitudes preferences. Moreover, an analyst (e.g., a 
mediator) can provide a questionnaire for each DM who can describe their 
behavior with respect to the other DMs involved in a dispute. The analyst can 
then collect the questionnaires and select an appropriate form of utility function 
for every DM involved.    
 
According to the above discussion and with respect to the brownfield negotiation 
case study, the DMs start their tactical negotiation by selecting a proper utility 
function. The general form of utility function for the seller (owner) and the buyer 
(government) is shown in Figure 6.2a. These shapes reflect the seller’s highest 
preference to get the highest price and, at the same time, the buyer’s highest 
preference to pay the lowest price. Generalizing these functions, various 
polynomial forms can be generated for the owner and the government, as shown 
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price of the property is in contrast to the owner’s position, the government’s utility 
function is a mirror image of the owner’s function ( Du and Chen, 2007; Pena-
Mora and Wang, 1998). 
 
6.2.3. Step 3: Obtain an Integrated Utility Function for Each Issue 
Once an appropriate utility function was selected for the owner and the 
government, the interactive negotiation process between the DMs is modeled. An 
approach to the modeling is presented below. In this approach, the utility 

















































Figure 6.3: The Process of Integrating Utility Function Forms 
 
Once the DMs’ utility functions are integrated into a joint coordinate system, the 
integrated utility function is obtained considering the following assumptions 
(Darling and Mumpower, 1990):  
1. The DMs make an initial offer that maximizes their self-interest payoff for 
the conflicting issue; 
2. After a DM has made a concession for a given issue, he or she never 
retracts that concession; 
3. DMs do not have any time constrains (e.g., negotiation deadline) when 
they negotiate;    
4. The negotiating situation is distributive although the DMs cooperatively 
continue their offers and counteroffers. Hence, gains for one DM translate 
into losses (not necessarily equal in magnitude) for the other. Agreement 
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is needed, and neither DM can abdicate or withdraw from the dispute prior 
to reaching an agreement; 
5. The DMs engage in a negotiation in which each alternately makes a new 
offer that changes by the same amount each time. Each DM can make 
only a 10-unit concession on a scale of 0 – 100, and neither can bypass 
the concession process; and  
6. When the integrated utility function reaches the maximum point, the DMs 
jointly gain the maximum payoff (i.e., satisfaction). The maximum point is 
used to determine the DMs’ concession. No further concessions by either 
DM with respect to that issue can be made, and the tactical negotiation is 
concluded. 
The above assumptions are used to conduct a pair-wise tactical negotiation 
using the DMs’ utility functions to obtain an integrated utility function. According 
to the above assumptions, an integrated utility function is used to obtain the 
exact amount of the concession each DM should make with respect to conflicting 
issues (Ji, et al. 2007; Mumpower, 1991; Pena-Mora and Wang, 1998).  
 
To generalize and clarify the integrating process, it is assumed that the owner 
represents DM 1 and the government represents DM 2 as shown in Figure 6.4. 
Both DMs intend to cooperatively negotiate to obtain the optimum resolution for 
the conflicting issue (i.e., the owner’s selling price). In other words, they want to 
cooperatively negotiate and sequentially reach to a point in which their joint 
satisfaction is maximized.  
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The negotiation process opens with DM 1 proposing an offer that initially 
maximizes her individual utility function with a zero concession level, indicated as 
point A in Figure 6.4. Point A stands for 100% integrated gain for both DMs in 
which UDM1(0) = 100% gain for DM 1 and UDM2(100) = 0% gain for DM 2. 
Similarly, DM 2 makes an initial counteroffer to maximize his payoff with zero 
concession as shown with point C in Figure 6.4. Point C also stands for 100% 
integrated gain for both DMs in which UDM2(0) = 100% gain for DM 2 and 
UDM1(100) = 0% gain for DM 1. Points A and C thus constitute the first and last 
points of the integrated utility function. Because the negotiation process is 
cooperative and both DMs want to reach an agreement, each time DM 1 
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concession. Each concession made by each DM corresponds to one point on the 
integrated utility function. Continuing this process, the integrated utility function 
shape is sequentially drawn from both sides. 
 
Point H, for example, on the integrated utility function, shown in Figure 6.4, is 
considered. Line DF in Figure 6.4 represents the marginal payoff gain for DM 1 
when a 30% concession is made by DM 1, whereas line DE represents the 
marginal payoff gain for DM 2 when a 70% concession is made by DM 2. To 
obtain the position of point H (i.e., the DMs’ joint gain or satisfaction), the gains 
by the DMs are algebraically summed to calculate the height of DH = DE + DF. 
The same procedure is carried out to obtain point M (Figure 6.4). In this case, I J 
represents the payoff gain by DM 1 when a 70% concession is made by DM 1 
and I K represents gain for DM 2 when a 30% concession is made by DM 2. The 
position of M is obtained by summing up the gains by the DMs. That is, I M = I J 
+ I K.  
 
Following this procedure, the DMs continue to compromise sequentially until the 
maximum point on the total utility function (B) is eventually reached. The 
maximum point represents the settlement point or the point of agreement 
because both DMs receive the highest joint payoff. This means that both DMs 
have reached the highest degree of satisfaction for their cooperative effort. The 
settlement point is used to obtain the concession indicated on the horizontal axis. 
In Figure 6.4, point N indicates the concession (40%) that DM 1 should make and 
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point P indicates the concession (60%) that DM 2 should make to reach a mutual 
agreement regarding the selling price of the owner’s property. The settlement 
point can also be mathematically obtained by optimizing the following equation: 
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is the integrated utility function for issue i, Wji is the weight for issue 
i of DM j, Uji is the utility function for issue i of DM j, and xi is the concession 
variable for issue i.  
  
6.2.4. Step 4: Select the Best Decision Value 
Figure 6.5 represents a situation in which the owner prefers to have a 
cooperative attitude and a desire to sell the property and avoid all risks involved 
with the brownfield property. Therefore, a utility function with n = 7 is a good 
representation of the owner who is willing to compromise more than the 
government. On the other hand, the government prefers to be cooperative but 
has no great interest in buying the contaminated property. As such, a utility 
function form with n = 2 is a good representation of the government who is willing 
to concede less than the owner.  
 
The integrated utility function obtained graphically in Figure 6.5, can be 
mathematically expressed as follows: 







































30% of the price
paid by Government  
Figure 6.5: Decision with the Maximum Utility Value 
 
Where wo and wg stand for the weights assigned to the issue by the owner and 
the government, respectively, and they both equal 1 since there is only one 
negotiating issue (the selling price of the owner’s property). Uo and Ug also 
represent the utility functions for the owner and the government, respectively.  
 
As shown in Figure 6.5, the maximum point on the integrated utility function 
represents the maximum utility value or the maximum level of satisfaction for 
DMs (Darling and Mumpower, 1990). As shown in Figure 6.5, point B represents 
the settlement point or the point of agreement because both DMs have reached 
the highest degree of satisfaction for their cooperative effort in this case. The 
settlement point is used to obtain the percentage of price (indicated on the 
horizontal axis) that each DM should pay. In Figure 6.5, point N indicates 30% of 
  Govern. Owner 
 n = 2 7 
x     
Integrated 
0 100 0 100 
10 99 52 151 
20 96 79 175 
30 91 92 183 
40 84 97 181 
50 75 99 174 
60 64 99 164 
70 51 100 151 
80 36 100 136 
90 19 100 119 
100 0 100 100 
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the price is paid by the government and 70% (100%-30%) of the price is 
conceded by the owner. If the initial price of the property is $200,000, for 
example, the government should pay $60,000 (0.3 × $200,000) and the owner 
should concede $140,000 (0.7 × $200,000).  
 
As it can be seen, the proposed tactical negotiation methodology assists the DMs 
to determine the specific concession needed to reach a mutual tactical 
resolution. It should be mentioned that disagreement point “d” (Kilgour, 2006) 
was not considered in this case study. The disagreement point represents the 
DMs’ minimum utility values that the DMs can count on it if they do not reach any 
agreement. The individual rationality condition is that no DM receives less utility 
than he or she would receive at “d”. Of course, it is guaranteed that the DMs can 
achieve “d”. The disagreement point will be considered in the tactical negotiation 
methodology involving multiple DMs proposed in Chapter 7. Moreover, in this 
case study only one conflicting issue (i.e., the selling price of the owner’s 
property) was considered. Considering multiple conflicting issues will be also 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
    
6.3. Sensitivity to the DMs’ Attitudes 
A major contribution of this chapter is related to the incorporation of the DMs’ 
attitudes into the proposed negotiation methodology. As the influence of DMs’ 
attitudes on strategic negotiations was investigated in Chapters 4 and 5, it is 
important to assess the effect of DMs’ attitudes on tactical negotiation outcomes. 
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In the proposed negotiation methodology, the attitudes of the DMs can be 
reflected by the power of the reformatted polynomial utility function (n):    
 
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the shape of utility function changes with the value of “n”. 
When 0 < n < 1, then the polynomial function has a negative convex shape for 
the government and positive convex shape for the owner. When 1 < n ≤ 10, then 
the utility function has a negative concave shape for the government and positive 
concave shape for the owner. The function shape is linear when n = 1.  (Ji et al. 
2007). It can be noticed that each value of “n” reflects the specific attitude of a 
DM. Moreover, the function forms when 1 < n ≤ 10 reflect decreasing marginal 
improvements in the utility as the values of the concessions approach the DM’s 
ideal. Thus, the shape of the integrated utility function form depends on the 
power of the DMs’ utility functions. When the shape of integrated utility function 
changes, the position of the maximum point on the integrated function also 
changes, and this change in maximum point indicates a different settlement point 
and thereby, different concession values for each DM. In other words, the 
change in the position of maximum point on the integrated utility function 
indicates that the maximum level of satisfaction for both DMs has changed. 
Figure 6.6 displays four scenarios in the tactical negotiation case study in which 
the owner and the government express different attitudes toward each other (i.e., 
different function forms corresponding to different attitudes were selected). These 

































60% of the price paid by Government
O: n=2 (positive attitude) 


























30% of the price paid by Government
O: n=7 (positive attitude) 



















20% of the price paid by Government
O: n=0.7 (negative attitude) 























60% of the price paid by Government
O: n=0.5 (negative attitude) 
G: n=5 (positive attitude) 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
scenarios with different utility function forms can arise during negotiations 





Figure 6.6: The Sensitivity of the DMs’ Attitudes to Negotiation Results 
 
Figure 6.6a displays a scenario in which the “n” values of the utility functions are 
more than one for both DMs. The government has a utility function with n = 6 and 
that he feels that he can pays even 40% of the price without detriment to his 
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position because if he pays 40% of the price, he can still receive a 100% payoff. 
On the other hand, the owner has a utility function with the power value of n = 2. 
Considering the owner’s graph, it can be seen that the owner is able to reduce 
only 10% of the initial price of its property without detriment to her position 
because if she makes up to a 10% concession to sell its property, she can still 
receive a 100% payoff. The individual payoff values for both DMs thus start to 
decrease after 40% and 10% concessions made by the government and the 
owner, respectively. It can be concluded for this case that the government, with a 
higher “n” value, is more cooperative than the owner, who has a lower “n” value. 
The “integrated” graphs in Figure 6.6 have been drawn using the procedure 
illustrated in Figure 6.4. It can also be seen that the maximum point on the 
integrated graph represents the settlement point of the negotiation which is 179% 
for this scenario shown in Figure 6.6.a. This settlement point indicates on the 
horizontal axis that the government pays for the 60% of the price and the owner 
reduces its initial offer by 40% and sells its property. 
 
When Figure 6.6.b is considered, n(owner) = 7 is higher than n(government) = 1. It can 
be seen that the owner can reduce its initial offer by 50% without detriment to its 
position, whereas the government starts losing its utility when any concession is 
made. It means that the government has a less cooperative attitude with respect 
to the owner, who feels that the initial offer can be reduced without significantly 
damaging its position. The maximum expected joint utility value for this scenario 
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is 162%, which is less than that in the previous scenario (179%). If the results of 
the two scenarios are compared, the following two observations can be made: 
1. Reduction of the expected joint utility value in the second scenario to 
162 % comparing with the first scenario (179%) indicates that the 
combination of “n” values in the first scenario (n(owner) = 2 and 
n(government) = 6) is resulted in a higher expected joint utility value than 
that in the second scenario (n(owner) = 7 and n(government) = 1); and 
2. The location of maximum joint utility on the integrated curve is shifted 
from right side of the plot in Figure 6.6a to the left side of the plot in 
Figure 6.6b. In other words, in the first scenario, the government is 
more cooperative (n = 6) and the owner is less cooperative (n = 2) so 
that the maximum utility point is placed on the right side; whereas, in 
the second scenario, the owner is more cooperative (n = 7) and the 
government is less cooperative (n = 1) so that the maximum utility 
point is placed on the left side. 
    
The two bottom plots in Figure 6.6c and 6.6d depict situations for which the “n” 
value for one or both DMs is less than 1 and, as can be seen, the shape of the 
utility function changes from concave to convex when the “n” value is reduced 
from more than 1 to less than 1. Such reduction of “n” value to less than 1 not 
only can reduce the cooperative attitudes of the DMs, but can also significantly 
decrease the total utility value to even less than 100%, which means that the 
negotiation process is unproductive (Figure 6.6c). In other words, it would be 
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better paid off for the DMs who have negative attitudes towards each other not to 
start negotiating since the results after negotiation is worse than the results 
before negotiation. Following the above procedure, other scenarios can be 
considered and the sensitivity of the DMs’ attitudes to the negotiation process 
can be examined. These attitude scenarios have been analyzed and the results 
are summarized in a categorized format, as shown in Table 6.1.  
         
         Table 6.1: The Results of the Sensitivity of the DMs’ Attitudes     
DM 1 (Owner) DM 2 (Government) 





0 < n < 1 Negative Convex Noncooperative 0 < n < 1 
Positive 
Convex Noncooperative Very Negative 13 ≤ SP ≤ 93 




Positive 40 ≤ SP ≤ 166 
0 < n < 1 Negative Convex Noncooperative 1 Linear Neutral Negative 31 ≤ SP ≤ 96 
1 < n  ≤ 10 Negative Concave Cooperative 1 < n ≤ 10 
Positive 
Concave Cooperative Very Positive 150 ≤ SP ≤ 200 
1 < n  ≤ 10 Negative Concave Cooperative 1 Linear Neutral Positive 125 ≤ SP ≤ 169 
1 Linear Neutral 1 Linear Neutral Neutral SP = 100 
 
6.4. Discussion of the Results 
As displayed in Table 6.1, the “n” value falls within one of the three ranges: 0 < n 
< 1, 1 < n ≤ 10, or n = 1. Since there are two DMs in this case, there can be six (2 
× 3) attitude situations (Table 6.1). In the first situation, both DMs have negative 
attitudes toward each other and, thus, the range of 0 < n < 1 is selected for the 
DMs’ utility functions. If the negotiation should proceed, the result of the 
negotiation is expected to be “very negative” and the Settlement Point (SP) will 
 193
be in the lowest range (13 ≤ SP ≤ 93). This means that the total (i.e., joint) utility 
value reduces to even less than 100% in this case, and such a negotiation is not 
productive because the joint satisfaction level for both DMs at the end of 
negotiation is even lower than the individual satisfaction level for each DM at the 
beginning of the negotiation. It should be remembered that the objective of the 
DMs is to maximize their total utility value and when they negotiate, they try to 
maximize their cooperative satisfaction.  
 
In the second situation, DM 1 has a negative attitude (0 < n < 1) toward DM 2, 
whereas DM 2 has a positive attitude (1 < n < 10) toward DM 1, and thus, 40 ≤ 
SP ≤ 166, and the total utility value falls within a range of positive and negative 
values. Accordingly, this situation results in a better total utility value than that of 
the previous situation. Following this procedure, the same discussion can be 
provided for the other four attitude situations shown in Table 6.1.  
 
It can be inferred from the six attitude situations in Table 6.1 that the higher value 
for the power (n) of the utility functions is selected, the more cooperative the DMs  
intend to be in their tactical negotiations. In other words, the DMs who both have 
a positive attitude toward each other can expect to achieve higher satisfaction 
level with higher total utility values and, as such, they may reach a “win-win” 
solution with the highest satisfaction for their joint efforts. The highest total utility 
value in the joint negotiation (Row 4 in Table 6.1) is called Nash equilibrium point 
where both DMs have positive attitudes towards each other and have reached 
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the highest value for their joint SP. In Nash equilibrium point the DMs have no 
incentive to move to other states or other attitude cases in Table 6.1.  
 
The power of the polynomial utility function can also reflect the DMs’ risk 
attitudes. In terms of the DMs’ attitudes towards risk, three types of DM are 
considered: risk avoider, risk taker, and risk neutral (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
The results of the proposed negotiation methodology show that: 
1. DMs who are more risk-averse and perhaps less cooperative prefer to 
select lower values for the power (n) of their utility function; 
2. DMs who are more risk-prone and perhaps more cooperative prefer to 
select higher values for the power (n) of their utility function; and 
3. DMs who are neutral towards risk prefer to select the power (n) of their 
utility function as n = 1.  
 
It can be seen in Table 6.1 that when 0 < n < 1, a utility function has a convex 
shape and when 1 < n ≤ 10, a utility function takes a concave shape. There are 
proven mathematical theorems (Kilgour, 2006; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) that 
correlate the DMs’ risk aversion level to the shape of the utility function. Risk 
avers, risk prone, and risk neutral are represented by a convex, concave, or 
linear function, respectively. The utility function shapes proposed in this research 
are driven by those mathematical theorems. Therefore, the results of the 
proposed methodology in this chapter are consistent with other research in this 
area.     
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6.5. Summary 
In this chapter, the development of the proposed attitude-based negotiation 
methodology at the tactical level involving two decision makers was 
demonstrated using the concept of utility function. The proposed methodology 
supports and complements the strategic level of the negotiation methodology 
developed in Chapter 4 when two decision makers were involved in the strategic 
negotiation. The brownfield negotiation case study, introduced in Chapter 4, was 
used in this chapter to develop the methodology. Also, the sensitivity of decision 
makers’ attitudes to the outcome of tactical negotiation was discussed. The 
results of the tactical negotiation of the case study prove that the tactical 
negotiation was needed to support and complement the strategic negotiation of 
the case study and thereby, the DMs were able to complete their negotiation and 
reach to a more sustainable resolution for their brownfield conflict.     
 
The concepts, techniques, and approaches used in this chapter will be used in 
Chapter 7 to develop a tactical negotiation methodology when multiple decision 
makers and multiple negotiation issues are involved. A real-life negotiation case 











CHAPTER 7:  
Attitude-Based Tactical Negotiation  
Involving Multiple Decision Makers 
   
 
7.1. Introduction 
The chapter describes the generalization of the tactical negotiation methodology 
developed in Chapter 6 so that the attitudes of the decision makers (DMs) can be 
considered in the case of multiple DMs and multiple negotiation issues. The 
tactical negotiation methodology proposed in this chapter thus complements the 
strategic negotiation methodology involving multiple DMs, as presented in 
Chapter 5.  
 
This chapter introduces a generalized tactical negotiation methodology, and a 
real-life brownfield negotiation case study is then used to clearly demonstrate the 
advantages of the proposed negotiation methodology. Finally, the influence of 
the DMs’ attitudes on the outcomes of the negotiations at the tactical level is 
elaborated, and the results are discussed.         
 
7.2. Generalized Tactical Negotiation Methodology  
Building upon the two-DM tactical negotiation methodology discussed in Chapter 
6, it is possible to generalize such methodology to include cases that involve 
multiple DMs and multiple negotiation issues are involved. Using the concept of a 
utility function, pair-wise negotiations are conducted between each pair of DMs, 
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for each issue. The generalized tactical negotiation consists of a total number of 
pair-wise negotiations, as follows (Figure 7.1):  
 Number of pair-wise negotiations = (n) × 
2
)1()( −× NN         [1] 


















Figure 7.1: Pair-wise Negotiations Used to Formulate Generalized 
Tactical Negotiation Methodology 
. . . . 
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Sets of Pair-wise Negotiation for Issue 1 
Sets of Pair-wise Negotiation for Issue 2
Sets of Pair-wise Negotiation for Issue 3






In each pair-wise negotiation, both DMs consider the negotiation issues and take 
into account their attitudes toward each other. Accordingly, for each DM, a utility 
function is selected from the variety of the utility functions proposed in 
Subsection 6.2.2. The pair-wise negotiation is then begun and continued until it 
results in an integrated utility function. The highest point on the integrated utility 
function indicates the highest level of satisfaction for both DMs and represents 
the settlement point needed for them to reach mutual consensus with respect to 
each negotiation issue. For example, in the tactical negotiation between DM 1 
and DM 2 with respect to issue 1 (the top left-hand graph in Figure 7.1), u12 
represents the maximum utility (satisfaction) and s12, reflected on the horizontal 
axis, represents the settlement point indicating the concessions DM 1 and DM 2 
should make in order to reach mutual agreement with respect to issue 1. 
 
7.3. Tactical Negotiation Process: Multiple DMs and Issues   
In real world, when multiple DMs negotiate multiple issues, many unprecedented 
events can occur during the negotiation and can influence the outcome. To 
accurately model a real tactical negotiation process, the following assumptions 
have been made:  
• When DMs begin negotiating at the tactical level, they already have 
complete information about the other DMs’ options and strategies because 
they have already carried out many rounds of negotiation at the strategic 
level, as explained in previous chapters, which complements the 
negotiation at the tactical level. 
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• There are no time constraints for tactical negotiation, and the DMs are not 
restricted to completing the negotiation by any particular deadline. 
• There must be at least one issue for negotiating, and the number of issues 
must be limited to a specified number n.  
• All DMs have the same power and importance. In other words, the weight 
of each DM equals to one. According to Fisher et al. (1991), negotiation 
focus should be on interests, not the DMs’ positions, and the DMs should 
be separated from the problem. 
• Once two DMs begin their bilateral (pair-wise) negotiation, the negotiation 
must continue until they reach a settlement (s). 
• With respect to the summation of DMs’ utility values to obtain the total 
utility value, it is assumed that the valuation of utility is the same for all the 
DMs involved in the tactical negotiation. 
• All DMs must complete their bilateral negotiations with respect to all 
negotiable issues in order to reach an overall settlement.   
 
Two approaches exist for conducting a tactical negotiation that involve multiple 
DMs and multiple issues: Approach 1 which addresses one issue at a time, and 
Approach 2 which addresses two DMs at a time. These two approaches for a 
case involving three DMs (i.e., DM 1, DM 2, and DM 3) are shown in Figure 7.2 
and explained in the following subsections. It should be noted that before 
beginning to negotiate, every DM (x) rates and prioritizes the issues to be 
negotiated with any other DM (y) by allocating a numerical weight to each issue 
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(i). Thus, the greater the weight value of an issue, the more important the issue is 







)( 1 , where n is the total number 
of issues. Some studies (Alfares and Duffuaa, 2008; Belton and Stewart, 2001; 
Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Lootsma, 1999; Saaty, 1980, 1990, 1994) have been 
conducted with the goal of determining proper numerical values for the weights of 
the issues. 
 
7.3.1. Approach 1: One Issue at a Time    
With this approach, DMs conduct a pair-wise negotiation with respect to one 
issue at a time (e.g., DM 1 - DM 2; DM 1 - DM 3; etc.) until a settlement point 
(s12, s13) is reached. When every DM conducts its pair-wise negotiation with other 
                                         
                        
DM 1 DM 2 
u12 
s12 















Approach 2: Two DMs at a Time 
A
pproach 1: O
ne Issue at a T
im
e 
Figure 7.2: Two Approaches for Conducting Tactical Negotiation 
 201
DMs with respect to Issue 1, an average settlement point (Sissue1) can be 
determined for every DM. Upon completing the pair-wise negotiations for Issue 1, 
the DMs then begin pair-wise negotiations for Issue 2, and an average settlement 
point (Sissue2) is also calculated for each DM. This negotiation process continues 
until the DMs involved reach mutual agreement (i.e., an average settlement 
point) with respect to all the negotiation issues.   
 
The above negotiating process is used for a situation in which three DMs are 
involved in tactical negotiations with respect to multiple issues. The average 
settlement point for each DM that results from negotiating issue i is determined 





































SDM1-issue-i: DM 1’s average settlement point resulting from negotiating issue i 
w12-issue-i: DM 1’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 2 
s12-issue-i: DM 1’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 2    
w13-issue-i: DM 1’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 3 
s13-issue-i: DM 1’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 3 
 
The above settlement points represent the amount of concession that each DM 
should make to reach agreement about issue i. To determine the average 
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settlement point for each DM that results from negotiating n issues, the following 
equations are used: 
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The one-issue-at-a-time negotiation approach is useful when negotiable issues 
are not correlated. Thus, regardless of the influence of other issues, the DMs can 
determine the type of their attitudes (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral) toward the 
other DMs and, accordingly, select a proper n value for their utility function. In 
other words, this negotiation approach can be used when the involved DMs can 
negotiate the issues separately. However, in some situations the issues are 
correlated. For example, when the cost of a brownfield site remediation and the 
duration of the same brownfield site remediation are two negotiable issues, the 
two issues (i.e., cost and duration) are correlated so that the shorter the desired 
duration, the higher the cost that should be paid. Therefore, when the issues are 
mutually related to one another, another tactical negotiation approach is needed 
in order to take into account the correlations among the issues, as proposed in 
the following subsection.   
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7.3.2. Approach 2: Two DMs at a Time  
With this approach, as shown in Figure 7.2, two pairs of DMs (e.g., DM 1 - DM 2; 
DM 3 - DM 4) conduct pair-wise negotiations with respect to all the issues at a 
time and continue their negotiation until a settlement point is reached with 
respect to every issue. In contrast with the first approach, the correlations among 
the issues influence the selection of the n value for the DMs’ utility function. In 
other words, the n values selected for two the DMs’ utility functions for 
negotiating issue i using Approach 1 are different from the n values selected for 
the same DMs and the same issue when Approach 2 is used. Different 
settlement points may therefore result from using different approaches. 
 
Once the two DMs complete their negotiations for all issues, each DM will start 
pair-wise negotiation with another DM (e.g., DM 1 - DM 3; DM 2 - DM 4) for all 
issues. With this approach, two DMs may negotiate the issues one by one, or 
they may negotiate all issues simultaneously. The advantage of this approach is 
that it takes into account the correlations among the issues. The negotiation 
process is complete when every DM has completed its pair-wise negotiation with 
all the other DMs.  
 
This negotiating process is used for a situation in which three DMs are involved 
and two DMs conduct a pair-wise negotiation for n issues at a time. The average 
settlement point for each DM is then determined using the following equations: 
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where: 
SDM1(ave): DM 1’s average settlement point resulted from negotiating n issues 
SDM2(ave): DM 2’s average settlement point resulted from negotiating n issues 
SDM3(ave): DM 3’s average settlement point resulted from negotiating n issues 
w12-issue-i: DM 1’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 2 
w21-issue-i: DM 2’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 1 
w13-issue-i: DM 1’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 3 
w31-issue-i: DM 3’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 1 
w23-issue-i: DM 2’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 3 
w32-issue-i: DM 3’s weight for issue i when negotiating with DM 2 
s12-issue-i: DM 1’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 2    
s21-issue-i: DM 2’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 1 
s13-issue-i: DM 1’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 3 
s31-issue-i: DM 3’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 1 
s23-issue-i: DM 2’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 3 
s32-issue-i: DM 3’s settlement point resulting from negotiating with DM 2 
 n: number of issues 
 
It should be noted that the set of equations [8], [9], [10] and the set of equations 
[5], [6], [7] result in the same values for the settlement point only when all issues 
are negotiated by the DMs. Therefore, when all issues are negotiated, either set 
can be used to determine the average settlement point for each DM. It should 
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also be mentioned that equations [8], [9], and [10] are used only when the DMs 
conduct pair-wise negotiations for all issues. If two DMs negotiate only some of 
the issues, then equations [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] must be used in order to 
determine the average settlement point with respect to each DM. 
 
The application of the two proposed approaches depends on the negotiation 
situations, the DMs’ attitudes toward the other DMs, and the negotiation issues. 
Although the first negotiation approach (one issue at a time) is fast and easy to 
conduct among multiple DMs, the second approach (two DMs at a time), while 
lengthy, is more accurate because the correlations among the issues can be 
considered. The latter approach is particularly useful when the issues are 
monetarily related to one another. Because the tactical negotiations for the 
present case study deal with cost-based issues, the second approach was used 
in order to consider the correlation of the issues, as explained in the next section.       
 
7.4 Application to the School of Pharmacy Tactical Negotiation 
The process of tactical negotiation involving multiple DMs and multiple issues, as 
proposed in the previous section, was implemented, as discussed in this section, 
in order to develop a tactical negotiation methodology for the UW School of 
Pharmacy case study. It should be remembered that a strategic decision had 
already been agreed upon by the DMs involved using the strategic negotiation 
methodology presented in Chapter 5. The proposed tactical negotiation 
methodology complements this strategic negotiation methodology. 
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The strategic negotiation for the school of pharmacy resulted in a mutual 
agreement in which PolyOne completes the site remediation quickly, the city 
does not take legal action and provides incentives for UW and PolyOne, and UW 
constructs a school of pharmacy in the decontaminated site. This strategic 
decision includes multiple issues that can be further negotiated in details in order 
to determine the specific concessions needed for all the DMs to reach mutual 
agreement. The tactical issues within the agreed-upon strategic solution are 
indicated in Table 7.1. Implementing the proposed negotiation methodology at 
the tactical level for the UW School of Pharmacy required three steps, as 
explained in the following subsections. 
 
Table 7.1: Tactical Issues Identified within the Strategic Decision 
 
7.4.1. Step 1: Decompose the Negotiation Issues into Sub-Issues  
Some issues in multi-issue tactical negotiations are complex and difficult to 
negotiate and should therefore be broken down into sub-issues. This method 
increases the number of issues, which facilitate negotiation process and also 
Agreed-upon Strategic Solution 
DM 
State 8 Description 
Negotiation Issue 
N Slow Remediation  
PolyOne 
Y Fast Remediation Fast-Remediation Costs
Y Brownfield Incentives Financial Incentives 
The city 
N Legal Action  
UW Y Building Construction Construction Costs 
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helps the DMs prioritize their issues for negotiation. Keeney (1992) believed that 
breaking down the issues into sub-issues allows the involved DMs to solve the 
least complicated issues first, and they will then be more engaged and 
encouraged to negotiate the remaining issues. Bellucci and Zeleznikow (2005) 
also recognized that there may be sub-issues within the issues on which 
agreement can be attained. Each sub-issue can also be decomposed into other 
sub-issues so that a hierarchy of issues and sub-issues is formed. It is important 
to note that the larger the number of issues in negotiation, the easier it may be to 
allocate them, since the possibility of trade-offs between the issues increases. 
However, decomposing a negotiable issue depends on the negotiation 
conditions, and there are cases in which an issue can not be decomposed into 
sub-issues. Figure 7.3 shows a flowchart of the issues and sub-issues identified 



































According to the agreed-upon strategic solution (Table 7.1), PolyOne agreed to 
remediate the site fast, and thus PolyOne’s negotiable issue is the fast-
remediation cost. In other words, because extra costs were involved in fast 
remediation, PolyOne intended to negotiate the extra costs with the other DMs 
with a view to determining how much the other DMs would be able to help. The 
process of fast site remediation consists of three steps: 1) cannibalize the 
remaining facilities (i.e., take salvageable parts of disabled machines or facilities 
and use them in building or repairing other equipment or facilities); 2) demolish 
and remove the old buildings; and 3) perform the environmental remediation. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 7.3, fast-remediation costs can be broken down 
into three cost-related sub-issues that correspond to these three steps. 
 
The city’s issue was brownfield incentives, which consisted of two sub-issues: 1) 
write off the back taxes and unpaid charges, and 2) reimburse the other DMs for 
maintenance expenses. Because of the threats to environment and the health 
hazards, the city, as a municipal organization, was the most cooperative DM 
because of the need to make sure that the contaminated site was redeveloped 
as soon as possible. Therefore, the city intended to provide incentives for the 
other DMs who were faced with financial difficulties. Due to the huge amount of 
unpaid charges that had been accumulated because the contaminated site had 
been abandoned for such a long time, the city was engaged in tactical 
negotiations with the other DMs in order to pay (i.e., write off) some of the unpaid 
charges and taxes that were owed to the city. There was also conflict about the 
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site maintenance expenses, and the city was involved in detailed negotiation to 
pay (i.e., reimburse) a reasonable amount of the expenses to the other DMs. 
 
Finally, UW’s negotiation issue was the initial construction costs. Although UW 
was the primarily responsible for constructing the school of pharmacy, some of 
the initial construction activities were costly, and UW needed financial help from 
the other DMs. Therefore, UW was engaged in pair-wise negotiations with the 
other DMs with respect to the initial construction costs.         
 
7.4.2. Step 2: Identify the DMs’ Least Expectations 
Prior to the start of a tactical negotiation, the involved DMs identify their minimum 
expectation with respect to each issue. The minimum expectation in tactical 
negotiation is referred to as the disagreement point (d) which represents each 
DM’s minimum level of satisfaction on which the DMs count if they do not reach 
any agreement. The individual rationality condition is that no DM receives less 
satisfaction than he or she would receive at point d (Kilgour 2006). It is thus 
guaranteed that the DMs can achieve at least d. Therefore, to maximize their 
negotiation position, every DM considers the other DMs and the negotiable 
issues, and attempts to find a disagreement point before the beginning of a pair-
wise negotiation. For example, when the city and PolyOne negotiate the extra 
cost (e.g., $1,000,000) associated with the fast site remediation, the city may not 
accept more than a 60% concession, or $600,000, which represents the city’s 
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disagreement point. In other words, the city will not accept any tactical solution 
that requires a payment greater than $600,000. 
 
7.4.3. Step 3: Simulate the Tactical Negotiation   
With respect to the tactical negotiation approaches proposed in Figure 7.2, the 
two-DMs-at-a-time negotiation approach was employed in order to simulate the 
tactical negotiations for the school of pharmacy. Because the issues in this case 
study are monetarily and mutually related to one another, the selected approach 
is more suitable for considering the interrelationships between the issues and the 
correlation among the sub-issues. The simulated tactical negotiation 
methodology for the school of pharmacy is shown in Figure 7.4.  
 
As can be seen, the DMs first consider the correlations among the issues and 
accordingly determine the weight of the issues as well as their minimum 
expectation (i.e., the disagreement point) with respect to each issue. The DMs 
then conduct pair-wise negotiation only for the issues that relate to both DMs, 
and therefore, they do not negotiate for the issues related to the third DM. For 
example, PO and UW will not conduct pair-wise negotiations for sub-issues 4 
and 5, which are the city’s issues (Figure 7.4). Also, there is no single issue to be 
negotiated by all the DMs. In this case study, three sets of pair-wise negotiations 
were conducted: between PO-City, PO-UW, and the City-UW. The three sets of 
negotiations are described in the following subsections.  
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7.4.4. Step 3a: Tactical Negotiations between PolyOne and the City 
The tactical negotiation between PolyOne and the city is modeled using the 
concept of utility theory and utility function. The procedure for conducting a 
tactical negotiation using utility function is described in Chapter 6, Section 6.2 for 
cases in which two DMs and only one issue are involved. The same procedure 
was employed to conduct pair-wise negotiations when multiple issues are 
negotiated in detail. 
 
As shown in Figure 7.4, PolyOne and the city conduct pair-wise negotiations for 
five of the six negotiable issues listed. The engagement of PolyOne and the city 
in negotiating most issues indicates that both DMs have found a rational 
motivation for further negotiating most of these issues identified in the agreed-

















































upon strategic solution. The background of this case study also indicates that the 
city and PolyOne participated in many rounds of negotiations and meetings to 
determine each DM’s share of the costs of remediation of the brownfield site.          
 
The pair-wise negotiation begins with the two DMs first evaluating all the issues 
and determining the weight and the disagreement point, or the minimum 
expectation, with respect to each negotiable issue. They then take into account 
the correlations among the issues to discuss whether they can make more 
concessions with respect to one issue in order to receive more benefits with 
respect to another issue. In other words, understanding the relationship between 
issues allows the DMs to find the most suitable range of concessions (i.e., an 
appropriate n value for the utility function) they can make in order to reach a 
more stable agreement. Understanding the interrelationships among the issues 
also helps the DMs to adjust their attitudes during their pair-wise negotiations.  
 
After determining the preliminary considerations, such as the weight of issues 
and the disagreement points, an appropriate utility function form is assigned to 
each DM for each issue, and an integrated utility function is then developed. The 
maximum point on the integrated utility function represents the highest level of 
satisfaction in a joint decision and also represents the settlement point which 
represents the concessions the DMs need to make in order to reach mutual 
agreement with respect to each issue. The five pair-wise negotiations between 


































b) Sub-issue 2: Demolish & Remove Old Structures
40% of the cost of demolishing old 
structures is paid by City
PO : n = 8 (positive attitude)

































d) Sub-issue 4: Write-off Back Taxes & Charges
50% of the back taxes are written off 
by City
PO : n = 5 (positive attitude)


































a) Sub-issue 1: Cannibalize Remaining Facilities
60% of the cost of cannibalizing is paid 
by City
PO : n = 3 (positive attitude)

































c) Sub-issue 3: Environmental Remediation
30% of the cost of environmental 
remediation is paid by City
PO : n = 9 (positive attitude)































e) Sub-issue 5: Reimburse for Maintenance Expenses
PO : n = 1 (neutral attitude)
City: n = 9 (positive attitude)


































It can be noted that the utility functions, shown in Figure 7.5, were selected for 
PolyOne and the city in which x represents the amount of the concessions made 
by the DMs and n represents the power term of the utility function. 
 
7.4.5. Step 3b: Tactical Negotiations between PolyOne and UW 
PolyOne and UW had two negotiable issues: 1) the cost of the environmental 
remediation, and 2) the initial cost of constructing the UW school of pharmacy. In 
this case study, the site was transferred to UW as the new owner of the site. As 
PolyOne negotiated the cost of the environmental remediation with the city, as 
discussed in the previous subsection, PolyOne was also willing to negotiate 
some of the remediation costs with UW. Because a lengthy remediation process 
would continued beyond the point at which UW became the site owner, UW did 
not want any interruption in the remediation process established by PolyOne, and 
UW was therefore engaged in the negotiation process.  
 
 
With respect to the third issue, the initial construction costs, UW was the DM 
mainly responsible for the costs of construction. However, because PolyOne had 
already assembled a great deal of suitable construction equipment on the site, 
UW was willing to negotiate the costs of the initial construction activities with 
PolyOne. The activities were overlapped with the PolyOne’s construction 
activities. The two pair-wise negotiations between PlyOne and UW are modeled 































a) Sub-issue 3: Environmental Remediation
PO : n = 9 (positive attitude)
UW: n = 1 (neutral attitude)
20% of the remediation cost 































b) Sub-issue 6: Initial Construction Costs
PO : n = 1 (neutral attitude)
UW: n = 10 (positive attitude)
80% of the construction cost is paid by UW
and UW in which x represents the amount of concession made by DMs and n 
represents the power term of the utility function. 
 
 








Figure 7.6: Tactical Negotiations between PolyOne and UW  
 
7.4.6. Step 3c: Tactical Negotiations between the City and UW 
The City and UW had three negotiable issues: 1) the amount of back taxes and 
unpaid charges with respect to the redeveloped site, 2) the amount of 
reimbursement paid by the city for the extra maintenance expenses already paid 
by UW, and 3) the cost of the initial construction preparation for the construction 
of the school of pharmacy. With respect to the first issue, both DMs decided to 
cooperatively negotiate the unpaid taxes and hydro charges that had 
accumulated during the transfer of ownership. With respect to the second issue, 









































a) Sub-issue 4: Write-off Back Taxes & Charges
City : n = 8 (positive attitude)
UW:  n = 8 (positive attitude)



































b) Sub-issue 5: Reimburse for Maintenance Expenses
City : n = 7 (positive attitude)
UW:  n = 3 (positive attitude)



































c) Sub-issue 6: Initial Construction Costs
City : n = 4 (positive attitude)
UW:  n = 10 (positive attitude)
40% of the initial construction
cost is paid by City
charges that were paid by UW before the transfer of ownership. UW’s positive 
attitude in negotiating the second issue encouraged the city to negotiate the 
costs of the initial construction activities and to accept a portion of these costs. 
The three pair-wise negotiations between the city and UW were modeled as 
shown in Figure 7.7. The following utility functions were selected for both DMs, in 
which x represents the amount of the concessions made by the DMs and n 




















7.4.7. Discussion of the Tactical Negotiation Results 
As described in the previous subsections, the tactical negotiation methodology 
involving six issues and three DMs (i.e., PolyOne, the city, and UW) was 
developed for the present case study. The concept of utility function was used to 
model and illustrate the pair-wise negotiations between PolyOne - City, PolyOne 
- UW, and City – UW, as set out in Subsections 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6, 
respectively. In this subsection, the outcomes resulting from the tactical 
negotiations are summarized as shown in Table 7.2, and a brief discussion of the 
results is provided as follows. 
 
As previously explained, after mutually agreeing on a strategic decision, the 
involved DMs continued their tactical negotiations very cooperatively and 
preferred to avoid any negative attitudes toward one another during the 
negotiations. The DMs realized that negative attitudes are not beneficial and 
would threaten the agreed-upon strategic solution which had been achieved after 
many years of intensive meetings and negotiations. Accordingly, when the DMs’ 
tactical negotiations were modeled using utility function, the n values (i.e., the 
power term of the utility functions) selected for the DMs were equal to or greater 
than one, which means that each DM’s attitude toward the other DMs was either 
neutral or positive. The city, PolyOne, and UW all had a positive attitude except 
in three situations in which PolyOne and UW had neutral attitudes toward other 
DM during their pair-wise negotiations, as shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2: The Tactical Negotiations Results for the School of Pharmacy  
Normalized Average 
  DMs' Negotiations PolyOne The city PolyOne UW The city UW 
PolyOne The city UW 
Disagreement 
Point (%) 50 80               
weight 0.03 0.03               
n 3 7               
Attitude Less Positive 
More 
Positive               




facilities         
(Cost:$ 100,000) 
Settlement (%) 40 60         40 60   
Disagreement 
Point (%) 90 45               
weight 0.08 0.08               
n 8 4               
Attitude More Positive 
Less 
Positive               
Joint Utility (%) 196               
Sub-issue 2:  
Demolish & 
remove old 
structures     
(Cost: $250,000) 
Settlement (%) 60 40         60 40   
Disagreement 
Point (%) 90 40 90 20           
weight 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18           
n 9 2 9 1           
Attitude More Positive 
Less 
Positive Positive Neutral           
Joint Utility (%) 187 167           
Sub-issue 3: 
Environmental 
remediation        
(Cost: $550,000) 
Settlement (%) 70 30 80 20     60 24 16 
Disagreement 
Point (%) 50 60     70 60       
weight 0.26 0.26     0.26 0.26       
n 5 5     8 8       
Attitude Positive Positive     Positive Positive       
Joint Utility (%) 194     199       
Sub-issue 4: 
Write-off back 
taxes & charges     
(Cost: $800,000) 
Settlement (%) 50 50     50 50 33 34 33 
Disagreement 
Point (%) 20 95     80 50       
weight 0.23 0.23     0.23 0.23       
n 1 9     7 3       
Attitude Neutral Positive     More Positive 
Less 
Positive       




expenses         
(Cost: $700,000) 
Settlement (%) 20 80     60 40 15 54 31 
Disagreement 
Point (%)     20 90 50 90       
weight     0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22       
n     1 10 4 10       
Attitude     Neutral Positive Less Positive 
More 
Positive       
Joint Utility (%)     169 197       
Sub-issue 6: 
Initial 
construction costs    
(Cost: $650,000) 
Settlement (%)     20 80 40 60 15 31 54 
Normalized Total Average (%) 37 41 22 
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The six negotiation issues and their approximate costs are shown in the first 
column on the left in Table 7.2. The input information (e.g., disagreement point, 
weight) and the output results (e.g., joint utility, settlement) are shown in the 
second column from the left in Table 7.2. The two rows at the bottom of the table 
display the suggested average share that each DM should pay with respect to 
the total cost of the six issues.    
 
The final results of the tactical negotiation (the last row in Table 7.2) indicate that 
the city agrees to pay a greater share of the total cost (37%) than either PolyOne 
(33%), or UW (30%). The results are consistent with the real-life detailed 
negotiations that took place. One of the main responsibilities of the City of 
Kitchener, as a municipal organization, is to remediate and redevelop brownfield 
sites as quickly as possible. The City of Kitchener (the city) was particularly very 
cooperative during the tactical negotiations and did not even prefer to have 
neutral attitudes toward PolyOne and UW, in the hope of helping the other DMs 
to reach a stable solution after the lengthy negotiations. 
 
With respect to the City-PolyOne pair-wise negotiations, both DMs considered 
the preconditions of the negotiation, assessed the correlations among the 
negotiating issues, and decided to negotiate five issues as, listed in Table 7.2. 
Negotiation of the first issue (i.e., cannibalize the remaining facilities) took place 
only between the city and PolyOne since UW was not involved with that issue. 
When the fast site remediation was decided on at the strategic level, PolyOne 
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preferred to reuse some of the existing facilities, and therefore, the process of 
cannibalization was considered. PolyOne negotiated the cost of the process 
($100,000) with the city. The results of the negotiation of the demolition and 
removal of the old structure on the contaminated site (issue 2) was that PolyOne 
pays 60% of the cost and the city pays 40% of the cost because some of the old 
structures and equipment belonged to the city and it was the city’s responsibility 
to contribute to the cost. Both DMs conducted a very successful tactical 
negotiation with respect to this issue and reached a higher level of satisfaction 
(joint utility of 196) than they achieved with respect to their other issues (Table 
7.2). On the other hand, in negotiating the issue of reimbursing for maintenance 
expenses (issue 5), both DMs reached the lowest level of satisfaction (joint utility 
of 167). This low level is due mainly to the fact that although the city had a 
positive attitude toward its opponent, PolyOne had a neutral attitude toward the 
city, which caused the lower level of joint satisfaction. 
 
With respect to the PolyOne-UW bilateral negotiations, both DMs reviewed the 
available negotiation issues and agreed to negotiate two of them, as shown in 
Table 7.2. In negotiating the issue of environmental remediation (issue 3), UW 
preferred to negotiate the issue with PolyOne because the lengthy process of 
remediation had been continued during the period when UW was the new owner 
of the site. The outcome of the negotiation was that 20% of the cost is to be paid 
by UW. UW’s cooperative attitude in negotiating the cost of the remediation 
encouraged PolyOne to accept UW’s request to negotiate the initial costs of the 
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construction of the school of pharmacy, for which UW was mainly responsible. 
Therefore, PolyOne negotiated with UW, having a neutral attitude toward UW, 
and agreed to share 20% of the cost according to the negotiation outcome.  
 
With respect to the City-UW bilateral negotiations, both DMs reviewed the 
available negotiation issues and preferred to negotiate the costs of three issues: 
1) write off back taxes and unpaid charges, 2) provide reimbursement for the site 
maintenance expenses, and 3) contribute to the costs of initial construction 
activities. Both the city and UW held very successful negotiations with respect to 
the unpaid charges for the abandoned site, and for the cost of the initial 
construction activities. In particular, the highest level of satisfaction (joint utility of 
199) was achieved when both DMs very positively negotiated the cost of the 
back taxes and previous charges (Table 7.2). One of the reasons for such a high 
level of cooperation between the city and UW is that when construction of an 
educational building on the remediated site was agreed upon, the city realized 
that the sooner the building could be constructed, the more benefits downtown 
Kitchener businesses will gain. In other words, the city envisioned the 
cooperative tactical negotiation with UW as a beneficial investment for the 
taxpayers, who were asking for a better business in downtown Kitchener. Using 
the proposed tactical negotiation methodology, each DM’s share of the costs with 
respect to each issue is listed in Table 7.3. The tactical negotiation issues and 
their associated costs are shown in the two columns at the left in Table 7.3. The 
percentage share and corresponding monetary share of the costs with respect to 
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each DM are also displayed in Table 7.3. The results shown in Table 7.3 are the 
exact amount of the concessions that must be made by the DMs in order for 
them to reach mutual agreement at the tactical level of negotiation in this case 
study. In other words, to complement the strategic negotiation and to complete 
the negotiation process for the case study, the concessions proposed in Table 
7.3 should be made by the DMs involved in the brownfield negotiation. 
 
Table 7.3: DMs’ Shares of the Costs of the Tactical Issues 
       
 
The resulting sharing of the costs on the part of the DMs involved in the tactical 
negotiations of the school of pharmacy lead to the following considerations: 
1. With respect to the total cost of all six issues ($3,050,000), the city will pay 
the largest share ($1,143,500), followed by PolyOne with the second 
largest share ($986,500), and UW, with the third largest share ($920,000). 
DM’s Share (%) DM’s Share ($) 
Sub-issue Cost ($) 
PolyOne The city UW PolyOne The city UW 
1 100,000 40 60  40,000 60,000  
2 250,000 60 40  150,000 100,000  
3 550,000 60 24 16 330,000 132,000 88,000 
4 800,000 33 34 33 264,000 272,000 264,000 
5 700,000 15 54 31 105,000 378,000 217,000 
6 650,000 15 31 54 97,500 201,500 351,000 
Average 508,333 37 41 22 164,400 190,600 153,300 
Total ($) 3,050,000    986,500 1,143,500 920,000 
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The proposed cost sharing is consistent with the background of the 
negotiation with respect to the school of pharmacy, in which the City of 
Kitchener showed the highest level of cooperation along with a positive 
attitude toward both PolyOne and UW. The City of Kitchener knew that 
PolyOne and UW were not responsible for the whole redevelopment costs 
of the brownfield site, which had been abandoned for many years. 
Therefore, the city took bold action during the tactical negotiations and 
accepted a large share of the costs. 
2. According to the proposed results shown in Table 7.3, PO’s largest cost is 
$330,000 for issue 3 (environmental remediation), the city’s largest share 
is $378,000 for issue 5 (reimbursement for maintenance expenses), and 
UW’s largest share is $351,000 for issue 6 (initial construction costs). The 
results indicate that the three DMs were ready to negotiate and to make a 
large contribution with respect to the issues that concerned them the most: 
issues 3, 5, and 6 for PO, the city, and UW, respectively. 
3. The amounts of the cost sharing indicate that the three DMs have 
contributed fairly to the negotiation of the cost of the issues, except for 
issues 1 and 2, in which UW made no contribution to the negotiations, and 
PolyOne and the city were solely responsible for the costs. Because the 
DMs mutually accepted the strategic solution and agreed to continue their 
negotiations cooperatively at the tactical level, none of them had a 
negative attitude toward the other DMs during the tactical negotiations. 
The DMs preferred to complete their lengthy tactical negotiations and 
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accept the costs in order to receive the future benefits of redevelopment 
and to avoid additional costs of remediation by abandoning the 
contaminated site.                    
 
7.5. Attitude-Based Sensitivity Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the power term (n) of utility function can represent 
DMs’ attitudes toward themselves and other DMs when a utility function is used 
in tactical negotiation. When 0 < n < 1, 1 < n ≤ 10, or n = 1, a DM has a negative, 
positive, or neutral attitude, respectively, toward itself and/or other DMs. It was 
also explained that if two DMs have less cooperative attitudes (i.e., a lower n 
value is selected for their utility function), then a lower joint utility (i.e., joint 
satisfaction) will result from their pair-wise negotiation. 
 
The proposed attitude-based utility function was employed for the pair-wise 
negotiations explained in Section 7.4. Before the commencement of the pair-wise 
tactical negotiations, an appropriate n value was assigned to each DM’s utility 
function according to the DMs’ attitudes toward itself and the other DMs. Based 
on the n values assigned to the DMs’ utility functions, the outcomes of the pair-
wise negotiations were obtained, as summarized in Table 7.2.  
 
The objective of the attitude-based sensitivity analysis presented in this section is 
to assess the sensitivity of the negotiation outcomes (output information) to 
changes in the n values (input variables). In other words, it is important to 
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investigate the effects of changes in the attitudes of the DMs toward the other 
DMs during the pair-wise tactical negotiations. It is also important to know how 
changes in attitude influence the negotiation settlement point and the level of 
joint satisfaction. To achieve these objectives, the attitudes of the DMs involved 
in the negotiations for the school pf pharmacy were analyzed. The outcomes 
resulting from the tactical negotiations were the settlement point and the joint 
utility for each issue, as shown in Figures 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 as well as in Table 
7.3. To examine the sensitivity of the output values to changes in the n value as 
input data, the possible range of the DMs’ n values (0 < n ≤ 10) was considered, 
and the corresponding settlement points and joint utilities were obtained.  
 
To facilitate the analysis of the results, the set of values for each output was 
plotted separately against the set of n values. Therefore, with respect to each 
negotiation issue and each pair-wise negotiation, two plots have been 
systematically examined: 1) the variation in the settlement point with the n value 
and 2) the variation in the joint utility value with the n value. The two plots have 
been developed for the three pair-wise negotiations between the DMs: pair-wise 
negotiations between PolyOne and the City, pair-wise negotiations between 
PolyOne and UW, and pair-wise negotiations between the City and UW. The 
resulting plots of the pair-wise negotiations between PolyOne and the City are 
shown in Figure 7.8, between PolyOne and UW are shown in Figure 7.9, and 






a) The impact of City's attitude changes on its 






























b) The impact of PO's attitude changes on its 






























c) The impact of City's attitude changes on 






















d) The impact of PO's attitude changes on its 






















Figure 7.8: Sensitivity Analysis for a Specific DM in the PolyOne – City Negotiations 
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a) The impact of UW's attitude changes on its 


























b) The impact of PO's attitude changes on its 


























c) The impact of UW's attitude changes on its 



















d) The impact of PO's attitude changes on its 


















Figure 7.9: Sensitivity Analysis for a Specific DM in the PolyOne – UW Negotiations 
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As shown, each figure consists of two plots: the first represents changes in the 
settlement point, or the amount of concession each DM should make, and the 
second represents changes in the joint utility value. To assess the sensitivity of 
a) The impact of City's attitude changes on its 


























b) The impact of UW's attitude changes on its 


























c) The impact of City's attitude changes on its 




















d) The impact of UW's attitude changes on its 



















Figure 7.10: Sensitivity Analysis for a Specific DM in the City – UW Negotiation 
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the two outputs of the negotiations with respect to each DM, the n value for one 
DM is changed while the other DM’s n value remained fixed. 
 
The plots in the figures are particularly useful when the sensitivity of the output 
from the negotiation for a DM is required with respect to a particular issue, as can 
be illustrated by considering the pair-wise negotiation between the city and UW. 
With respect to sub-issue 6 (initial construction costs), one may examine the 
effect of UW’s n value changing from n = 10 to n = 1 on the settlement point and 
the joint utility value. In other words, when UW’s attitude toward the city changes 
from positive to neutral, the range of reduction in the settlement point and the 
joint utility level can be determined. The right-hand plots in Figure 7.10 show that 
when UW’s n value changes from 10 to one during the negotiation for sub-issue 
6, UW’s concession is then reduced from 60 % to 40 % with respect to that issue. 
The joint utility value is also reduced from 197 to 147, which indicates that the 
level of joint satisfaction drops considerably when UW changes its positive 
attitude to a neutral attitude toward the city. 
 
7.5.1. Discussion of the Attitude-Based Sensitivity Results 
The plots included in the previous subsection can be used to assess changes in 
the negotiation parameters and can be summarized in two plots (Figure 7.11). 
The overall impact of the DMs’ attitudes on their average amount of concession 
is shown in Figure 7.11a, and the impact of the DMs’ attitudes on the DMs’ 
average level of satisfaction is shown in Figure 7.11b.  
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Figure 7.11: Overall Results of the Sensitivity Analysis for the Tactical 
Negotiations for the School of Pharmacy  
 231
As shown in Figure 7.11a, when 0 < n < 1, the DMs have a negative attitude 
toward themselves and/or toward the other DMs, and the amount of concession 
is considerably reduced. The steep slope of the graphs in that area indicates that 
the settlement point is very sensitive to the selection of an n value of 0 < n < 1 for 
a DM’s utility function. When the n value changes from less than one (i.e., a 
negative attitude) to a value more than one (i.e., a positive attitude), the slope of 
the graphs then increases positively. The turning point on the graphs occur when 
n = 1, which means that the DMs have neutral attitudes. When the DMs have a 
positive attitude toward themselves and/or the other DMs (i.e., 1 < n ≤ 10), then 
the slope of the graphs increases slightly. In particular, when 2 < n ≤ 6, the 
increase is more than when 7 < n ≤ 10. In other words, when an n value between 
2 and 6 is selected, more changes in the DMs’ amount concession can be 
expected. On the other hand, when an n value between 7 and 10 is selected for 
the DMs’ utility functions, no significant change in the DMs’ amount of 
concession will result.  
 
As shown in Figure 7.11b, the utility (i.e.,  level of joint satisfaction) of the three 
pair-wise negotiations increases when the n value is increased from 0.1 to 10. 
Furthermore, when 0 < n < 1, the joint utility value is low and the marginal 
changes in the average utility value increase. On the other hand, when 1 < n ≤ 
10, the marginal changes in the joint utility value decrease although the joint 
utility value itself is high. In other words, the pair-wise negotiations conducted in 
the case study indicate that when two DMs with a positive attitude negotiate, the 
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joint utility value that results from the selection of n = 7 for both DMs’ functions 
will not differ significantly from the joint utility value that results from the selection 
of n = 10 for both DMs’ functions. 
 
7.5.2. Monte Carlo Simulation 
In the previous subsection, the sensitivity of the DMs’ amount of concession and 
utility value to the whole range of changes in the DMs’ attitude (i.e., 0 < n ≤ 10) 
was analyzed. The objective of this subsection is to present an evaluation of the 
sensitivity of the DMs’ amount of concession and utility value to only a limited 
range of n values (e.g., ±10% of n). In other words, the objective is to verify the 
accuracy of the n value selected by changing the n value slightly and observing 
the magnitude of the changes in the DMs’ amount of concession and utility value. 
This objective was achieved through the use of the Monte Carlo simulation 
(Hegazy, 2006), which is a versatile problem-solving technique used to 
approximate the probability of specific outcomes by running multiple trial runs, 
called simulations, using random variables. The core idea of the Monte Carlo 
simulation is to use random samples of parameters or the input in order to 
explore the behavior of the output. The technique has also applications in the 
physical sciences, design and visual arts, finance and business, and 
telecommunications. As shown in Figure 7.12, with respect to the school of 
pharmacy negotiations, the Monte Carlo simulation was used to examine the 
accuracy of the output with respect to the three pair-wise negotiations (i.e., PO – 




The average n value was calculated for the six issues, identified in the case 
study and listed in Table 7.2. A pair-wise negotiation was then simulated 
between the DMs, considering the average n value for each DM’s utility function. 
For each pair-wise negotiation, a settlement point and a maximum utility value 
were obtained as the outputs of the negotiations before the Monte Carlo 
simulation was implemented (Figure 7.12). 
 
In the first step of evaluating the accuracy of the two results, the values within 
10% of the average n value are considered, and the simulated output is obtained 
for each randomly selected n value. The process is repeated 1000 times in order 
to obtain 1000 sets of output which are used to determine the average of the 
simulated output. The initial output is then compared with the simulated output, 





















(± 10 %) × n 
1) Max. Utility Value 
2) Settlement Point 
 
 
1) Updated Utility Value 
2) Updated Settlement    
Point 
Figure 7.12: The Application of the Monte Carlo Simulation for the Case Study 
 234
 
In the second step of evaluating the accuracy of the two results, the values within 
20% of the average n value are considered, and the simulated output is obtained 
for each randomly selected n value. The same process explained in the first step 
is then carried out in order to obtain a different set of output. In the third and last 
step, the values within 40% of the average n value are considered, the simulated 
output is obtained for each randomly selected n value, and the results are 
discussed. The results of the implementation of the Monte Carlo simulation in this 
case study are shown in Figures 7.13, 7.14, and 7.15 for the PO – City, PO – 
UW, and City – UW negotiations, respectively. The statistical results of the 
simulations are also summarized in Table 7.4, followed by a brief discussion of 
the simulation results.           
    
As can be seen, the overall results of the Monte Carlo simulation indicate that no 
significant change occurs in the joint utility value and the settlement point (output) 
when the n value (input) changes within ± 10% and ± 20 % of the initial n value. 
However, when the n value (input) changes within ± 40 % of the initial n value, 
the joint utility value and the settlement point observably change. In other words, 
the resulting discrepancies and errors (i.e., [initial output – simulated output] / 
initial output) are very small to the point of negligible when the n value changes 
within ± 10% or ± 20 %. On the other hand, the errors are relatively high when 
the n value changes within ± 40%. 
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Figure 7.13: Histograms for PO - City Resulting from the Monte Carlo              
Simulation 
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Figure 7.14: Histograms for PO – UW Resulting from the Monte Carlo Simulation  
 237












































































































Figure 7.15: Histograms for City – UW Resulting from the Monte Carlo Simulation  
 238
Table 7.4: Summary of the Monte Carlo Simulation Results for the Case Study 
Simulation Simulation Statistics for  Three Pair-wise Negotiations PO - City PO – UW City - UW 
Settlement (%)  50 50 50 
Utility 195 195 198 Before  
Average “n” for Six Issues PO = 5.2 City = 5.4 
PO = 5 
UW = 5.5 
City = 6.3 
UW = 7 
Settlement (%) 50 50 50 
Ave. Utility (%) 195 194 198 
Minimum 187 186 193 
Maximum 198 198 199 
Standard Deviation 1 2 1 
Setl. 0 0 0 
Within 10%  of 
average “n”  
Error (%) 
Util. 0 0.5 0 
Settlement (%) 50 50 50 
Ave. Utility (%) 194 193 197 
Minimum 175 170 180 
Maximum 199 199 200 
Standard Deviation 3 4 2 
Setl. 0 0 0 
Within 20%  of 
average “n”     
Error (%) 
Util. 0.5 1.0 0.5 
Settlement (%) 40 40 30 
Ave. Utility (%) 187 187 192 
Minimum 82 73 71 
Maximum 200 200 200 
Standard Deviation 18 21 16 
Setl. 10 10 20 
After  
Within 40%  of 
average “n” 
Error (%) 
Util. 4.1 4.1 3.0 
 
As shown in Table 7.4, when the n values within ± 40% are considered as the 
simulation input, the standard deviation (σ) reaches 18, 21, and 16 for the PO –
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City, PO – UW, and City – UW negotiations, respectively. Such high standard 
deviations indicate that the output data are spread over a large range of the 
mean value (output) as shown in Figures 7.13d, 7.14d, and 7.15d. On the other 
hand, when the n values are selected within ± 10%, the standard deviation 
reaches 1, 2, and 1, for the PO – City, PO – UW, and City – UW negotiations, 
respectively. The low standard deviations indicate that all of the output data 
points are very close to the same value (the mean). 
 
With respect to the situations in which the n value changes within ± 10% and ± 
20%, the maximum joint utility value that results from the Monte Carlo simulation 
is very close to the original maximum joint utility value, so no change occurs in 
the settlement values after the simulation. As shown in Table 7.4, the settlement 
value is 50% both before and after the simulation (i.e., ±10% and ±20%) with 
respect to the three pair-wise negotiations. In other words, if the original n value 
or even the values within ±10% and ±20% of the original n value are considered, 
the settlement point does not change. Therefore, the results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation indicate that the initial n values selected for the DMs’ utility function in 
the present case study are accurate and, thus, the results can be verified.      
 
7.6. Case Study Updates 
Once the site was reasonably remediated in 2001, it was donated for public use, 
which would allow easier coordination between the development of the land and 
the completion of the environmental remediation. The city then reviewed 
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redevelopment plans in order to assess which projects (e.g., transportation 
terminal, parking lots, and educational centre) could best meet the requirements 
of the taxpayers. After a long investigation, the DMs involved eventually agreed 
on the construction of an educational centre as the redevelopment phase of the 
brownfield project. The DMs involved viewed an educational campus as a 
potential boom to downtown redevelopment. Educational institutions can help 
create the 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week traffic the city wants to see in the 
core. Moreover, education institutions are growth industries that can adapt to a 
downtown environment. They have the greatest success in the revitalization and 
adaptive reuse of industrial heritage buildings and redundant industrial building 
space. As proposed by the methodology developed and as indicated by the final 
results of the tactical negotiations, the City of Kitchener contributed significantly 
to the negotiations by having a positive attitude as well as by providing 
reasonable incentives. The motivations of the city for completing the strategic 
and tactical negotiations and its objectives in the redevelopment of the site are 
outlined as follows: 
1. Diversifying and expanding Kitchener's economic base and generating 
significant impetus toward the revitalization of downtown Kitchener and the 
creation of a core area; 
2. Attracting the education and knowledge-creation sector to provide a critical 
balance for the city, which can lessen the impact of future economic 
downturns; 
3. Stimulating Kitchener's economy through ongoing expenditures by visitors; 
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4. Stimulating an influx of health-related start-up businesses; 
5. Stimulating residential growth in the downtown Kitchener; and 
6. Redeveloping vacant and underutilized downtown buildings and lands. 
 
In addition to the costs proposed in Table 7.3, when the construction of the UW 
School of Pharmacy was begun, the DMs continued their cooperative help with 
respect to major costs of the construction. For example, the city gave UW $30 
million for the development of the project, and UW contributed $12 million as an 
operating endowment. Other contributions included $15 million per year 
operating costs, a $60 million per year research budget, and $55 million other 
contributions, with a total budget of $147 million (Ash, 2004). Figure 7.16 shows 
the UW School of Pharmacy, which was under construction and had been 
scheduled to be completed by the end of 2008. The DMs involved (PolyOne, the 
city, and UW) were working together to obtain the environmental approvals 
necessary to effect the final transfer of the property to the city and, ultimately, to 
UW. 
 
7.7. Lessons Learned 
This remarkable real-life negotiation case study represents the best opportunity 
for turning a brownfield project into a showcase of brownfield redevelopment. 
The case study also provides important lessons in negotiation. First, this case 
study proves how positive attitudes of the DMs involved could significantly 
improve the outcome of brownfield negotiations so that very beneficial and stable 
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solution were resulted that benefits all the DMs involved. In this case study, the 
site was initially owned by a privately owned company (PolyOne) and was finally 
transferred (through the City of Kitchener) to UW, a publicly owned institution. 
Therefore, this situation made this case study a very interesting negotiation 
scenario in which the parties involved who had diverse preferences and interests, 
began negotiations, shared their concerns, and mutually agreed upon a 
beneficial outcome from their joint negotiations. 
 
Figure 7.16: The UW School of Pharmacy under Construction 
The parties involved benefited from this project in the following ways: 
1. PolyOne Canada saved money. 
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2. The City of Kitchener and the Ministry of Environment saved time, money, 
and resources by dealing with a single, constant entity. 
3. The City of Kitchener removed an eyesore and gained a valuable 
community asset in a relatively short time.  
4. The University of Waterloo was successfully able to expand its 
educational and geographical facilities to downtown Kitchener by 
constructing a school of pharmacy and receiving financial and social 
support for the project.  
5. Business gained confidence that it can work with government and the 
community to solve brownfield problems without being penalized for 
positive efforts. 
 
The other lessons that can be learned from this brownfield case study are as 
follows: 
1. Volunteer and take control, even if it means accepting additional financial 
responsibility. 
2. Work for solution without waiting for governmental agencies. 
3. Define the ultimate use of a brownfield project and then tailor the 
remediate. 
4. Start by involving the community before commencing the project. 
5. Focus remediation funds on site clean-up rather than on multiple-party 
transactions and legal costs.  
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6. Minimize overall costs and shorten the time frame by conducting 
cooperative negotiations among the parties involved. 
7. Change potential the positive attitudes of the parties to practical positive 
attitudes. 
8. Maintain and demonstrate the credibility of the parties. 
9. Regard governmental institutes as a reliable ally in brownfield 
negotiations. 
 
Finally, PolyOne has subsequently implemented many of the lessons learned in 
this case study at two U.S. superfund sites, with very promising results. The first 
site was a non-operating site in Wharton, NJ, that was remediated under the 
supervision of the U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and the New 
Jersey DEP (Department of Environmental Protection) and the second site was a 
former site in Wilmington, DE, at which the Delaware DNREC (Delaware’s 




This chapter has presented a tactical negotiation methodology that was 
developed in order to consider multiple decision makers and multiple negotiation 
issues as well as the attitudes of the DMs. The tactical negotiation methodology 
proposed in this chapter was developed based on the generalization of the 
negotiation methodology presented in Chapter 6. The negotiation methodology 
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described in this chapter complements the strategic negotiation methodology 
described in Chapter 5. 
 
The generalized procedure for tactical negotiation was first introduced and 
explained with reference to two negotiation approaches: 1) one issue at a time 
and 2) two DMs at a time. To take into account the correlations among the 
negotiation issues, the second approach was employed in the development of a 
tactical negotiation methodology for the school of pharmacy negotiations, a real-
life brownfield negotiation case study. In the first step of developing the 
methodology, the issues under the case study negotiation were identified, and 
the weights and least expectations were determined for each issue with respect 
to each DM. In the second step, the proposed tactical negotiation methodology 
was implemented in the case study, and three pair-wise negotiations were 
developed using the concept of utility functions and considering the six 
negotiation issues as well as the DMs’ attitudes. In the third step, for each pair-
wise negotiation, a settlement point, as the detailed negotiation outcome, was 
obtained with respect to each issue, and appropriate discussions were then 
provided, based on the results as presented in figures and tables. Finally, the 
chapter described an attitude-based sensitivity analysis that was carried out in 
order to evaluate the sensitivity changes in the attitudes of the DMs. In particular, 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to assess and validate the utility function form 












This chapter presents the implementation of the negotiation methodology 
described in Chapters 4 and 5 into a Negotiation Decision Support System 
(NDSS). The NDSS has been developed as a working prototype that can provide 
decision makers (DMs) with automated, speedy, and more accurate decision 
results with respect to the resolution of construction conflicts. The NDSS was 
implemented with the use of a spreadsheet program. To demonstrate the 
decision-support capabilities of the prototype, details of its implementation are 
presented using the brownfield case study conflict presented in Chapter 4. 
 
8.2. Design of the Proposed System 
The attitude-based negotiation methodology described in this research lends 
itself well to spreadsheet modeling, in which each component of the 
methodology, such as the procedure for determining the attitudes of DMs and 
their state rankings, can be represented on different spreadsheets. Furthermore, 
spreadsheets have many advantages and powerful features that enable rapid 
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prototyping of the proposed negotiation methodology, and the validation and 
testing of the results can therefore be facilitated (Yousefi et al., 2008). 
 
For this research, Microsoft (Ms) Excel software was selected for the 
implementation of the proposed methodology because of its ease of use, wide 
range of uses in construction, helpful formulas and add-in programs, and 
powerful programmability features. An earlier Ms Excel spreadsheet with basic 
Graph Model formulations (Kassab et al., 2006) was adapted for this research in 
order to incorporate the attitudes of DMs and the related analysis. 
 
8.3. Prototype Negotiation Decision Support System 
The spreadsheet functions and macro language of Microsoft Excel were used to 
design the NDSS, called “ABCNegotiation” (ABC stands for Attitude-Based 
Construction). The development of the prototype involved programming and 
formulating efforts in order to code and test a variety of modules for developing a 
unified, user-friendly interface. The NDSS was basically developed as a 
workbook that contains several worksheets, including a main screen with a 
simple interface and buttons for activating the step-by-step procedures, as shown 
in Figure 8.1. A schematic diagram of all components of the prototype is shown 
in Figure. 8.2.  
 
The interface automates all of the computations involved in the NDSS and allows 
the user (e.g., a decision maker) to interact with the prototype, to enter the 
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appropriate input data, to navigate through the worksheets, and finally, to obtain 
the best strategic decision. The agreed-upon strategic decision can then be 
further negotiated using the tactical negotiation option of the NDSS in order to 
determine the specific resolution needed for the DMs to reach mutual agreement.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: The NDSS Main Menu Screen 
 
The brownfield negotiation case study introduced in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5) was 
used in this chapter in order to clarify the design of the NDSS components and to 
demonstrate the steps involved in the development of the process. The facts in 
this case study were used to simulate the negotiations at the strategic and 
tactical levels as conducted between the DMs (i.e., the the owner and the the 
government) in order to find the best mutual resolution.  
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Main Screen  
Step 1 
Figure 8.2: Components of the Proposed NDSS 
Details: Figure 8.1 
Details: Figure 8.3 
Step 2 Details: Figure 8.4 
Step 3 Details: Figure 8.5 
Step 4 Details: Figure 8.6 
Step 5 Details: Figure 8.7 
Tactical Negotiation Details: Figure 8.8 
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To benefit from the proposed NDSS, a user, who can be the owner, the 
government, or a mediator, can use the program before and/or during the 
negotiation process. The proposed NDSS therefore provides speedy and 
accurate advice for the DMs involved so that they can make better decisions and 
more efficiently determine the most beneficial resolution for their brownfield 
conflict. The NDSS design involves several steps, as explained in the following 
subsections.     
 
8.3.1. Step 1: Determine the DMs and Their Options 
Once the user clicks on the “Decision Makers and their Options” button on the 
main screen, a worksheet appears, as shown in Figure 8.3, and the user can 
enter the names of DMs and the number and the names their available options. 
Two buttons have also been designed to allow the user to add more DMs or to 
delete redundant DMs, as shown in Figure 8.3. 
 
As shown in the circles in Figure 8.3, the user can use the drop-down box to 
simply enter the number of decision options for each DM. Once the number is 
entered, the program generates boxes in which the user can type a suitable 
description for each option. It should be noted that specifying the DMs and their 
options is the most crucial step in modeling the negotiation process because the 
other steps depend on the number of DMs and the available options specified for 
them in this step. The options also need to represent realistic courses of action 
that each DM can take. A reasonable description can be typed based on the 
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user’s extensive consultation with its associated group, which may involve 





Figure 8.3: Decision Makers Screen in the Proposed NDSS 
 
8.3.2. Step 2: Rank the DMs’ States 
In this step, shown in Figure 8.4, the list of all states (2^4 = 16) are presented to 
the user, and when the user determines the number of infeasible states in the 
box circled in Figure 8.4, the program then deletes all the identified infeasible 








Figure 8.4: The DMs’ State Rankings Screen in the Proposed NDSS 
 
It should be mentioned that the process of removing infeasible states follows the 
description in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). Once the infeasible states are determined 
(four infeasible states in the present case study), the program automatically 
generates a table of the remaining feasible states (12 in this case), as shown in 
the top table in Figure 8.4. Each state consists of a combination of the letters “Y” 
and “N,” which stand for accepting the option or not accepting the option, 
respectively. 
 
Once the feasible states are determined, the user can use the lower table shown 
in Figure 8.4 and ordinally rank the feasible states from the most preferred states 
on the left to the least preferred states on the right. To facilitate the state-ranking 
Drop-Down Box to 
Rank States 
Number of Removed Infeasible States 
Generating 12 Feasible States 
2 Feasible States and DMs’ State Rankings 
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process, the user can use the drop-down box in each cell to select an 
appropriate feasible state. It should be mentioned that the program cannot 
automatically rank the feasible states and that the user must rank the feasible 
states with respect to each DM’s preference and considering all available 
feasible states. The ordinal ranking of the feasible states is a necessary step in 
the GMCR process.     
 
8.3.3. Step 3: Specify the DMs’ Reachable Lists 
In this step, the user specifies the DMs’ reachable lists (i.e., possible moves), as 
shown in Figure 8.5. A reachable list is a record of all the feasible states that a 
given DM can move to and from relative to the other feasible states. The DMs’ 
reachable list is used to determine which states represent an improvement for 
each DM when their attitudes are incorporated into their decision to either move 
to another state or remain in the current state. 
 
The user first considers the state rankings of the DMs involved in this case study 
negotiation. The drop-down box for each cell in the table allows the user to easily 
find the available feasible states and select one appropriate state number for 
each cell. As shown in Figure 8.5, the owner can move from state 8, for example, 
to states 9, 10, or 11, and the government can move from state 8 to states 0 or 4, 
as shown and indicated by two circles in the DMs’ state rankings in Figure 8.5. It 
should be noted that according to a DMs’ moves, the DM shifts from one state to 




Figure 8.5: Reachable Lists Screen in the Proposed NDSS 
 
8.3.4. Step 4: Perform the Attitude-Based Stability Analysis 
Once the DMs’ reachable lists are specified, the stability analysis, defined within 
the paradigm of GMCR, is carried out. The attitude-based solution concepts (i.e., 
stability types), and the attitude-based definitions provided in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.4) are implemented in a tableau that is used to model the moves and 
countermoves of the DMs according to the attitudes of the DMs toward 
The government can move 
from state 8 to states 0 or 4. 
Drop-down box 
3 DMs’ Reachable Lists 
The owner can move from 
state 8 to states 9, 10 or 11. 
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themselves and one another. Figure 8.6 shows the DMs’ attitude matrix and the 
stability analysis tableau for the present case study.  
 
 
    
 
 Figure 8.6: Automated Attitude-Based Stability Analysis Using the Proposed NDSS  
 
As shown in Figure 8.6, the user should first enter an appropriate type for the 
attitudes of the DMs toward themselves and one another using the attitude table 
and the drop-down boxes provided for each cell. Three types of attitude are 
defined in the boxes: positive, neutral, and negative. The user examines the 
DMs’ attitudes according to the conflict situation and then enters the appropriate 
4 Attitude-Based Stability Analysis 
Equilibrium states, or 
possible conflict 
resolutions, depend 
on the DMs attitudes.  
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attitude term into each cell in the attitude table. Once the attitude terms have 
been entered into the table, the program automatically carries out the stability 
analysis in a systematic format within a tableau, as shown in Figure 8.6 and 
according to the following sequential steps:  
1. The program generates the DMs’ state rankings using the state-ranking 
screen shown in Figure 8.4. 
2. The program automatically determines the states underneath each state 
in the DM’s state ranking using the DMs’ reachable lists discussed in 
Subsection 8.3.3. 
3. The program automatically determines the DMs’ moves from each state 
in the DMs’ state rankings to the states within the DMs’ reachable lists, 
using the DMs’ attitudes toward themselves and one another.   
4. The program identifies the states within each DM’s state ranking from 
which they have no move and marks them as NASH stable in the “DMs’ 
stability” row shown in the stability analysis tableau. 
5. The program automatically analyzes the stability of the remaining states 
involved in each DM’s state rankings, and determines the stability type of 
the remaining states (e.g., RSEQ or U), according to the definition of 
RSEQ and U provided in Section 4.4. 
6. The program identifies the states within both DMs’ state rankings from 
which they have at least one type of stability. If a state in both DMs’ state 
rankings is marked with RNASH or RSEQ, then the program marks the 
state as E in the “Equilibria (Final Results)” row shown in Figure 8.6. 
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 As can be seen, the proposed prototype completely automates the attitude-
based stability analysis. The user needs to enter only the appropriate attitudes of 
the DMs in the attitude table, and the program then quickly and accurately 
provides the user with a possible equilibrium state. As discussed in Chapter 4, it 
is very cumbersome to carry out an attitude-based stability analysis manually.   
 
8.3.5. Step 5: Select a Strategic Decision 
Once the attitude-based stability analysis has been carried out, the program 
provides the user with a list of equilibrium states that are generated in table 
format along with a description of each equilibrium state, as shown in Figure 8.7.  
  
     
Figure 8.7: “Strategic Decision” Screen in the Proposed NDSS 
5 Strategic Decision 
After analyzing the three 
possible solutions, a final 
strategic decision is 
selected by the user.  
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Appropriate links have been defined between this worksheet and other 
worksheets in this program. For example, the equilibrium state cells on the left 
side of the table are linked to the cells in the equilibrium row shown in the stability 
analysis tableau in Figure 8.6. The user reviews and analyzes the resulting 
equilibrium states, or potential solutions for the conflict, and based on the current 
conflict situation, selects the most beneficial solution at the strategic level.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the most beneficial strategic decision for the present 
case study negotiation is equilibrium state 2, which was in fact agreed upon by 
the DMs. As shown in Figure 8.7, a drop-down box is provided so that the user 
can select the strategic decision; once the appropriate decision option is 
selected, the description of the decision appears to the right of the state selected. 
The state description helps the user identify the negotiation issues that will be 
negotiated at the tactical level, as discussed in the following section. 
 
8.4. Tactical Negotiation Support  
The agreed-upon strategic decision can be further negotiated at the tactical level 
in order to reach a mutual detailed resolution. The proposed NDSS includes a 
tactical negotiation component which has been designed based on the tactical 
negotiation methodology developed in Chapter 6. In the proposed methodology, 
a polynomial utility function is assigned to each DM, and through interaction of 
the DMs’ utility functions, an integrated utility function is obtained and used to 
determine the settlement point, or the specific concession each DM should make 
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in order to reach a mutual detailed resolution. The tactical negotiation screen is 




 Figure 8.8: Tactical Negotiation Screen in the Proposed NDSS 
 
The agreed-upon strategic decision selected for the present case study, as 
shown in Figure 8.7, constitutes one issue for negotiation, which is the selling 
price of the owner’s property. The DMs involved in the present case study 
negotiation decide to cooperatively negotiate the issue and obtain the specific 
concessions each DM should make in order to reach a mutual resolution at the 
tactical level.      












Based on the above negotiation situation and the DMs’ positive attitude toward 
themselves and each other, the user enters a positive attitude in the four cells in 
the attitude table (Figure 8.8). Once the attitude table has been completed, the 
program automatically adjusts an appropriate range for the n value, the power of 
the polynomial utility function. Because the DMs have a positive attitude toward 
each other in this situation, the program selects the range [1 < n ≤ 10], and the 
user enters appropriate n values for the DMs, using the drop-down boxes shown 
in Figure 8.8. Once the n values have been entered by the user, the program 
automatically carries out the following sequential steps: 
1. The program generates an appropriate number of rows (11 rows in 
this case) for the middle table, as shown in Figure 8.8. The first 
column on the left represents the x value of the DMs’ polynomial 
utility functions and constitutes a 10% concession that each DM can 
make in each step. The second, third, and fourth columns include 
the numerical values for the utility functions of the owner, the 
government, and the integrated function, respectively. 
2. The program draws the DMs’ utility function form in a coordinated 
system using the numerical values of the table generated in Step 1. 
3. The program draws the integrated utility function form and specifies 
the maximum point on it. 
4. The program graphically reflects the maximum point of the 
integrated utility function on the horizontal axis in order to show the 
exact concession each DM should make, as circled in Figure 8.8.     
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As can be seen, the proposed prototype utilizes the concept of utility theory and 
incorporates an easy-to-use graphical feature in order to determine the exact 
concessions needed at the tactical level of negotiation. For example, Figure 8.8 
depicts a situation in which the user selects the n values of 2 and 7 for the owner 
and the government, respectively. The program then automatically carries out the 
remaining tactical negotiation process and determines that a 30% concession 
should be made by the government, and that a 70% (100% - 30%) concession 
should be made by the owner with respect to the cost of the selling price of the 
owner’s property.  It should be noted that the DMs’ disagreement point, as 
defined in Chapter 6, has not been considered in the proposed NDSS.  
      
8.5. Summary 
This chapter describes the implementation of the negotiation methodology 
proposed in the previous chapters in a simplified negotiation decision support 
system. The proposed prototype offers a promising framework for turning the 
implicit experience gained by construction participants into the explicit expertise 
needed for resolving the increasingly complex disputes that occur in the 
construction industry. The design of the negotiation decision support system was 
developed as a method of allowing the proposed negotiation methodology to be 
conveniently applied to construction disputes. The scalability feature of the 
proposed prototype allows future expansion, such as the consideration of the 
weight and disagreement point for each issue and each DM, as well as the 
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consideration of multiple decision makers and multiple negotiation issues. 
Moreover, sensitivity analysis at both the strategic and tactical levels of 
negotiation can be considered using the proposed sensitivity analysis described 














































This chapter presents a review of the contents of this thesis and provides a 
summary of the conclusions and research contributions. It also highlights 
recommendations and suggestions for future studies of the complex conflicts and 
disputes that occur in the construction industry. 
 
9.2. Research Summary 
The goal of this research was to present a systematic, logically consistent, and 
theoretically well-founded approach to the study of negotiation methodology for 
resolving complex disputes in construction. Accordingly, a negotiation framework 
was proposed in order to achieve the following objectives: 1) understand 
construction negotiation and the attitudes of the decision makers; 2) develop a 
negotiation methodology that considers the attitudes of the decision makers; and 
3) design a negotiation decision support system. 
 
To provide a good understanding of construction negotiation, a thorough analysis 
of the characteristics of construction negotiations was performed, as provided in 
Chapter 2, in order to identify the characteristics of negotiation, particularly those 
related to the area of brownfield negotiations. 
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To develop a suitable negotiation methodology, two complementary levels of 
negotiation have been considered, as described in Chapter 4: strategic and 
tactical. With respect to the strategic level, the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR) was presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 described the 
adaptation of GMCR to include consideration of the attitudes of the decision 
makers with the goal of determining a potential strategic agreement that is the 
most beneficial decision given the competing interests of the decision makers 
involved. To that end, attitude was formally defined and represented within the 
paradigm of GMCR. Attitude-based stability concepts, such as Nash stability and  
Sequential stability were then defined, following which a variety of attitude 
scenarios were examined and their results analyzed in order to determine the 
most acceptable strategic decision.  
 
The proposed negotiation methodology includes the in-depth tactical-level study 
of the chosen strategic decision using attitude-based utility functions to help the 
decision makers reach a mutually acceptable solution to the issues pending. As 
described in Chapter 6, an attitude-based utility function is therefore defined for 
each decision maker, according to the attitude of the decision maker. An 
integrated utility function is then determined and used to identify the most 
beneficial negotiated settlement with respect to each issue.  
 
To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed negotiation methodology, two 
construction case studies were used to explain the development of the proposed 
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methodology. The first case study, a brownfield negotiation between two decision 
makers, was employed as presented and used in Chapters 4 and 6 in order to 
illustrate the development of the negotiation methodology that considers the 
attitudes of two decision makers. The second case study is a real-life brownfield 
negotiation case involving multiple decision makers which is discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7 as a means of explaining the generalization of the negotiation 
methodology for multiple decision makers. For this case study, six attitude 
scenarios were identified and analyzed at the strategic level, as presented in 
Chapter 5, in order to determine the sets of possible strategic decisions. These 
sets were then analyzed and the most beneficial strategic decision selected. At 
the tactical level for the second case study, a generalized methodology for 
multiple decision makers was developed, as explained in Chapter 7, so that 
pending issues can be resolved using two approaches: one issue at a time, and 
two decision makers at a time. Using the latter approach, a mutual settlement for 
each issue was suggested for the decision makers involved in the case study. 
Chapter 7 also discusses the attitude-based sensitivity analysis which used the 
Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the sensitivity of the outcomes of the 
negotiations to changes in the attitudes of the decision makers. 
 
Once the negotiation methodology was developed and successfully applied to 
the case studies, a simplified negotiation decision support system was designed, 
as presented in Chapter 8. A prototype was developed that is capable of 
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handling and solving the challenging conflicts and the complex disputes that 
occur in the construction industry.  
 
The following are the main characteristics of the new negotiation methodology 
that make it an efficient approach for resolving challenging construction conflicts 
and disputes: 
 It systematically combines the strategic and tactical levels of decision 
making and thereby offers complementary levels of decision making. 
 It formally defines attitude and models it within the proposed negotiation 
methodology, thus providing a suitable approach for simulating the 
behavior of decision makers. 
 It can consider multiple human factors, such as fear, anger, and hate, and 
can define them within the structure of the proposed negotiation 
framework. 
 It permits the use of a wide range of numerical scales that can describe 
the quality of a solution at both levels. 
 It can be used for resolving complex construction disputes that involve 
multiple decision makers and multiple conflicting issues. 
 It has been developed based on the characteristics of the construction 
industry, such as its competitive-cooperative nature and its domain-
specific knowledge. 
 It takes into account the characteristics of construction negotiators, such 
as their positions and choices. 
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 It can be adapted to consider the characteristics of other types of disputes, 
such as family disputes. 
 It employs the Graph Model technique by using attitude-based stability 
concepts such as RNASH and RSEQ to study the negotiators’ actions and 
counteractions during negotiations. 
 It consists of a supportive quantitative approach in addition to the 
qualitative approach used in GMCR in order to determine the strategic 
decision options. 
 It employs the concept of utility theory in order to help the decision makers 
identify mutual agreement at the tactical level of negotiation. 
 It uses the proposed attitude-based utility functions to enable decision 
makers to examine the impact of changes in their attitudes on the 
outcomes of the tactical negotiations. 
 During the tactical negotiation process, it quantifies for each DM the 
weight and disagreement point for each issue under negotiation. 
 It permits the decomposition of issues into sub-issues at the tactical level 
of negotiation.  
 It incorporates a powerful sensitivity analysis to examine changes in the 
negotiation outcomes at both the strategic and tactical levels of 
negotiation. 
 It has been developed and successfully applied to brownfield negotiation 
case studies involving multiple decision makers and multiple conflicting 
issues.  
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9.3. Research Contributions 
This research contributes significantly to the provision of managerial tools that 
have the potential benefit of supporting construction negotiations by integrating 
the strategic and tactical perspectives of negotiation while considering the 
attitudes of the decision makers. The proposed attitude-based negotiation 
introduces a new systems engineering methodology that will help managers 
tackle a variety of real-world controversies, particularly in the construction 
industry.  
 
With respect to the strategic level of negotiation, the expansion of GMCR to 
propose an attitude-based GMCR provides a flexible analytical tool that reflects 
how the attitudes of the decision makers may change the outcome of the 
negotiation. As well, the attitude-based solution concepts, defined within the 
paradigm of GMCR, provide operational tools for assessing whether unwanted 
consequences can result in a particular dispute because of improper attitudes. 
With respect to the tactical level of negotiation methodology, the attitude-based 
utility functions assist decision makers in ascertaining which attitudes are needed 
in order to guide the conflict to more preferable, or win/win, solutions for all of the 
decision makers concerned. 
 
A negotiation decision support system is proposed in order to conveniently apply 
the developed negotiation methodology to actual disputes. The proposed 
negotiation decision support system has significant advantages with respect to 
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speed, accuracy, practicality, flexibility, reliability, and versatility. Moreover, the 
proposed prototype offers a promising system for turning the implicit experience 
gained by construction participants into the explicit expertise needed for resolving 
the increasingly complex disputes that occur in the construction industry. 
   
The research is expected to help improve negotiation methodologies for 
resolving challenging construction disputes and thereby save significant amounts 
of time and costs. The new methodology is also expected to help construction 
decision makers both in the public and private sectors make more appropriate 
decisions that will establish reliable engineering decision-making systems and 
ensure the sustainable operation of constructed assets. The model developed in 
this research is expected to provide the following important contributions: 
1. The research is a step toward a better understanding of dispute resolution 
and the negotiation process in the construction industry.  
2. The developed model constitutes a more comprehensive negotiation 
approach in which the strategic and tactical levels of negotiation are 
complementarily combined.  
3. The proposed negotiation methodology has a unique ability to take into 
consideration the attitudes of the decision makers at both the strategic and 
tactical levels of negotiation. 
4. The proposed negotiation methodology has been conveniently implemented 
into a simplified negotiation decision support system, which can provide 
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decision makers with significant advantages, such as automated negotiation 
modeling, easy-to-use features, and more accurate results.   
5. The developed methodology is expected to help in the re-engineering of 
traditional construction negotiation processes. In other words, the useful 
concepts presented in non-engineering sciences such as psychology and 
sociology, can be used for developing negotiation support tools that provide 
more beneficial outcomes. 
6. The relationships among attitude-based stability concepts, such as RNASH 
and RSEQ have been investigated, and relevant propositions have been 
formally defined.  
7. The attitude-based model proposed in this research provides a unique 
opportunity to study the influence of other psychological factors, such as fear 
and hate, on the outcomes of negotiation. 
8. The research helps to foster a positive environment in which construction 
professionals and practitioners can negotiate and therefore reduce the 
destructive consequences of complicated disputes. 
9. The research provides a major expansion of GMCR by combining attitudes 
within the paradigm of GMCR which furnishes a flexible analytical tool which 
reflects how the DMs’ attitudes may change the strategic negotiation 
outcomes.  
 
In addition to the above contributions, the research provides the decision makers 
involved in brownfield disputes with an innovative negotiation framework that can 
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take into consideration the psychological factors involved in brownfield 
negotiations. The proposed negotiation model may therefore assist participants 
in brownfield disputes to resolve growing number of increasingly challenging 
brownfield disputes around the globe in both developed and developing 
countries. Finally, although the focus has been on negotiation support for 
resolving construction disputes, the proposed system can be easily adapted to 
other types of disputes, such as those related to families or other industries, such 
as manufacturing or real estate. 
 
9.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
In spite of the inherent ability of the proposed negotiation framework to resolve 
complex construction disputes, like many other methods of modeling negotiation, 
it has limitations. A number of improvements which therefore would be beneficial 
include the following suggestions for future research: 
 Study the cost of delays due to construction disputes, and consider the 
effect of time and costs on the length of construction negotiation. 
 Conduct investigation that includes a variety of construction disputes, and 
analyze practical approaches for resolving complex disputes. 
 Expand the three attitude types (i.e., positive, neutral, negative) to include 
the wider range of attitude types that lie within the types defined for this 
research.   
 Investigate the influence of other psychological factors (e.g., fear, hate, 
and anger) on the outcomes of construction negotiations.   
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 Consider the situation at the tactical level of negotiation in which all 
decision makers intend to negotiate all conflicting issues simultaneously. 
 Study the interrelationships of the proposed attitude-based solution 
concepts such as RNASH, RSMR, RGMR, and RSEQ. 
 Expand the design of the negotiation decision support system to consider 
each DM’s disagreement point with respect to each negotiation issue. 
 Create an Internet (web-based) application from the current system to 
enable multiple users to use and benefit from the system simultaneously. 
 Study the characteristics of negotiation and negotiators in other industries 
and implement the developed negotiation model for resolving disputes in 
other areas such as manufacturing, information technology, and 
environmental management. 
 
The results of conducting more comprehensive stability analyses would 
undoubtedly lead to significant insight into the brownfield case studies and also 
provide an enhanced methodology for incorporating the attitudes of the decision 
makers into an interactive decision-making process.  
 
It is believed that the model developed in this research will make the decision 
process clear, transparent, and easy to track for all decision makers. In addition, 
the decision makers involved in complex negotiations will be provided with more 
sustainable solutions to their disputes. These advantages will likely help 
construction participants make better decisions about resolving complex 
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disputes. Uninformed or faulty decision making can thus be significantly reduced, 
thereby saving significant amounts of costs and resources, minimizing delays, 
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Computer Program for Removing  
Infeasible Attitude Cases 
 
 
It should be noted that the results of the following programming codes, written in  
 
java, are summarized in Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, presented in Chapter 5.  
 
******************************************************************************************* 
// Computer Program for Generating Various Attitude Cases and 




public class AttitudeGenerator1  
{   //instance variables 
    private int numOfDemakers;  
 private int numofAttudes; 
 private int[][] attitudeArray; 
 private int arrayDimention;    
   public AttitudeGenerator1(int howManyDm, int howManyAtts)//Constructor 
     { 
       numOfDemakers=howManyDm; 
       numofAttudes=howManyAtts; 
       arrayDimention=((int)Math.pow(howManyAtts, howManyDm*howManyDm)); 
       attitudeArray= new int[arrayDimention][howManyDm*howManyDm+1];  
       int [] attitudeType= new int [3]; 
    attitudeType[0]=+1;  //positive attitude 
    attitudeType[1]= 0;  //neutral attitude 
    attitudeType[2]=-1;  //negative attitude 
    int index=-1; 
       int count=1; 
       for (int ii=0; ii<numOfDemakers*numOfDemakers; ii++)  //initialize 
attitudeArray   
       {    
         count=numofAttudes*count; 
         int position=arrayDimention/count; 
         for (int i=0; i<arrayDimention; i++) 
         { 
          if (i % position ==0) 
            { 
           index++;   
            } 
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          attitudeArray[i][ii]=attitudeType[index]; 
          if ((index+1)==3 && ((i+1)%position==0) ) 
            { 
           index=-1; 
            } 
         } 
       } 
     } 
  public void printAttitudeArray( int perLinePrint)// print attitudeArray in a text file 
named attitude.txt 
  { 
     
    PrintWriter outputStream =null; 
     try 
        { 
          outputStream = new PrintWriter(new 
FileOutputStream("attitude.txt")); 
        } 
     catch(FileNotFoundException e) 
        { 
          System.out.println("Error opening the file attitude.txt."); 
          System.exit(0); 
        } 
    int rpt=this.arrayDimention/perLinePrint; 
    for (int iii=0; iii<rpt; iii++) 
      {  
       int ctr=0; 
        for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
          { 
            int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers;  
              for (int j=iii*perLinePrint; j<iii*perLinePrint+perLinePrint; j++)  
              { 
                ctr=temp;   
             for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
               { 
               outputStream.print(this.attitudeArray[j][ctr]); 
               int repeat=CalSpace(this.attitudeArray[j][ctr], 3); 
                  for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                   { 
                    outputStream.print(" "); 
                   } 
                  ctr++; 
                 if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
                   { 
                    outputStream.print("|"); 
                   }  
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              }   
              } 
             outputStream.println(); 
     
           } 
     for (int i=0; i<(this.numOfDemakers*3+1)*perLinePrint; i++) 
       { 
       outputStream.print("-");  
       } 
     outputStream.println(); 
   } 
   int ctr=0; 
      for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
         { 
            int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers; 
              for (int j=rpt*perLinePrint; j<this.arrayDimention; j++)  
              { 
                ctr=temp;   
             for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
                { 
                outputStream.print(this.attitudeArray[j][ctr]); 
                int repeat=CalSpace(this.attitudeArray[j][ctr], 3); 
                   for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                     { 
                        outputStream.print(" "); 
                     } 
                   ctr++; 
                   if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
                     { 
                     outputStream.print("|"); 
                     }  
               }   
              } 
           outputStream.println();  
       } 
   outputStream.close();   
  } 
  public void printInLine() //print attitudeArray in a line-base in a text file named 
attitudePrintedInLine.txt  
  { 
   PrintWriter outputStream =null;; 
     try 
        { 
          outputStream = new PrintWriter(new 
FileOutputStream("attitudePrintedInLine.txt")); 
        } 
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     catch(FileNotFoundException e) 
        { 
          System.out.println("Error opening the file attitudePrintedInLine.txt."); 
          System.exit(0); 
        } 
     for (int i=0; i<this.arrayDimention;i++) 
       { 
       for (int j=0; j<(numOfDemakers*numOfDemakers); j++) 
         { 
       if (j % numOfDemakers==0 && j!=0 ) 
        { 
        outputStream.print(" | ");  
        } 
       int  rpt=CalSpace(attitudeArray[i][j],3); 
        for (int ii=0; ii<rpt; ii++) 
       { 
         outputStream.print(" "); 
       } 
     outputStream.print(attitudeArray[i][j]);   
         } 
    outputStream.println(); 
   } 
  outputStream.close(); 
  } 
  private static int CalSpace(int var, int base)//number of spaces needed to be left 
while printing 
  { 
    int space=base-Integer.toString(var).length(); 
    return space;  
  } 
  public void CalculationOfInfeasibilities() // recording infeasible cases in a text file 
named infeasibles.txt 
  { 
   PrintWriter outputStream =null; 
    try 
        { 
          outputStream = new PrintWriter(new 
FileOutputStream("infeasibles.txt")); 
        } 
    catch(FileNotFoundException e) 
        { 
          System.out.println("Error opening the file infeasibles.txt."); 
          System.exit(0); 
        }    
     int [] position=new int [this.numOfDemakers]; 
     int pos=0; 
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     for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers; i++) 
      { 
      position[i]=pos; 
      pos=pos+this.numOfDemakers+1; 
      } 
      int counter12=0; 
      int counter13=0; 
      int counter23=0; 
      int counter123=0; 
      int counter1=0; 
      int counter2=0; 
      int counter3=0; 
      int Counter1=0; 
      int Counter2=0; 
      int Counter12=0; 
    int [][] temp1=new int [this.arrayDimention/this.numofAttudes][4]; 
     int [][] temp2=new int [this.arrayDimention/this.numofAttudes][4]; 
     int [][] temp3=new int [this.arrayDimention/this.numofAttudes][4]; 
   for (int i=0; i<this.arrayDimention; i++) 
   { 
     if (this.numOfDemakers==2) 
     { 
      if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]!=-1 ) 
       { 
       for (int ii=0; ii<4;ii++) 
       { 
      temp1[Counter1][ii]=this.attitudeArray[i][ii];  
       } 
       Counter1++;   
       }   
      if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]!=-1 ) 
       { 
      for (int ii=0; ii<4;ii++) 
      { 
     temp2[Counter2][ii]=this.attitudeArray[i][ii];  
      } 
     Counter2++; 
       }  
      if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 ) 
       { 
     for (  int ii=0; ii<4; ii++) 
     { 
    temp3[Counter12][ii]=this.attitudeArray[i][ii];  
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     } 
       Counter12++; 
       }   
        
     } 
    if (this.numOfDemakers==3) 
   { 
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]!=-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]!=-1 )  
     { 
      counter1++; 
     }  
     if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]!=-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]!=-1 ) 
     { 
      counter2++; 
     }  
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]!=-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]!=-1 ) 
     { 
      counter3++; 
     }  
     
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]!=-1 ) 
     { 
      counter12++;  
     }   
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]==-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]!=-1 ) 
     { 
      counter13++; 
     }  
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]==-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]!=-1 ) 
     { 
      counter23++; 
     } 
    if (this.attitudeArray[i][position[0]]==-1 && 
this.attitudeArray[i][position[1]]==-1 && this.attitudeArray[i][position[2]]==-1 ) 
     { 
      counter123++; 
     }  
   } 
  } 
   if (this.numOfDemakers==2) 
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   { 
   outputStream.println("DM1 negative and DM2 only neural and positive ==> 
"+Counter1+" Infeasible Cases  "); 
   int perLinePrint=10; 
   int rpt=Counter1/perLinePrint; 
    for (int iii=0; iii<rpt; iii++) 
     {  
       int ctr=0; 
         for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
           { 
             int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers;  
               for (int j=iii*perLinePrint; j<iii*perLinePrint+perLinePrint; j++)  
                  { 
                    ctr=temp;   
                   for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
                     { 
                     outputStream.print(temp1[j][ctr]); 
                     int repeat=CalSpace(temp1[j][ctr], 3); 
                       for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                        { 
                        outputStream.print(" "); 
                        } 
                       ctr++; 
                       if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
                        { 
                         outputStream.print("|"); 
                         }  
                      }   
                 } 
        outputStream.println();   
          } 
        for (int i=0; i<(this.numOfDemakers*3+1)*perLinePrint; i++) 
         { 
            outputStream.print("-");  
         } 
        outputStream.println(); 
   } 
    int ctr=0; 
    for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
     { 
       int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers; 
         for (int j=rpt*perLinePrint; j<Counter1; j++)  
           { 
             ctr=temp;   
            for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
              { 
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             outputStream.print(temp1[j][ctr]); 
             int repeat=CalSpace(temp1[j][ctr], 3); 
                for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                  { 
                  outputStream.print(" "); 
                  } 
             ctr++; 
             if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
               { 
              outputStream.print("|"); 
               }  
             }   
          } 
   outputStream.println();   
   } 
   outputStream.println(); 
   outputStream.println("DM2 negative and DM1 only neural and positive ==> 
"+Counter2+"  Infeasible Cases  "); 
    int rpt1=Counter1/perLinePrint; 
    for (int iii=0; iii<rpt1; iii++) 
      {  
        int ctr1=0; 
         for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
           { 
            int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers;  
              for (int j=iii*perLinePrint; j<iii*perLinePrint+perLinePrint; j++)  
                 { 
                   ctr1=temp;   
                for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
                  { 
                  outputStream.print(temp2[j][ctr1]); 
                  int repeat=CalSpace(temp2[j][ctr1], 3); 
                  for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                   { 
                  outputStream.print(" "); 
                   } 
                  ctr1++; 
                 if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
                   { 
                   outputStream.print("|"); 
                   }  
                  }   
                 } 
       outputStream.println();  
       } 
     for (int i=0; i<(this.numOfDemakers*3+1)*perLinePrint; i++) 
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      { 
        outputStream.print("-");  
      } 
       outputStream.println(); 
   } 
    int ctr2=0; 
    for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
     { 
       int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers; 
       for (int j=rpt*perLinePrint; j<Counter2; j++)  
         { 
          ctr2=temp;   
         for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
            { 
           outputStream.print(temp2[j][ctr2]); 
           int repeat=CalSpace(temp2[j][ctr2], 3); 
           for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
             { 
             outputStream.print(" "); 
             } 
        ctr2++; 
           if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
             { 
             outputStream.print("|"); 
             }  
            }   
        } 
     outputStream.println(); 
   } 
   outputStream.println(); 
   outputStream.println("DM1 and DM2 simultaneously negative ==> 
"+Counter12+" Infeasible Cases  "); 
   int rpt3=Counter12/perLinePrint; 
   for (int iii=0; iii<rpt3; iii++) 
     {  
       int ctr3=0; 
         for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
           { 
             int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers;  
             for (int j=iii*perLinePrint; j<iii*perLinePrint+perLinePrint; j++)  
                 { 
                   ctr3=temp;   
                 for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
                   { 
                   outputStream.print(temp3[j][ctr3]); 
                   int repeat=CalSpace(temp3[j][ctr3], 3); 
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                       for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                       { 
                        outputStream.print(" "); 
                       } 
                  ctr3++; 
                      if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
                        { 
                         outputStream.print("|"); 
                        }  
                    }   
                 } 
     outputStream.println();   
    } 
     for (int i=0; i<(this.numOfDemakers*3+1)*perLinePrint; i++) 
       { 
         outputStream.print("-");  
       } 
     outputStream.println(); 
   } 
    int ctr4=0; 
    for (int i=0; i<this.numOfDemakers;i++) 
       { 
         int temp=i*this.numOfDemakers; 
           for (int j=rpt3*perLinePrint; j<Counter12; j++)  
             { 
                ctr4=temp;   
             for (int ii=0; ii<this.numOfDemakers;ii++)  
                { 
               outputStream.print(temp3[j][ctr4]); 
            int repeat=CalSpace(temp3[j][ctr4], 3); 
              for (int k=0; k<repeat; k++) 
                { 
                 outputStream.print(" "); 
                } 
              ctr4++; 
              if ((ii+1) % this.numOfDemakers ==0 ) 
              { 
              outputStream.print("|"); 
              }  
              }   
            } 
   outputStream.println(); 
   } 
   outputStream.close(); 
  } 
   if (this.numOfDemakers==3) 
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    { 
    outputStream.println("DM1 negative, DM2 and DM3 only neutral and 
positive=> infeasible cases: "+"   "+counter1); 
    outputStream.println("DM2 negative, DM1 and DM3 only neutral and 
positive=> infeasible cases: "+"   "+counter2); 
    outputStream.println("DM3 negative, DM1 and DM2 only neutral and 
positive=> infeasible cases: "+"   "+counter3); 
    outputStream.println("DM1 and DM2 simoulateously negative, DM3 only 
neutarl and positive=> infeasible cases:  "+"   "+counter12); 
    outputStream.println("DM1 1 and DM3 simoulateously negativ, DM2 only 
neutarl and positive=> infeasible cases: "+"   "+counter13); 
  
    outputStream.println("DM2 and DM3 simoulateously negative, DM1 only 
neutarl and positive=> infeasible cases:    "+"   "+counter23); 
    outputStream.println("DM1, DM2, and DM3 simoulateously negative=> 
infeasible cases:    "+"   "+counter123); 
    outputStream.print("Total number of infeasible attitude case for three 
DMs negotioations: "); 
    int 
sumOfInfeasibilities=Counter12+counter12+counter13+counter23+counter123+c
ounter1+counter2+counter3; 
    outputStream.println(sumOfInfeasibilities); 
    outputStream.println("Total feasible cases = Total cases - Total 
infeasible cases ==> "+(this.arrayDimention-sumOfInfeasibilities)); 
       outputStream.close(); 
    }  
   } 
  public static void main(String[] args) 
   {   
     Scanner myScanner = new Scanner(System.in); 
     System.out.println("Enter the number of decision makers:"); 
     int numOfDms=myScanner.nextInt(); 
     System.out.println(" Enter the number of attudes that they can have:"); 
     int numOfAttus=myScanner.nextInt(); 
     AttitudeGenerator1  app = new AttitudeGenerator1(numOfDms, 
numOfAttus); 
     app.printAttitudeArray(10);// 10 attitude case display  
     app.CalculationOfInfeasibilities();// obtain the number of infeasible 
attitude case  
     app.printInLine(); 







Numerical Results for 3-DM Negotiation: 
  
DM1 negative, DM2 & DM3 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   2916 
 
DM2 negative, DM1 & DM3 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   2916 
 
DM3 negative, DM1 & DM2 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   2916 
 
DM1 & DM2 negative, DM3 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   1458 
 
DM1 & DM3 negative, DM2 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   1458 
 
DM2 & DM3 negative, DM1 only neutral & positive => infeasible cases:   1458 
 
DM1, DM2, & DM3 simultaneously negative           => infeasible cases:    729 
 
Total number of infeasible attitude cases:             13851 
 




Numerical Results for 2-DM Negotiation 
 
DM1 negative & DM2 only neutral and positive attitudes==>Infeasible Cases: 18   
-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 0  |-1 0  |-1 0  |-1 0  | 
1  1  |1  0  |0  1  |0  0  |-1 1  |-1 0  |1  1  |1  0  |0  1  |0  0  | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-1 0  |-1 0  |-1 -1 |-1 -1 |-1 -1 |-1 -1 |-1 -1 |-1 -1 | 
-1 1  |-1 0  |1  1  |1  0  |0  1  |0  0  |-1 1  |-1 0  | 
 
DM2 negative & DM1 only neural and positive attitudes ==> Infeasible Cases: 18   
1  1  |1  1  |1  1  |1  0  |1  0  |1  0  |1  -1 |1  -1 |1  -1 |0  1  | 
1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
0  1  |0  1  |0  0  |0  0  |0  0  |0  -1 |0  -1 |0  -1 | 
0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 | 
 
DM1 & DM2 simultaneously negative attitude =========> Infeasible Cases: 9 
-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 1  |-1 0  |-1 0  |-1 0  |-1 -1 |-1 -1 |-1 -1 | 
1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 |1  -1 |0  -1 |-1 -1 | 
 
Total number of infeasible attitude cases:        45 
 
******************************************************************************************** 
